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ABSTRACT 
 
 
When Will States Talk? Predicting the Initiation of Conflict Management in Interstate 
Crises. (August 2006) 
Belinda Lesley Bragg, B.A., University of Melbourne 
 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Charles Hermann  
Dr. Nehemia Geva 
 
 
 
This research addresses the question of why some crises between states are resolved 
through negotiated agreements while others result in continued conflict or escalate to war. 
The model deviates from previous approaches to the study of conflict management in four 
key ways: 1) management is treated as a conflict strategy rather than an outcome; 2) costs, 
rather than calculation of the relative benefits of conflict over management, motivate the 
initiation of conflict management; 3) the conceptualization of costs is broadened to 
incorporate subjective factors; and 4) issue salience is proposed to determine the threshold 
at which an actor’s preference for conflict over management changes.  
The central question this conceptualization raises, therefore, is what factors 
influence actors’ strategy choices during a crisis. The theory proposes that, when it comes to 
the initiation of conflict management, it is costs that dominate the decision process. Or as 
Jackman (1993) so succinctly puts it; “for those confronted with a very restricted range of 
available alternatives extending from horrendous to merely awful, minimizing pain is the 
same as maximizing utility”.  
Both experimental and statistical methodologies are used to test the hypotheses 
derived from the theory. Original experimental data were collected from experiments run 
  
iv 
on undergraduate students at Texas A&M University. For the statistical analysis a data set of 
interstate crises and negotiation behavior was compiled using data from the SHERFACS 
and International Crisis Behavior data sets and data collected specifically for this research.  This 
multi-method approach was chosen because of the nature of the questions being examined 
and in order to minimize the limitations of the individual methodologies. The experimental 
tests demonstrate that the expectations of the model are supported in the controlled 
environment of the experiment. The results from the empirical analysis were, within the 
restrictions of the data, consistent with both theoretical expectations and the experimental 
results. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This research addresses the question of why some crises1 between states are 
resolved through negotiated agreements while others result in continued conflict or escalate 
to war. It draws on war termination literature to develop a decision making model that 
explains when and why actors involved in international crises attempt crisis management2. 
The war termination literature has a strong empirical and formal grounding, but tends to 
treat conflict as a function of systemic or structural characteristics of the international 
system and negotiation as an outcome, separate from the process of the conflict itself.  
The model developed here introduces two key factors. First, it conceptualizes 
negotiation as a strategy, rather than an outcome. It proposes that, in a crisis situation, an 
actor has two strategy choices available; conflictual action or management (negotiation). By 
structuring the crisis environment in this manner, it becomes possible to examine the 
process of crisis management as part of the crisis itself.  
Second, it conceptualizes crises as issue-based, rather than solely the result of 
structural characteristic of the international system. Actors are considered to have a general 
notion of the value they place on the issue in dispute. This value is considered to be a 
function of the salience, or importance, of the issue to the actor. Actors experience concrete 
                                                 
 This dissertation follows the style of the American Political Science Review. 
1 For the purpose of this research, I conceptualize crises according to Snyder and Diesing’s definition: “a 
sequence of interactions between the governments of two or more sovereign states in severe conflict, short 
of war, but involving the perception of a dangerously high probability of war” (1977: 6).  
2 Crisis management is defined as the attempt to peacefully manage and resolve disputes either bilaterally or 
with the aid of an outside or third party. The primary purpose of conflict management, therefore, is “…to 
arrest the expansion and escalation of conflicts and create a structure or conditions under which it would be 
conducive to realizing beneficial consequences” (Bercovitch, 2000: 3).  
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costs associated with fighting; loss of life, materiel, and economic factors as well as less 
tangible negative effects, such as loss of public support or international reputation. The 
issue at stake – salience - affects actors’ conflict behavior through their evaluation and 
perception of the costs resulting from conflict. The loss of one hundred lives for an issue of 
great salience will be judged as more acceptable than the loss of the same lives for an issue 
of minor importance (Bragg and Geva 2005). The model proposes that the costs of conflict 
are translated by the decision maker through the conflict context (issue salience), 
representing the pain an actor experiences from pursuing a conflictual strategy. 
This research incorporates these two factors to explain the point in a crisis at which 
an actor will decide to move from a conflictual to a management strategy. As the move to 
negotiation, or crisis management of any type, requires the willingness of both parties, the 
question must be further broken down: 
1. In a crisis situation, when will an actor offer conflict management, and which 
actor will be the first to instigate negotiation? 
2. In a crisis situation, when will an actor accept an offer of conflict management? 
 
The model developed to explain why, and therefore when, actors will offer or 
accept conflict management incorporates four central explanatory variables; relative power, 
issue salience, costs and sensitivity to those costs3. The concept of pain in introduced to 
capture the impact of costs on an actor, represented by the combination of costs and 
sensitivity. Issue salience is theorized to determine the actor’s pain threshold for a specific 
crisis. Once that threshold is reached, the actor’s preference for a conflictual strategy over 
management changes. How soon the threshold is reached, the rate of pain accumulation, is 
determined by the relative power of the actor, the intensity of the conflict and their 
                                                 
3 Sensitivity is conceptualized as a function of domestic regime characteristics and international support. 
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sensitivity to those costs (regime characteristics). The final factor which is theorized to 
affect the actor’s strategy choice is the receipt of an offer from their opponent.  
 
Why Move to an Issue –Based Approach? 
A model which stresses the importance of issue in determining and understanding 
the actions of crisis actors alters the role that power plays in our understanding of conflict 
behavior. It is the importance of the issue, or issues, under dispute which are theorized to 
determine willingness of actors to pursue a conflictual strategy and the pain the cost of that 
choice create. Rather than relative power explaining the choices of actors involved in 
international crises, power indicates the ability of an actor to achieve his/her goals.  
 
Changing the Explanatory Role of Relative Power 
Most existing empirical research on war termination searches for empirical patterns 
between objective measures such as casualty rates, duration and balance of force to explain 
war and conflict termination4. In this model, relative power remains as an explanatory 
variable, acknowledging the reality that a state’s ability to achieve a goal through fighting will 
inevitably be conditioned by the relative balance of forces between them and their 
opponent. Furthermore, relative power can also provide an important indication of the 
probably timing of offers to enter or accept negotiation.  
I also argue, however, that a decision maker’s “pain threshold” is a function of the 
salience placed on the issue / issues in dispute. The speed with which they reach that 
                                                 
4 Kecskemeti (1958); Iklé (1971); Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman (1990); Ostrom & Job (1986); Lalman (1988); 
Werner (1998); Bennett & Stam (1996).  
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threshold and experience that pain however, is largely determined by the balance of forces. 
The greater a state’s military advantage, the more likely they are to experience lower levels 
of casualties and losses. The greater an opponent’s advantage, the more likely a state is to 
experience high costs over a shorter period of time.  
Conceptualizing relative power in this way significantly changes its role in explaining 
conflict behavior. Power is no longer the key variable to explain states’ behavior and 
choices. Instead, its function is to predict the speed at which a state incurs or anticipates 
incurring costs and, therefore, the speed at which they reach their pain threshold.  Power 
does not determine the choices of states in and of itself. Rather, it conditions the degree to 
which actors can achieve their goals conflictually. As such, it provides a crucial indicator of 
the timing of an actor’s change in preference for fighting over talking.    
 
Why Introduce the Concept of Pain? 
Costs are a basic construct in the formulations of rational choice and expected 
utility. They capture the disutility of the outcome of a given alternative and, in conjunction 
with the utility of that alternative, affect the preferences that underlie choice. In the context 
of international conflicts, costs are usually related to tangible consequences: casualties, direct 
material losses as well as economic downfalls. It is increasingly accepted, however, that 
there are also domestic political ramifications to the use of force (see for example: Ostrom 
and Job 1986; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1990). The legitimacy and political capacity 
of regimes of all types is negatively impacted by the human costs of war (Bennett and Stam 
1996; Jackman 1993). Furthermore, the ability of leaders to retain power decreases when 
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they suffer military defeats or their use of force is seen to be unsuccessful (Bueno de 
Mesquita and Siverson 1995).  
Since cost is such a multi-faceted construct, the attempt to link it to the choice 
process implies the need to identify the dynamics by which individual cost elements are 
“integrated” into the total cost. The epistemic implication of that integration is the 
formation of a hypothetical construct to capture this composite variable. Moreover, the 
shift from the seemingly “objective” variables to a hypothetical construct supports a 
corresponding transition to a more phenomenological orientation (Singer 1969). In such an 
approach, what are presumed to influence a decision maker’s choice calculation are the 
perceived or experienced costs – the pain -  rather than “objective” costs.  
The shift towards the phenomenological orientation implies that the same cost may 
create a different disutility, depending on the decision context5. The concept of “pain” is 
used to capture this transition from the relatively tangible and objective elements of costs, 
familiar from existing conflict research, to the more perceptual and experiential construct 
theorized to affect decision makers’ choices in a conflict.  It also makes it possible to 
incorporate the subjective, context dependent elements of cost acknowledged but not 
quantified in existing rational choice models of conflict. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 For example, Egyptian President Sadat’s statement, (in a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Begin prior to 
the Yom Kippur war), that he was “prepared to sacrifice a million Egyptian soldiers in return for the last 
grain of the holy earth of Sinai” (http://www.zionet.co.il/manhigut/en/view_article.php3?article_id=85) is 
not a statement that would be easily stomached in western democracies.   
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Testing the Model 
Both experimental and statistical methodologies will be used to test the hypotheses 
derived from the theoretical model. This multi-method approach was chosen because of the 
nature of the questions being examined and in order to minimize the limitations of the 
individual methodologies. The hypotheses being tested are process-oriented and, as such, 
are very well-suited to an experimental design. In particular, experiments allow the 
researcher a great deal of control over the way in which variables are defined and 
operationalized, and the context in which they are presented. A statistical, large-n analysis, 
on the other hand, provides a more direct test of the applicability of the theory to the “real 
world”. Particularly when it comes to the measurement of issue salience, however, data on 
actual crises has limitations and the same closeness between theory and operationalization is 
not possible. By using both methods, therefore, the theory is tested both more directly and 
more realistically6.  
Before moving to a discussion of how the theoretical model will be tested, the 
question of the ability of experimental methodology to examine questions such as those 
raised in this model must be addressed. The internal validity of experimentation as a means 
of testing hypotheses can be directly tested7, and is accepted by international relations 
scholars and political scientists more generally (Kinder and Palfrey 1993).  
It should also be noted that, much like formal models, experiments are designed 
primarily to test hypotheses deduced from a given theory and model. Additionally, 
                                                 
6 It should bee noted that in both the experimental and empirical models issue salience is assumed to be 
symmetric between actors. The reasons for this restriction are discussed in greater detail in the relevant 
chapters. 
7 See discussion of the results of the manipulation checks of salience and information reported in this results 
section. 
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experiments can also be employed to explore the consequences of controlled counterfactual 
scenarios that are derived from more loosely defined theories. Again, as with formal 
modeling, this gives us potential insight into what may happen, but did not as yet actually 
happen, in the real world (Mook 1983). In cases where the experiment is an appropriate 
representation and thus test of the theory, the findings merely support the logic of the 
theory. “What we seek to generalize is not the findings but the theory” (Geva and Skorick 
2001).  
Chapter I will provide a conceptual introduction to the questions addressed in this 
research and their importance to the study of interstate crises, in particular their resolution 
through crisis management techniques. The rationale for moving to an issue-based 
approach to the study of conflict management initiation will be discussed, and its 
implications for the role and treatment of relative power. Finally, the concept of “pain”, as 
conceptualized in this research will be introduced, focusing on the advantages provided by 
moving from purely static and tangible measures of costs, particularly in light of the 
centrality of contextual factors to the model presented.  
 Chapter II will review the state of the literature in several pertinent areas. As the 
conflict literature is vast, it is not the intention of this chapter to provide a comprehensive 
review of all aspects of the literature. Rather, the review is structured around the dependent 
and independent variables used in the theoretical model and the move toward 
operationalization of these concepts in both the experimental and empirical chapters. 
Traditional and quantitative conflict literature provides a clear starting point for an 
examination of the effects of relative power and objective costs, (in particular economic and 
casualties), on actor behavior and strategy choices during conflicts. The theory’s 
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concentration on the effect of context, in this case the issue at stake, and individual actors’ 
sensitivity, both domestically and internationally to the costs of conflictual action, brings the 
research more in line with phenomenological and decision-based approaches to the study of 
conflict. These, in turn provide a linkage in to the conflict management literature, which 
places emphasis on issues and interests as key to generating resolution, and, consistent with 
the wide use of case studies, incorporates individual decision maker characteristics into its 
explanation of negotiated outcomes. 
In Chapter III the theoretical model will be introduced and the relationship between 
the various independent variables and the model mechanisms discussed. Hypotheses 
concerning the choices actors make in particular circumstances and the effect of variables 
such as relative power and issue salience will also be introduced and discussed in this 
chapter. There will then be a discussion of how the theoretical model will be tested. An 
overview of he experimental and empirical models will be provided, with an emphasis on 
explaining how each individual model interrelates and reinforces the other. The aim of this 
multi-method testing approach is to provide the most comprehensive and appropriate test 
for the theoretical propositions presented. 
Chapters IV, V, and VI develop the three related experiments designed to provide a 
controlled test of the hypotheses generated in the theoretical model. All three experiments 
are interconnected and the results of the first will be cross validated by replication in the 
second and third. The results of the three experiments and their implications for the theory 
will be discussed in each chapter.  
Chapter VII will test the same hypotheses statistically, including the hypothesis 
regarding the effects of relative power. Data limitations, discussed in the chapter, prevent 
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comprehensive empirical testing of all hypotheses. The empirical models presented and 
tested are, therefore designed to fulfill two main purposes. First, wherever possible to 
replicate with “real world” data the hypotheses tested in the earlier experimental chapters. 
Second, to explore the extent to which questions such as those raised by this research can 
be addressed with the extant data, and what additional data collection and conceptualization 
needs to be done to improve our ability to study the move from conflict to conflict 
management empirically.   
Finally Chapter VIII will summarize how the model and findings contribute to the 
literature on conflict termination and our understanding of the conflict management 
process more generally. Particular attention will be paid to the advantages of combining 
these different literatures and moving away from a purely systemic focus to one which 
accounts for context-specific factors.  
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
In 1973 Blainey noted “For every thousand pages published on the causes of war, 
there is less than one page directly on the causes of peace. And yet the causes of war and 
peace, logically, should dovetail into one another” (1973: 3) As Vasquez’s recent edited 
volume (2000) indicates, almost thirty years later we still know much more about the causes 
of war and its escalation, than we do about the mechanisms by which its conflictual 
processes can be managed to achieve negotiated resolution.  Yet if, as Blainey argues, the 
causes of war and peace are so closely connected, why is the conflict literature so 
disproportionately devoted to explaining the initiation and escalation of conflicts?  
It is my contention that conflict management is relatively neglected in the conflict 
literature because it is most often seen as and end in itself, rather than an continuation of 
the conflict by different means.  We know that wars and militarized disputes are nearly 
always preceded by crises. We also know that militarized disputes, once started, progress 
through different phases or stages, most often defined by the level and extent of violence 
and costs they involve. In this sense, use of force can be thought of as a strategy, the 
intensity of which varies over time. Conflict management, if considered as part of the 
conflict process, becomes an alternative strategy for achieving resolution of the conflict. 
This view is similar to Blainey’s conclusion that “…the outbreak of war and the outbreak of 
peace are essentially decisions to implement aims by new means” (1973).  
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Crises and Conflict 
Traditional conflict literature has focused on system level factors to explain the 
behavior of states in the international system. More recently, however, increasing attention 
has been played to the role of state characteristics. Decision making perspectives have long 
emphasized the importance of considering policy makers perceptions in understanding 
responses to international events and pressures. These contending perspectives are evident 
in how the notion of a crisis is defined in these various branches of the conflict literature. 
The clearest distinction is between the systemic perspective, which considers crises 
as situations that have significant implications for the stability of interaction within the 
international system as a whole or a subsystem (Young 1968), and the decision making 
perspective that define crises in terms of national policy makers’ responses to such systemic 
situations (see for example; (Allison 1971; Kennedy 1971). Hermann synthesizes elements 
of both these conceptualizations to arrive at a three-part definition of a crisis as a situation 
that “(1) threatens high-priority goals of the decision-making unit (2) restricts the amount of 
time available for response before the decision is transformed, and (3) surprises the 
members of the decision-making unit by its occurrence” (Hermann 1972:13). The idea that 
a full understanding of the dynamics of a crisis situation can only be gained by 
incorporating both levels of analysis has become a common features of the conflict 
literature (see for example: (Holsti 1972; McClelland 1972; Robinson 1972).  
This definition of a crisis is, however, relatively content-free. It does not specify the 
level at which the event takes place; the national, regional or international, nor does it 
specify the area of activity effected. The research presented here is focused on a subset of 
crises, defined by Brecher (1993) as military-security crises, they key indicators of which are 
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“threat to basic values, action demonstrating resolve, and overt hostility” (1993: 2). 
Although characterized as a military-security crisis, due to the implications for the actors 
involved, the triggering event for such as crisis does not necessarily have to be violent in 
nature, rather it must be perceived as a threat. Neither does the threat have to originate 
from an outside source, “[a]n international crisis can also be initiated by an internal 
challenge to a regime…” (Brecher 1993: 3).  
Following from Hermann’s definition of crisis is his observation that “[t]he 
characterization of crisis from the systemic approach suggests the relationship of the 
concept to such terms as change and conflict” (1972). Rubin et. al. define conflict as a 
“…perceived divergence of interest, or a belief that the parties’ current aspirations cannot 
be achieved simultaneously” (1994: 5). According to this definition conflict is inherently 
strategic in nature, as each actor sees his/her ability to achieve a particular goal as both 
connected to and incompatible with the goals of his/her opponent. Wallensteen further 
refines this conceptualization of conflict by noting that conflict “…contains a severe 
disagreement between at least two sides, where their demands cannot be met by the same 
resources at the same time” (2002: 15).   
So two elements appear to be necessary to the presence of conflict; there must be 
incompatibility between two or more actors and there must be some form of scarcity. But 
conflicts do not always provoke crises, so what it the relation between the two? 
Wallensteen’s (2002: 15) distinction between latent and manifest conflict may offer some 
insight into the connection. If incompatibilities are recognized, but there is no action that 
can be taken to alter the situation, then conflict will, according to Wallensteen, remain 
latent. However, if action is possible, the conflict will become manifest. Returning to 
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Hermann’s (1972) definition of crisis, which implies both the need and opportunity for 
action on the part of the decision maker, then it would seem that crises may be regarded as 
a subset of conflict situations in which action is both possible and indeed inevitable.  
 
Managing and Resolving Crises 
The Role of Issue 
This discussion of crises and conflict raises an interesting observation. Inherent in 
the definition of both phenomena is the centrality of issue. That is, the existence between 
two or more parties of incompatible positions on an issue or issues of importance between 
two or more parties. Yet the conflict literature for the most part ignores the role of issues in 
explaining conflict behavior and crisis choices. Rather, it remains at the system level, only 
one of the levels identified by Hermann, Brecher and others as necessary for understanding 
and identifying crises. So, it would seem that even at the definitional level there is support 
and rationale for developing a model of crisis behavior which incorporates the effects of 
issue salience.  
Conflict management is the black hole of the conflict literature. Conflicts are 
examined from their origins as disputes, through their escalation and to their termination. 
Termination however, is, considered more often than not simply an outcome, describing 
the extent to which each actor achieved their aims. That is, capitulation, victory, negotiation, 
or stalemate. The implication of these outcomes as processes in themselves is seldom given 
much attention.  
Wallensteen (2002) sees the explanatory power of bargaining approaches in conflict 
resolution as limited. Specifically, he argues that, due to the lack of structure and 
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enforceable rules in the international arena, actors in a dispute are less constrained than they 
are in domestic conflicts such as labor disputes. As he puts it “…conflict resolution takes 
on an entirely different dimension when parties have been trying to kill each other” (2002: 
3). War, according to Wallensteen, is a quantitatively different type of conflict, the stakes are 
higher, and the incompatibilities more fundamental to the groups involved and, unlike 
economic conflicts and bargaining situations, the issues are rarely fungible.  
Expected utility theory, one branch of the conflict literature, does move away from 
strict adherence to the centrality of power as a determinant of conflict behavior. As work by 
Bueno de Mesquita and others (Bueno de Mesquita 1982; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 
1990; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999) demonstrates, “rational actors can choose to wage war 
even when their subjective (or real) prospects of victory are very small if they care enough 
about the issues in question” (1988: 638-9). So there is precedent for an issue-based 
approach to the question of conflict management. 
As discussed earlier, one of the less usual, aspects of this research is that it falls in 
the fault line between two major bodies of literature which do not talk well with each other. 
In particular, the conflict literature has much more to say about what causes war and 
conflict than it does about the conditions for its end. However, as Wittman points out; 
[b]ecause there is a great deal of symmetry between how a war ends, and how a war 
begins…the theoretical structure can be applied equally well to investigating the initiation of 
war” (1979: 44)   
Relative Power 
 Realism and its more recent version, neorealism, remain the dominant perspective in 
international relations and conflict studies in particular. This dominance is reflected not only 
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in the development of theories of war and conflict, but has also influenced the manner in 
which large-scale data projects (such as COW and MID) have been constructed. This, in 
turn, has arguably conditioned the ability of scholars to test theories of conflict which 
deviate from the expectations and assumptions of this theoretical paradigm (Diehl 1992). 
Any discussion of the role that relative power plays in existing theories and studies of 
conflict behavior must, therefore take into account these antecedents. 
There can be no getting around the fact that a state’s ability to achieve its goals 
through military action will inevitably be conditioned by its power, relative to its opponents. 
Or, as Blainey puts it: 
One conclusion seems clear. It is dangerous to accept any explanation of 
war which concentrates on ambitions and ignores the means of carrying out 
those ambitions. A government’s aims are strongly influenced by its 
assessment of whether it has sufficient strength to achieve those aims. 
Indeed the two factors interact quietly and swiftly. (1973: 151) 
 
However, as the United States and other powers have experienced throughout 
history, it is not always the most advanced, strongest and well-trained forces that ultimately 
triumph in militarized disputes and wars. Relative power may determine the speed with 
which an actor accumulates costs in a conflict, but, short of total annihilation, it cannot 
predict that actor’s willingness to tolerate those costs to achieve their goal.  
Expected Utility  
"Reason and war," or expected-utility theory (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; 
Bueno de Mesquita 1982) incorporates the domestic realm into international interactions.  
States are assumed to be rational, unitary actors (with leaders acting as "gatekeepers").  
Expected-utility theory bears some relation to realism/neorealism, but it does make some 
important contributions which put it at odds with important realist notions, especially the 
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systemic focus, and Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992 ) themselves heavily criticize 
realism.  The two basic questions they authors’ ask are, do states base their policies on 
reason, and do these policies advance the general welfare?  They conclude that states are 
indeed rational, although they fail to conclude that foreign policies necessarily advance 
welfare. 
Expected utility approaches retain the centrality of relative power as a determinant 
of conflict behavior through the calculation of the probability of success in conflict. They 
refine our understanding of the choices states make, however, through the introduction of 
the notion of utility. That is, determining that you can win a fight is no longer reason 
enough to start one. Rather, choice is balanced by consideration of the value of the issue at 
stake compared to the cost of achieving it. It is the manner in which costs have been 
conceptualized and incorporated into our understanding of conflict behavior, in particular 
conflict termination and post-conflict bargaining, that will be considered next.  
Many expected utility approaches to war termination (see, for example Bueno de 
Mesquita 1982; Wittman 1979), assume that agreement to end a war can only be achieved if 
agreement makes both sides better off than continued fighting. The assumption behind 
these approaches is that actors initiate or accept conflict management only after determining 
that there exists a settlement that makes both actors better off than would continue fighting 
(Wittman 1979). The argument presented in this research deviates from this assumption. 
Actors are assumed to choose between conflict and management not on the basis of 
maximizing their ultimate outcome (the terms of any settlement or complete victory), but by 
assessing the costs they have sustained through fighting, relative to the importance they 
place on the issue in dispute. At the first stage of the conflict management process – 
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initiation – which this research is solely concerned with, it is the immediate pain of conflict, 
balanced against the value placed on the issue which is considered to dominate the decision 
process.  
Expected utility models also address the question of the timing of management 
initiation. In particular, the dilemma that can emerge from the need for both actors to 
prefer management to conflict in order for management to be possible. According to this 
logic, as the probability that one side is going to lose a fight increases, so does its preference 
for attempting a negotiated agreement. However, if one side’s probability of winning is 
decreasing, then the other side’s must be increasing, thus their incentive to negotiate could 
be expected to decrease. This expectation has much in common with power preponderance 
theory and can initially appear to be a considerable obstacle to initiating conflict 
management. However, Wittman argues that this interpretation is in fact misleading as it 
discounts the effect that changing probabilities of victory have on the demands made by the 
losing side and, therefore, the attractiveness of settlement to the winning side. He contends 
that: 
 War and peace are substitute means of achieving an end. If one side is more 
likely to win at war, its peaceful demands increase, but at the same time the 
other side’s peaceful demands decrease. Thus we do not know whether an 
overlap is more or less likely. (1979: 751) 
 
Costs   
In line with expected utility theory, much of the war termination literature (see 
(Werner 1998: 323) assumes that there is a relationship between the costs of a conflict it 
duration. That is, actors continue to fight until the costs of doing so outweigh their 
evaluation of the stakes. The more expansive the aims of the aggressor, the higher the costs 
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they will be willing to sustain. Following this logic, it is expected that war termination 
becomes more likely as the costs of conflict rise. Similarly, this would seem to suggest that 
an actor could shorten the duration of a war by increasing its initial intensity.  
Werner (1998) discusses the implications of this approach to the relationship 
between war aims, conflict costs and terms of settlement. She focuses on the different 
implications of models which assume the benefits of conflict to be fixed and exogenous to 
those bargaining models (for example: Morrow 1989; Morgan 1994) which treat the terms 
of any negotiated settlement as endogenous to the conflict and bargaining processes. 
Werner finds that support for the latter approach is more consistent (1998: 336). Werner’s 
focus, however, is on the relationship between the process of war and the ultimate terms of 
settlement. So, while her findings can provide some insight into the relationship between 
costs and strategy choices in conflicts, they do not directly address the question central to 
this research; when will conflict management be initiated?   
In the model developed here, actors involved in a crisis are considered to be utility 
maximizers. However, their frame of reference is not expected gain, but experienced loss, 
or cost. Actors are considered to have a general notion of the value they place on the issue 
in dispute. This value is considered to be a function of the salience of the issue to the actor. 
Actors also experience concrete costs associated with fighting – loss of life, materiel, and 
economic factors. This conceptualization of the role of costs draws heavily on expected 
utility. However, as will be argued in the later discussion of sensitivity to costs, this research 
proposed that is not objective costs that are incorporated into a decision maker’s calculus; 
rather, such costs are assessed in light of the salience of the issue at stake and the sensitivity 
of individual leaders to both the domestic and international ramifications of conflict costs.  
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Casualties and Public Support 
Before beginning a discussion of the possible variables that contribute to public 
support for the use of force it is important to note one major caveat. Nearly all of the 
empirical, case study and theoretical work on the subject examines US public opinion8. 
Extending the findings of this research to a general model of conflict decision making as 
presented here presents a problem for two, possibly more reasons. First, the US is a western 
democracy and, as discussed above regime type matters. Second, all of these studies of US 
public opinion have been done during a period in which the US has either been a 
superpower or, more recently the only superpower. As perceptions of risk and threat have 
been shown to influence public opinion, and relative power and international clout can be 
expected to effect these perceptions, it is possible that certain determinants of public 
opinion may be suppressed (for example vital interests), and others possibly sensitized 
(casualties), by the expectations created by the US’s international prominence and power.  
The research available does, however, point to several key variables which can 
influence the level of public support for the use of force, and thus the decision maker’s 
response to costs. These are: the perceived success of an action; the length of an action; the 
rationale for engagement and the rally effect. As the presence of any of these factors is 
linked to an increase in support, it seems logical to infer that their absence would decrease 
support, thus increasing the impact of such costs – the pain - experienced by the decision 
maker.  
                                                 
8 Two exceptions to this are Eichenberg’s (1989) Public Opinion and National Security in Western Europe and Risse-
Kappen’s (1991) comparative study of liberal democracies. Public opinion data from Eastern Europe is also 
becoming more available with time. However, this still leaves the majority of public opinion data coming 
from European, democratic states. 
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Success 
Jentleson (1992) refers to the impact of success on public opinion as the “halo 
effect” – the “quintessential version of risk aversion theory” (1992: 52). While Jentleson 
remains unconvinced that success is the most appropriate indicator of public opinion, he 
does find some support for the theory9. The support is mirrored in Kull and Ramsay’s study 
of American public attitudes to military fatalities in the post-Cold War era, which presents 
evidence10 that “The critical question that will determine public response [to casualties] is 
not whether US vital interests are involved, but whether the operation is perceived as likely 
to succeed” (2001: 212). Peffley et al. (1995: 310) also find that success creates a strong rally 
effect and generates increased presidential approval ratings. They suggest that one of the 
reasons success has such a strong positive effect on public opinion is that it removes 
uncertainty – effectively ending the debate about the issue itself and the appropriate 
response (314).  
Duration 
Success brings us to the second proposed determinant of public support – the 
length of the action. Not surprisingly, short, decisive actions are more likely to generate 
public support than long, drawn out engagements. How separate this factor is from success 
is less clear, however. As the oft-cited example of Vietnam demonstrates, lack of mission 
clarity creates uncertainty in terms of both execution and results. Both factors, it is argued 
                                                 
9 Specifically the cases of Lebanon, 1984; Panama, Libya and the Gulf War all demonstrated high support after 
clearly successful execution (Jentleson 1992) 
10  Kull and Ramsay utilize extensive, multi-source polling data from PIPA; ABC; CNN-USA Today; Time-
CNN; and Gallup. The polls provide contemporary public opinion data on US military involvement in 
Somalia (after the October 1993 fatalities), the Gulf War (before and after the ground war against Iraq), 
Saudi Arabia (after the June 1996 bombing in Dhahran), Lebanon (After the 1983 bombing of the Marine 
barracks) and Bosnia (Feb-Mar 1998).   
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depress public support. Holsti, quoting Clifford, provides anecdotal support for the 
influence of this belief on the Johnson administration’s decision making on Vietnam during 
the summer of 1965: 
George Ball warned: ‘We can’t win. The war will be long and protracted 
with heavy casualties. The most we can hope for is a messy conclusion. We 
must measure this long term price against the short-term loss that will result 
from withdrawal.’ Producing a chart that correlated public opinion with 
American casualties in Korea, Ball predicted that the American public 
would not support a long and inconclusive war. (Holsti 1991: 446) 
 
Ball’s assumption of the US public’s unwillingness to stomach casualties is reflected in the 
perceptions of contemporary policymakers. Similarly, Kull and Ramsay’s (2001) study 
showed that there was a strong, widespread belief among foreign policymakers that there is 
not enough national interest at stake in the post-Cold War era to justify US deaths.  
Rationale for Engagement 
The linkage of tolerance of casualties and national interest is in itself an assumption.  
The contention is that the public will be more supportive of the use of force when the vital 
national interests of the country are at stake. Interest-based explanations are premised 
largely on realist-based notions of the determinants of foreign policy, translated down to the 
level of the individual. Strategic ties, geopolitical primacy and geographic proximity, all 
factors commonly found in general theories of conflict are, in this case used as determinants 
of public opinion. The key problem with this conceptualization is that the US public has 
been found again and again to have a very sparse, superficial understanding of international 
events (Holsti 1992; Jentleson 1992; Peffley et. al. 1995). 
Jentleson proposes an alternative structure for explaining variations of public 
support for the use of force, one based on the “principle policy objective” either foreign policy 
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restraint or internal political change, with the former generating greater levels of support 
(1992: 53). Part of the logic behind these expectations is linked to the efficacy of military 
force in achieving either goal.  
Foreign policy restraint objectives tend to lend themselves more readily to 
strategies that are primarily military and secondarily political … Internal 
political change objectives, however, tend to require strategies in which the 
relative balance is reversed, and in which the objectives are much more 
difficult to translate into an operational military plan. (1992: 53) 
 
While the distinction between these two types of military action is both innovative and 
links well to broader conflict theory, it remains reliant on success and duration arguments. 
If foreign policy restraint is more suited to a military response, then isn’t it also more likely 
that a military action in such as case will be successful and decisive? As the current war in 
Iraq so painfully demonstrates, it is far quicker and easier to defeat a country’s military and 
overthrow its government than it is to create regime change in the midst of an occupation 
and insurgency.        
Rally Effect 
It is a well-documented and accepted fact that public support for intervention is 
generally high in the days immediately following the instigation of force. Peffley et.al. (1995) 
suggest that part of the reason for this surge in public support may be a media effect. They 
note that, particularly in the early stages of a conflict, the administration tends to have a 
virtual monopoly over information regarding a conflict. Furthermore, the president can use 
his prestige and position to directly address the nation and further shape public perceptions. 
These conditions, the authors argue, mean “…members of the opposition party are often 
reluctant to criticize the president” and “under these circumstances, media coverage of the 
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president’s use of military force tends to be not only intense but extremely favorable as 
well” (1995: 308). 
Again, while an individual phenomenon in itself, the rally effect seems to be driven 
by the same factors as rationale – success and duration. Especially in the case of the United 
States11, it is unlikely that an initial attack will go badly. Secondly, the rally effect is 
temporally confounded by duration. At the time in the conflict in which it occurs there is 
rarely any indication or discussion of the possible duration of the action and no direct 
experience by which to judge duration. Again, think back to the Bush administration’s 
estimates of a timeframe for US troops in Iraq and Bush’s infamous and premature 
declaration of “mission accomplished” in May of 2003.  
 
Sensitivity to Costs 
Despite the early dominance of the realist approach to study of international 
relations, over the past 15 years attention to the domestic sources of influence on foreign 
policy has increased. Led by the strength of empirical evidence supporting the democratic 
peace (Maoz and Abdolali. 1989) phenomenon, scholars have examined the extent to which 
factors such as structural constraints (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1990), public opinion 
(Mueller 1973; 1994), and leader’s responses to public opinion (Ostrom and Job 1986; 
Russett and Graham 1989) influence foreign policy actors. While the majority of this 
research has focused on democratic regimes, Morgan and Campbell (1991) suggest that 
leaders in non-democratic states are also constrained by institutional factors and that the 
effects of these constraints may be equally as important as they are in democratic regimes.   
                                                 
11 Due to the overwhelming military superiority it enjoys. 
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Democratic Regimes 
In democratic regimes, a government’s ability to use force to resolve international 
disputes is contingent upon public support. That is, those who will bear the brunt of the 
economic and human cost of fighting must either actively approve of, or passively 
acquiesce, to their government’s decision. Furthermore, structural features of democratic 
institutions – legislatures, bureaucracies, interest groups – are all considered to constrain the 
actions of democratic leaders. Broad societal support, at both the popular and institutional 
levels, is considered to determine the viability and legitimacy of any and all democratic 
policies, including the deployment and use of the military. 
It is widely accepted that public support for military action is strongly influenced by 
the costs of that action, and that the clearest indicator the public has of those costs is the 
number of casualties their military forces are sustaining12.  
Attention to Public Opinion in the US 
According to Holsti’s (1992) overview of public opinion research, the impact of 
public opinion on US foreign policy has increased over time. Holsti notes a change in the 
opinion-policy link between the post-WWII and post-Vietnam eras, and offers both a 
substantive and methodological explanation for the differences. Substantively, during the 
post-WWII era the president was generally thought to have a “free hand” when it came to 
foreign policy. The public was considered to be both ill-informed and relatively 
disinterested in foreign affairs, influenced by the executive, but not influencing (1992: 444). 
After Vietnam, however, this idea of executive freedom was questioned and evidence of 
                                                 
12 See for example: Gartner, Scott, and Segura (1998); Gartner, Sigmund, and Wilkening (1997); Mueller (1973; 
1994); Nincic (1995). 
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public influence on presidential actions, although not definitive, begins to emerge. 
Quantitative studies, although short on causal clarity, suggest that, if used, foreign policy 
issues can influence election outcomes and voters do have a tendency to punish foreign 
policy failures (1992: 452). More generally, he finds there is “impressive correlation evidence 
that policy changes are in fact predominantly in the direction favored by the public” (1992: 
459). Detailed case studies further suggest that the influence of the public also depends on 
the policymaker; “Whereas public opinion influenced many mid-level officials and a few 
higher ones – for example Casper Wienberger – it has little impact on others, including 
Ronald Reagan” (1992: 455). 
Holsti does point out, however, that there are other possible explanations for these 
apparent substantive changes. First, influenced by realist theory, much of the study of 
foreign policy has focused on crises, leaving little time for public opinion to kick in (1992: 
444). Furthermore, polling questions, survey and statistical techniques have all improved 
greatly in more recent times. This has allowed for more focused and nuanced studies of 
public opinion to be carried out. Still, as Holsti reminds us, “we have a good deal more 
systematic evidence describing the state of, or trends in, public opinion, than on how it has 
affected the actual conduct of foreign affairs” (1992: 451).   
Non-Democratic Regimes 
It is not just in democracies that leaders can be adversely affected by casualties. 
According to Stam (1996) and others (Jackman 1993) the legitimacy and political capacity of 
regimes of all types is negatively impacted by the human costs of war. Furthermore, the 
ability of leaders to retain power decreases when they suffer military defeats or their use of 
force is seen to be unsuccessful (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995). As discussed 
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earlier, “body counts”, or the number of casualties sustained in a conflict is one possible 
measure of success (Gartner and Myers 1995).   
Differences in the Impact of Public Opinion by Regime Type 
There is no theoretical or intuitive reason to expect the connection between public 
opinion and casualties to differ across regime types. To do so would imply that the 
responses of individuals to loss is related to the political system they live under. What is 
expected to differ however, is the sensitivity leaders have to public opinion. That is, leaders 
in democratic states are expected to place greater importance on public support of a 
particular foreign policy action, especially one than involves the use of forces, than are 
leaders in non-democratic regimes. This is based on the observation that, in democratic 
governments, the link between popular support and political longevity is both more direct 
(through the institutional mechanism of elections) and disaggregated (universal suffrage). 
What Regime Type Can’t Tell Us 
Consideration of the effects of regime type provides some insight into how various 
factors contribute to the pain a decision maker experiences in response to choosing a 
conflictual dispute resolution strategy. In terms of the model presented it indicates the 
extent to which domestic public opinion sensitizes decision makers to the tangible costs of 
conflict, particularly casualties13. What it cannot tell us, however, is how much pain a 
decision maker will be willing to endure to achieve a goal. Determination of the pain 
threshold for a particular conflict is theorized to be based on the particular issue at stake. 
                                                 
13 As discussed in the section “Defining success in conflicts” public support may also be predicated on 
perception of the success or failure of a particular action. 
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The more salient an issue is, the higher the level of pain an actor will be willing to sustain 
before looking for an alternative means of resolution.  
There is also evidence from the American public opinion research that the influence 
of public opinion varies according to the type of foreign policy issue. In particular, Holsti 
notes that public opinion is less influential in crisis situations. He presents two possible 
explanations for this decrease. First, there is less time for the public to react and the 
administration to gain information on public opinion. Second this lack of time for reflection 
and debate makes it easier for a leader to manipulate and direct public opinion regarding the 
best response (1992: 461). This latter point is also consistent with Peffley et al’s. (1995) 
explanation of the rally effect.  
Domestic Homogeneity 
Regime type also cannot provide a direct indication of the degree of consistency of 
public support within a particular society. As discussed, regime type can affect the type and 
degree of constraints faced by leaders involved in foreign crises and conflicts. However, 
levels of domestic support for a particular conflict may be conditioned by other social and 
demographic characteristics, in particular, the level of homogeneity within the society. More 
homogenous societies are more likely to share a common evaluation of the importance of a 
particular issue of dispute and, therefore, a common evaluation of the relative merits of 
management and conflict.  
Coser discussed the possible implications of domestic differences on the conflict 
management process, noting that: 
Such contentions [over when to move to management] are likely to be more 
deepgoing the less integrated the social structure. In integrated structures 
internal contentions may vitalize and strengthen the groups’ energies, but if 
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divergencies as to appropriate action affect the basic layers of common 
belief, symbolizations of victory and defeat are also likely to be basically 
divergent. (1961: 351) 
 
The Issue at Stake 
Blainey discounts the necessity of considering the specific issue context of a conflict 
in a manner consistent with realist and systemic theorists’ fixation on the centrality of power 
as an explanatory variable.  
One generalization about war can be offered with confidence. The aims are 
simply varieties of power. The vanity of nationalism, the will to spread an 
ideology, the protection of kinsmen in an adjacent land, the desire for more 
territory or commerce, the avenging of defeat or insult, the craving for 
greater national strength or independence, the wish to impress or cement 
alliances – all these represent power in different wrappings. The conflicting 
aims of rival nations are always conflicts of power. Not only is power the 
issue at stake, but the decision to resolve the issue by peaceful or warlike 
methods is largely determined by assessments of relative power. (1973: 150) 
 
This distillation of motivation provides a neat and parsimonious way of conceptualizing the 
decision to use force or not. I would argue, however, that it sacrifices considerable 
explanatory power when it comes to understanding the motivations for moving toward a 
strategy of management rather than conflict.  
Issue Type 
Much of the justification given for the disregard of issue type or salience in studies 
of conflict behavior is put down to the dominance of the realist paradigm. Consistent with 
Blainey (1973), Mansbach and Vasquez state that  
…the realist paradigm omits the differences among stakes at issue as a 
significant variable, because it assumes that there is, fundamentally, only one 
issue in global politics – the struggle for power and peace. (1981: 868) 
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 They challenge this view, however, arguing that “ignoring stakes leads to important 
distortions when mapping global behavior” (1981: 870). Although their study is based on 
specific, rather than generalizable foreign policy issues, it does provide initial support for 
their contention that “behavior in world politics may vary significantly according to the 
issues under contention” (1981: 874). 
Gochman and Leng (1983) provide a more generalizable approach to the 
incorporation of issue type in the study of conflict behavior. They divide issues into two 
basic categories – vital and not vital. Their categorization is consistent with a realpolitik 
logic; vital interests are “(a) the political independence of the state and the survival of the 
governmental regime, and (b) the retention of, and control over, territory within and 
contiguous to the national borders” (1983: 100). All other issues, whether economic, 
military or territorial are considered as “less than vital” (1983: 100). Their empirical tests 
provide support for the hypothesis that vital issues play an important role in the escalation 
of hostilities in interstate bargaining. They conclude, consistent with Vasquez (1983; 1985), 
Rosen (1972) Hensel and Diehl (1994) and Bennet (1996; 1998)14, that: 
…where the dispute bargaining entails opposing tendencies simultaneously 
pushing toward war and non-war settlements, non-behavioral attributes can 
tip the balance. Particularly important are the issues in contention. 
(Gochman and Leng 1983: 108) 
 
An alternate typology of issues, developed initially by Rosenau (1966), was tested by 
Vasquez (1983). The basic division according to this typology is between tangible and 
intangible issues. The fundamental difference between these two classifications is that 
tangible issues have divisible ends, while intangible issues do not. Subsequently, disputes 
                                                 
14 See discussion below 
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over intangible issues do not create a bargaining space in which compromise is possible, and 
thus cooperative interactions usually fail (Vasquez 1983: 181). Vasquez operationalizes 
tangibility according to “whether a stakes end can be photographed and its means 
purchased” (1983b: 181) and intangible ends as those which cannot be seen directly (e.g. 
prestige), and intangible means as verbal actions (e.g. signing a treaty.). In this study he 
conducts a content analysis of event data concerning US –West German interactions (1949-
75), identifying “78 distinct substantive stakes over which the actors were contending in this 
historical period (e.g., access to Berlin)” (1983: 181).  
Issue Salience  
Rosen (1972) touches on the impact of issue salience on the comparative willingness 
of actors to sustain the costs of conflict. In particular, he notes the balancing effect that 
asymmetric issue salience can have on overcoming the relative power disadvantage common 
is guerilla wars and wars for independence. He quotes Ho Chi Minh’s prediction that “In 
the end the Americans will have to kill ten of us for every American soldier, but it is they 
who will tire first” (1972: 168) to illustrate his point. He suggests that major powers often 
miscalculate the probable trajectory of independence conflicts because their frame of 
reference is fundamentally different from that of the forces they face.  
So while the strategic theory of the United States [in Vietnam] was derived 
from a model of war power based on the ability to harm, the strategic theory 
of the guerilla is based on the willingness to suffer. (1972: 168) 
 
He suggests, however, that each side’s “war power model” was modified through 
exposure to the other resulting in a synthesis in which each actor’s “cost tolerance” is 
balanced against their ability to inflict harm on an opponent (1972: 169). The concept of 
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cost tolerance is similar to that of “pain” developed in this model. However, Rosen’s theory 
and analysis do not explicitly examine the impact of issue type or salience on an actor’s 
willingness to endure the costs of conflict.  
The question of the effect of issue salience is addressed more explicitly by Vasquez, 
although his study is restricted to critical foreign policy issues; “those which have the 
highest salience in a political system” (1985: 644), and does not therefore provide a general 
theoretical framework for the incorporation of salience into a crisis behavior model. 
Furthermore, Vasquez’s discussion is primarily concerned with the sources and effects of 
domestic contention over such foreign policy issues and offers no propositions regarding 
how relative salience of an issue might affect the process of an issue once it becomes as 
crisis.  
Vasquez also touches on the concept of issue salience in his (1983) study of 
cooperative-conflictual interactions between the US and West Germany. Here, he 
introduces a measure of intensity by counting the interactions associated with each of the 78 
identified issues and using it as an indicator of the attention a specific “stake” is generating 
(1983: 182).  Once again, however, the generalizability of this operationalization of salience 
is limited. First, the “stakes” themselves are specific policy issues and second, the intensity 
measure is based on the number of events engendered by each stake, with no accounting 
for the individual intensity or severity of the specific event. Overall, Vasquez’s approach to 
salience in this study is not well suited to the central questions of interest to this research.  
Hensel and Diehl’s (1994) study provides a more generalized discussion of issue 
salience but is restricted to examining why states chose not to resort to military options in 
interstate disputes. The do note, however, that nonmilitarized disputes are “somewhat 
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unlikely when highly salient (or vital) issues are under contention” (1994: 484), although go 
on to note that this relationship is contingent on the behavior of the opponent, relative 
power and the absence of internal conflict in the target state. These last two factors are 
consistent with the theoretical expectations of the model developed in this research. 
Hensel and Diehl base their operationalization of issue salience on Holsti’s (1991) 
issue typology. They collapse the original 24 categories into four: territory, regime, policy 
and third-party issues then again into two: territory or regime; and policy or third-party 
(Hensel and Diehl 1994: 492). Their finding, that issue salience so defined has the greatest 
influence on nonmilitary response; high salience issues being much less likely to provoke a 
nonmilitary response, is consistent with the expectations of the model developed here. So is 
their conclusion that “[t]he intent of the opponent must be measured not only by its level of 
hostility…but also be the importance of the issues involved in the confrontation from the 
vantage point of the target state” (1994: 503). 
This recognition that not all issues are equally as important to states and that the 
salience of the issue in dispute in a specific crisis will condition the conflict behavior of 
actors has been demonstrated in later studies. Bennett (1996) found limited empirical 
support for the hypothesis that there was a positive relationship between issue salience and 
rivalry duration. His 1998 study of rivalry duration found that rivalries concerning 
important issues lasted longer than those that did not (1998: 1224). However, once again 
the operationalization of issue salience one based on what Bennett refers to a “realist 
conception” (1998: 1219). Rivalries over borders or homeland territory are considered more 
salient, as are colonial issues or issues of regional influence. So, much as with Hensel and 
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Diehl (1994), although salience is incorporated into theory, the operationalization 
significantly limits its explanatory purchase.   
Diehl (1992) provides perhaps the clearest overview of the progress conflict 
literature has made in attempting to incorporate issue type and salience into the quantitative 
study of conflict. He identifies three reasons why issue-based analyses have not been more 
common in the literature. First, as does Vasquez, he point to the dominance of the realpolitik 
approach and it’s assumption that power alone determines behavior and outcomes in the 
international arena. Moving on from this, he notes the tendency of scholars to support the 
belief that “the black box of decision-making should remain closed at least at this stage in 
the international conflict field” (1992: 334). Finally, he raises the more pragmatic rationale, 
discussed earlier, that “[s]cholars also become socialized by the data sets they work with and 
their thinking tends to be stifled by that familiarity” (1992: 334). 
Linked to this last rationale is the problem, apparent from this review and discussed 
in later chapters, regarding the difficulties inherent in identification and measurement of 
issues themselves. And, as Diehl observes: 
 It is even more problematic to develop and empirical measure of the 
salience of those issues involved in the conflict. In some conflicts, the stakes 
involved in the conflict are not as tangible as might be the case with 
conflicts over territory or markets.… Furthermore, one runs into the 
problem of perception; it is difficult to determine if hat appears objectively 
to be very salient is perceived as such by decision-makers (or vice versa).  
(1992: 336) 
 
When it comes to determining the relative importance of different issues across different 
crises things become even more problematic, as an example may serve to illustrate. It is 
generally accepted that conflicts which involve territorial are of great importance to states, 
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as, in a state-based international system, control of territory is a prerequisite for most other 
issues (i.e. political power, resources). However, does this mean that a territorial dispute 
such as the Falkland Islands war should be considered to be as salient to the British as a 
hostile threat to the current boundaries of Great Britain would be? Or, alternately, that a 
trade dispute that threatens export earnings vital to a country’s economic survival is less 
important than a border dispute over an insignificant and unutilized area of territory? My 
point is this, the “what” of the issue at stake may provide a very rough indication of how 
important the issue may be, but to assume that relative salience can be ranked by the type of 
issue, alone appears unsupportable and potentially problematic.   
If this is the case, however, how can we further refine our measurement of issue to 
accommodate variations in intensity and importance across these substantive issue types? 
The illustrations presented suggest that, in addition to the type of dispute, issue salience is 
determined by the extent to which the conflict has the potential to negatively affect the 
actors involved. That is, the more likely a an issue is to directly and significantly decrease 
your security, self-determination and well-being, the more likely you are to consider it to be 
salient, regardless of “what” that issue is.  
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CHAPTER III 
THEORY AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Georg Simmel noted that conflict termination is “a specific enterprise. It belongs 
neither to war nor to peace, just as a bridge is different from either bank it connects” (1955: 
34). It is perhaps for this reason that the transition from conflict to conflict management 
does not receive much attention in either the war termination or conflict management 
literature. The model presented and tested in this research addresses this specific issue by 
asking what motivates actors involved in interstate crises15 to cross that bridge and initiate 
crisis management16.   
 The model developed in this research deviates from previous approaches to the 
study of conflict management in four key ways: 1) management is treated as a conflict 
strategy rather than an outcome; 2) changing costs modify the cost/benefit analysis of 
conflict and the initiation of conflict management; 3) the conceptualization of costs is 
broadened to incorporate subjective factors and; 4) issue salience is proposed to determine 
the threshold at which an actor’s preference for conflict over management changes.  
 
 
 
                                                 
15 As discussed earlier, I conceptualize crises according to Snyder and Diesing’s definition: “a sequence of 
interactions between the governments of two or more sovereign states in severe conflict, short of war, but 
involving the perception of a dangerously high probability of war” (1977: 6). This definition is consistent 
with Hermann’s more general definition of crises as situations which threaten high priority goals, surprise 
the decision maker and leave little time for response (1972).  
16 Crisis management is defined as the attempt to peacefully manage and resolve disputes either bilaterally or 
with the aid of an outside or third party. The primary purpose of conflict management, therefore, is “…to 
arrest the expansion and escalation of conflicts and create a structure or conditions under which it would be 
conducive to realizing beneficial consequences” (Bercovitch 2000: 10)  
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Building the Theory 
Management as a Strategy 
This model builds on Simmel’s observation regarding conflict management by 
separating the initiation of management from consideration of the final terms of settlement. 
This research focuses exclusively on the decision to initiate or accept conflict management. 
The move to conflict management is treated as a strategy change, rather than an outcome. 
As such the model makes no predictions regarding the success or failure of any subsequent 
negotiations, or the terms of settlement, if any are reached. The initiation of conflict 
management is conceptualized as part of the process of a conflict, rather than its end result. 
Again, what this model seeks to explain is what motivates actors to move from a conflictual 
strategy to a management strategy, not the terms of settlement that ultimately result.  
Conceptualizing management as a strategy, or process within a conflict, rather than 
its outcome provides several advantages.  It makes it possible to compare the impact of 
various factors, such as costs and issue salience on the crisis behavior choices of actors. In 
addition, it provides a means of transitioning from the examination of conflict processes, 
such as use of force and escalation, to the examination of management strategies; a 
transition that is not well established in the literature.                
As discussed earlier, most of the expected utility approaches to war termination (see 
for example: Allison 1971; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992 ; Bueno de Mesquita 1982; 
Snyder and Diesing 1977; Wittman 1979, Werner, 1998) treat negotiation as an outcome; 
one that is achieved only if agreement makes all actors better off than continued fighting. 
The decision rule behind these models is one of utility maximization, which is difficult to 
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challenge, given the high stakes of such crises. This model, however, does not address crisis 
outcomes, but rather the strategic choices actors make during the process of a crisis.  
The model does not assume that actors necessarily initiate or accept an offer of 
management with the intention of negotiating a settlement. Management initiation can play 
several roles in the conflict process; it can provide useful information regarding an 
opponent’s demands, it can provide breathing room from conflictual action and the 
opportunity to regroup and strengthen forces and it can indicate whether there is, in fact 
terms of settlement that may be mutually acceptable. For this reason, it is proposed that the 
decision rule used by actors to determine their preferred strategy is driven more by the 
conflict conditions present at the time, than their expectations regarding the outcome of any 
settlement which is, according to Pillar, highly uncertain at this stage (1983: 57-58).                            
Costs Drive Strategy Change 
The desired benefit sought through conflictual action is assumed to remain static 
over the course of the crisis. Conflict costs, however, are dynamic and inevitably increase 
over the course of a crisis. It is the changes in these costs, therefore, that impact the net 
benefits that an actor can hope to achieve. Actors are assumed to act to maximize their net 
benefit. Indeed, given this assumption, cost minimization is identical to maximizing net 
benefit. If the benefits associated with the crisis are static, then minimizing costs provide 
the only means to affect change in the net benefit. For this reason the model proposes that 
the strategy change, indicated by the initiation or acceptance of an offer of conflict 
management, is driven primarily by the costs actors experience over the course of the 
conflict.  
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It is possible that the goals of actors may change in response to events that occur 
over the course of the conflict; however these changes are most likely to be of lesser 
magnitude and certainty than the costs experienced in conflictual action. Therefore, even if 
the assumption of static benefits was to bee relaxed, costs would still be expected to 
dominate the decision maker’s calculus at this stage of the conflict. Furthermore, benefits 
are uncertain and realized only in the future, whereas costs are experienced by the decision 
maker in the here and now. 
This model is concerned exclusively with the strategy decision process during a crisis; 
it does not seek to predict what the final outcome of the crisis may be. The focus on costs is 
also consistent with Snyder and Deising’s observation that a crisis is a situation in which 
“…finding the best possible solution is a luxury” (1977: 347). The model therefore assumes 
that the decision rule determining the choice of strategy at this stage in a conflict is based on 
minimizing losses, in order to maximizing net benefits.  
Because the assumption is made that benefits remain static while costs change, the 
choice between a conflictual or management strategy is theorized to be driven by 
experienced and expected costs, rather than potential gain. The decision to move from an 
exclusively conflictual to a management strategy is predicated on the disutility an actor 
experiences while involved in a conflict. Conflicts are situations in which actors are faced 
with very limited opportunity sets. And, as Jackman points out, “[f]or those confronted with 
a very restricted range of available alternatives extending from horrendous to merely awful, 
minimizing pain is the same as maximizing utility” (Jackman 1993: 279).  
 
 
  
39 
Moving from Objective Costs to Pain 
This leads to the third key aspect of this model; how costs are defined in crisis 
situations. As discussed in the literature review, conflict costs are usually defined and 
measured as the economic, human and materiel losses an actor experiences during a 
conflict. Most generally, they can be thought of as the negative occurrences experienced 
cumulatively over the course of a specific crisis. Implicit in this conceptualization of costs, 
however, are two assumptions. First, that crises occur in a political vacuum, with that actors 
determining strategy choices without reference to their wider political situation. Second, that 
the costs have a consistent impact on a decision maker, irrespective of the context in which 
they are incurred.  
This model challenges the assumption that the impact of costs on a decision maker 
is invariant. Rather, it proposes a means by which the subjective elements of cost, 
acknowledged but rarely incorporated into conflict termination models, can be addressed in 
a systematic manner. The theory contends that the impact of objective costs on a decision 
maker’s utility calculus is conditioned by factors specific to the decision maker (his/her 
political environment) and the conflict itself (issue salience). The adoption of this 
contingent conception of costs is predicated on the assumption that the decision 
environment conditions the way in which an actor perceives objective costs.  
Implications of the Incorporation of Political and Crisis Context Factors 
Since even the classical rational choice notion of cost is a multi-faceted construct, 
the attempt to link it to the choice process implies the need to identify the dynamics by 
which individual cost elements are integrated into the total calculation of cost. The 
epistemic implication of that integration is the formation of a hypothetical construct to 
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capture this composite variable. Moreover, the shift from objective variables to a 
hypothetical construct supports a corresponding transition to a more phenomenological 
orientation (Singer 1969). In such an approach, what are presumed to influence a decision 
maker’s choice calculation experience of objective costs, rather than the objective costs 
themselves.  
The shift towards the phenomenological orientation implies that the same cost may 
create a different disutility, depending on the decision context17. The concept of “pain” is 
used to capture this transition from tangible and objective elements of costs, familiar from 
existing conflict research, to the more perceptual and experiential construct theorized to 
affect decision makers’ choices in a conflict.        
The recognition that human perception of physical stimuli is non-linear in nature is 
well accepted in psychology. Stevens’s (1975) experiments on magnitude estimation 
provided the groundwork for the now well-established psychophysical principle that 
individuals’ sensitivity to changes in a physical stimulus varies as a function of the 
percentage change in stimulus magnitude, rather than the absolute change. Depending on 
the type of stimulus, perception of consistent incremental change can decrease as intensity 
increases – response compression – or  increase – response expansion (Goldstein 1999:12). 
This observed physical phenomenon is similar to the principle of diminishing marginal 
utility common in economics.  
                                                 
17 For example, Egyptian President Sadat’s statement that he was “prepared to sacrifice a million Egyptian 
soldiers in return for the last grain of the holy earth of Sinai” 
(http://www.zionet.co.il/manhigut/en/view_article.php3?article_id=85) is not a statement that would be 
easily stomached in western democracies.   
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Stevens’ principle has also been demonstrated to affect individuals’ perceptions of 
cost in various settings. Fetherstonhaught et al. (1997) conducted an experiment to measure 
support for sending medical assistance to refugee camps experiencing a cholera outbreak in 
which the size of the camps was manipulated but the number of deaths that intervention 
would prevent was held constant. In general they found that, when the saved lives 
represented a smaller proportion of the total threatened respondents found intervention less 
worthwhile. That is, that people become desensitized to the value of an individual life when 
its loss is framed in terms of a larger overall victim population. Freidrich et al.’s (1999) 
experiment on willingness to support mandatory antilock brake requirements for new cars 
reports similar findings. 62% of respondents required more lives to be saved for the same 
expenditure, when the number of lives at risk was larger (Friedrich et al. 1999).    
Stevens’ law provides the initial support for the contention that responses to stimuli 
can vary as a function of context and, in particular the accumulation pattern of the stimulus. 
In addition there is empirical evidence that the same psychometric principle influences 
individuals’ perceptions of non-physical stimuli. Physiological research into reactions to and 
recollections of physical pain provides an indication of how our understanding of physical 
pain may be add to these findings and be adapted to this research. Dar and Leventhal’s 
(1993) parallel-processing model conceives of pain as having both a sensory and affective, 
or perceptual component, provides a starting point for translating pain to the political 
realm. The sensory aspect can be encompassed by the familiar notion of costs. The affective 
as the perceptual, reflective factors which modify the impact those costs have on a decision 
maker - their sensitivity to the cost of conflictual action.  
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These two aspects of a stimulus contribute independently to the overall pain 
experience to create what Dar and Leventhal refer to as a distress schema (1993), which 
determines individuals responses to a stimulus. However, they propose that this schema is 
overridden if individuals are instructed to attend only to the sensory aspect of a stimulus 
and the experience is thus perceived primarily according to its sensory features. In 
comparing the relative painfulness of distress schema or sensory-based experiences of 
stimuli they propose that “If one accepts the premise that negative emotions associated with 
pain increase suffering and make the experience more “painful”, it follow that processing 
the noxious stimulus as a primarily sensory experience should reduce pain and distress” 
18(Dar and Leventhal 1993: 341). 
So how can this expectation be adapted the context of crisis decision making? First, 
it supports the proposition that considering the impact of costs as contingent on the 
context in which they are experienced improves our understanding of their influence on an 
actor’s strategy choices in a crisis. In effect, both sensory (objective cost) and affective (cost 
sensitivity, or consequences) components of an experienced stimulus (conflictual action) are 
being accounted for. Furthermore, the contention that the pain of an experienced cost is 
heightened by attention to the negative emotions it generates lends support to the 
proposition discussed below, that low public support for a conflict increases a decision 
maker’s sensitivity to costs.  
Political Context Effects 
Work by Bueno de Mesquita and others has begun to address this issue by 
incorporating the idea that all leaders seek to retain political office above all other 
                                                 
18 This prediction is supported by their findings. 
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considerations (Bueno de Mesquita 1982; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1990). The model 
presented here expands on this idea by proposing conflict costs impact actors to differing 
degrees, conditional on their broader political environment.  
It is argued that costs do not influence the decision process in isolation. Rather, they 
are translated by the decision maker, through his or her specific political context. The 
political context is a function of the domestic and international constraints faced by the 
decision maker in light of the current crisis. Domestic constraints are the factors which may 
adversely affect an actor’s ability to retain power. Although regime type19 provides a rough 
means of approximating the structural constraints facing an actor, it cannot account for 
possible variation as a function of the specific crisis. For this, more specific measures such 
as public opinion are needed. In addition, the potential for opposition may vary across 
similar regimes as a function of other characteristics such as the level of heterogeneity and 
more specific measures of political rights and civil liberties, which can effect the overall 
level of regime openness.  
Furthermore, the model also enables consideration of how international opinion 
regarding the specific crisis may increase or decrease an actor’s sensitivity to the objective 
costs of conflict. The threat or use of sanctions and the presence of international 
peacekeeping forces may increase the potential objective costs of costs of continued 
conflictual action. International attention to a crisis, and the behavior of the actors involved 
may also increase their sensitivity to the these and other more direct objective costs of 
conflict. Concern for maintaining a “good reputation” in the international community 
                                                 
19 This is a common approach in conflict studies that acknowledge the impact of domestic variables on 
international actions (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1990: Maoz, Ze'ev, and Abdolali 1989; Mueller 1973; 
1994;  Ostrom and Job 1986 Russett 1990-91).  
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would, in the context of the model, also increase an actor’s sensitivity to these objective 
international costs. Offers of mediation, while not increasing objective costs, would also be 
expected to increase sensitivity to conflict costs, while simultaneously encouraging attempts 
at conflict management.    
Conversely, if an actor were to receive support from a third party for continued 
conflict, the opposite effect would be expected. The involvement of a third party would 
change the balance of power between the actors, thus potentially changing the rate at which 
objective conflict costs were incurred. Indirect support through economic or military aid 
would have a similar, if less extensive impact. International support for conflictual behavior 
may also alleviate reputational concerns and increase domestic support, thus desensitizing 
the actor to the costs of continuing a conflictual strategy.   
The Role of Issue Salience  
Pain is theorized to affect an actors’ decision to change from a conflictual to a 
management strategy by indicating the impact of the conflict costs experienced, on the 
decision calculus of the actor. As Shelling writes: 
In addition to taking and protecting things of value it [military power] can 
destroy value. In addition to weakening an enemy militarily it can cause an 
enemy plain suffering… 
To inflict suffering gains nothing and saves nothing directly; it can only 
make people behave to avoid it. The only purpose, unless sport or revenge, 
must be to influence somebody’s behavior, to coerce his decision or choice. 
To be coercive violence has to be anticipated. And it has to be avoidable 
through accommodation. (Schelling 1966: 2)   
  
In this sense pain acts no differently from the traditional cost measures used in 
rational choice models. As pain accumulates over the course of a crisis, the benefits of 
continuing a conflictual strategy diminish. In order to determine when an actor will change 
  
45 
his/her strategy however, and offer negotiation, it is necessary to know how much pain 
s/he is willing to sustain. This brings us back to the basic idea behind this model; that 
people will fight harder and longer for things they care more about.  
Issue salience is expected to be the conflict characteristic that has the greatest 
influence on an actor’s willingness to incur costs and their subsequent perception of the 
painfulness of those costs. This relationship is based on the simple expectation that people 
will fight harder for things that are important to them. Salience is thus theorized to have a 
direct effect on the extent to which actors will tolerate pain, or losses, in pursuit of a goal. 
Huth (1998) contends that the importance of the issue in dispute, in particular territory, is 
crucial to understanding the conflict behavior of states. The significance of issue salience for 
understanding state actions in international conflicts is also addressed by Danilovic (2002). 
There is, therefore, indirect theoretical support for expecting a different response to 
casualties in high salience conflicts compared to those considered to have low salience.  
By focusing on issue salience this model is able to directly address the issue of 
resolve by separating it from power and linking it instead to the context of the crisis. 
Resolve becomes incorporated in the central notion of issue salience, which determines 
level of pain an actor is willing to endure. This pain threshold marks the point at which an 
actor’s strategic preference for conflict over management changes.  Once reached, an actor 
will move from a fighting to a talking strategy by either offering to negotiate or accepting an 
opponent’s offer of negotiation. The level of this threshold is theorized to be a direct 
function of the importance the actor places on the issue at stake. 
As discussed earlier, a focus on relative power and other systemic factors makes it 
difficult to account for situations in which small nations prevail in conflicts with major or 
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region powers, leaving us to resort to indirect and imprecise notions such as unequal 
“willingness”, or “resolve”, to use that power. This model enables us to directly address the 
issue of resolve by separating it from power and linking it instead to the context of the 
crisis. Resolve, therefore, becomes incorporated into the central notion of issue salience, 
which is proposed to determine the level of costs an actor will be willing to endure.  
This change from a power-based to an issue-based explanation creates an interesting 
modification of our expectations regarding the effect of relative power on conflict behavior. 
A relative power disadvantage is generally expected to increase the costs an actor incurs. 
However, this model proposes that in high salience conflicts higher costs are regarded as 
acceptable. Put together, this suggests that the ability of relative power to predict conflict 
behavior may be confounded in situations where the less powerful actor regards the conflict 
issue as more highly salient than does the greater power. 
 
Model Specification: Predicting the Timing of Conflict Management  
The model proposes that there is a relationship between an actor’s willingness to 
sustain pain and the context in which that pain is experienced. That is, an actor’s pain 
threshold for a conflict is a function of the importance s/he places on the issue at stake. A 
decision maker enters a conflict with certain expectations of regarding the costs involved. 
These expectations correspond to a certain level of pain, which he/she has judged in 
advance to be acceptable, given the issue at stake. Thus, pain is incorporated into 
expectations regarding when an actor’s strategy choice between conflict and management 
will change in a specific conflict context. 
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As the conflict progresses, the accumulated costs move the decision maker toward 
his/her pain threshold. It is at this threshold level of pain that we expect to see decision 
makers searching for an alternate means of resolving the crisis, and thereby ending the pain. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the relations between salience and the pain threshold, as affected by the 
relative power of the actor.20 As indicated in the figure, pain not only affects the threshold 
at which an actor’s strategy preference changes, but also the rate at which that threshold is 
reached. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Linearity in the graph is just a simplification heuristic. 
FIGURE 3.1 Effect of Relative Power on the Predicted Timing of 
Preference Change from Conflict to Management 
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1 = expected point of change in preference (negotiate) of weaker actor in low salience conflict. 
2 = expected point of change in preference (negotiate) of weaker actor in high salience conflict. 
3 = expected point of change in preference (negotiate) of stronger actor in low salience conflict. 
4 = expected point of change in preference (negotiate) of stronger actor in high salience conflict. 
 
  
48 
Sensitivity to the objective costs incurred through conflictual action also affects the 
speed with which an actor reaches his/her pain threshold. As discussed above, sensitivity is 
theorized to be a function of the domestic political environment – the openness of the 
actor’s regime - and the crisis context. It is the former component that is theorized to affect 
the rate of pain accumulation, while the latter determines the actor’s threshold for that pain. 
This relationship is illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3.2 Effect of Regime Characteristics on the Predicted Timing of 
Preference Change from Conflict to Management 
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Open Regime = High levels of civil liberties and political rights (high sensitive to costs) 
Closed Regime = Low levels of Political rights and civil liberties (low sensitivity to costs) 
 
I =  expected point of change in preference (negotiate) of an open regime actor in low salience 
conflict. 
II = expected point of change in preference (negotiate) of an open regime actor in high salience 
conflict. 
III = expected point of change in preference (negotiate) of a closed regime actor in low salience 
conflict. 
IV = expected point of change in preference (negotiate) of a closed regime actor in high salience 
conflict. 
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How Will Receiving an Offer Change an Actor’s Strategy Choice? 
At the simplest level, an offer can be regarded as an additional piece of information 
to be considered by the decision maker when choosing between the two available strategies 
– conflict or management. In order to affect the decision process, however, an offer must 
be observed to change either the actor’s rate of pain accumulation or his/her threshold for 
pain. Following the logic of the model, the introduction of an offer can be considered as a 
signal of an opponent’s perception of the conflict; a signal that the opponent has reached 
his/her own pain threshold. This signal in turn provides new information to the decision 
maker regarding how to assess his/her own position. There are different ways in which 
such a signal may be interpreted, however, and the manner of interpretation has 
implications for how receipt of an offer is expected to change the decision maker’s own 
pain threshold21. 
The first assumes the decision maker to be willing to increase his/her pain threshold 
in order to achieve a greater payoff. The second assumes that the prospect of avoiding 
further pain will outweigh the potential costs accommodation signaled by an agreement to 
negotiate, (at least in the abstract). This raises the interesting possibility that both 
expectations may be right, but that the decision maker’s choice between them is influenced 
by the importance s/he places on the issue. That is, in high salience conflicts, where 
decision makers are expected to be more resilient to pain, an offer is more likely to trigger a 
strategic response, increasing the decision maker’s own pain threshold. In low salience 
                                                 
21 Snyder and Deising’s (1977) discussion of bounded rationality suggests that if an opponent proves to be 
more obstinate than expected a decision maker will lower his/her initial aspiration level, while if the 
opponent is more accommodating than expected the aspiration level will be revised upward. This process or 
revision, however, is not expected to occur more than once or twice in a conflict.  
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conflicts, however, when decision makers are more sensitive to pain, the domestic 
constraint explanation will hold and decision makers will be more likely to decrease their 
pain threshold in response to an offer of negotiation. This interactive relationship between 
the effect of an offer and issue salience is illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Propositions and Hypotheses 
The model presented proposes that an actors’ move from a conflictual to a 
management strategy is determined by the pain accumulated over the course of the crisis 
and the actor’s threshold for pain in that particular crisis conflict. Pain accumulation is 
predicted to be a function of the actor’s relative power, costs experienced (which is partially 
a function of their relative power) and their sensitivity to those costs. The threshold is a 
function of the salience of the issue at stake to the actor.  
FIGURE 3.3 Effect of an Opponent’s Offer of Conflict Management on Pain 
Threshold. 
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The hypotheses to be tested are based on the theoretical expectations regarding the 
effect of these three factors on two dependent variables22. The first dependent variable 
concerns the timing of conflict management initiation across different crisis cases. The 
second dependent variable indicates which actor within an individual crisis initiates conflict 
management (offers to talk)23.  
Proposition 1  
An actor’s pain threshold determines the point in the conflict at which s/he will initiate conflict 
management.  
1a: A low pain threshold will decrease the time to conflict management 
initiation. 
1b:  A high pain threshold will increase the time to conflict management 
initiation. 
 
Proposition 2  
An actor’s pain threshold is a function of the salience of the issue in dispute.  
2a: The higher the issue salience the higher the pain threshold. 
2b: An offer of conflict management affects the actor’s pain threshold, 
contingent on the salience of the crisis. 
 
From these two propositions the following hypotheses are derived: 
H1: Actors in low salience disputes will have a lower threshold for pain than 
those in high salience disputes, resulting in an earlier offer of negotiation. 
 
H2: Actors in highly salient disputes will sustain greater costs before offering to 
negotiate than those in low salience disputes.  
 
H3:  Actors in highly salient disputes will respond to an offer of negotiation from 
their opponent by fighting longer than they would have if no offer had been 
made.  
 
H4:  In low salient disputes, actors will respond to an offer of negotiation from 
an opponent by fighting for less time than they would have if no offer had 
been made.  
                                                 
22 The hypotheses listed deal with the expected main effects of the independent variables only. Additional 
hypotheses regarding the interactions between the independent variables are specified in the empirical 
chapters. 
23
 Another possible factor that may affect the timing of negotiation is the speed at which costs, and thus pain, 
are accumulated. In order to simplify the model and analysis speed is not considered as a variable in this 
research, but will be addressed in later work. 
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Proposition 3  
An actor’s sensitivity to the costs of conflict determines the rate at which the pain threshold is 
reached.  
3a: Sensitivity affected by the political consequences, both domestic and 
international, of costs incurred through conflictual action. 
Proposition 4  
An actor’s sensitivity to the costs of conflict determines the rate at which the pain threshold is 
reached.  
4a: The power of an actor, relative to his/her opponent, will affect the rate of 
accumulation of costs. 
 
The following hypotheses are derived from propositions three and four: 
H5: Higher levels of civil liberties and political rights24 will increase an actor’s 
sensitivity to conflict costs, thus decreasing the time to management 
initiation. 
 
H6: International involvement in conflict management attempts will increase 
actors’ sensitivity to the costs of conflict, decreasing the time to 
management initiation. 
 
H7: Within a crisis, all other things being equal, the actor with the highest 
relative civil rights and civil liberties will be more likely to initiate 
management. 
 
H8. Actors will reach their pain threshold more quickly when they are the 
weaker party in the dispute and more slowly when they are the stronger 
party25. Thus, weaker actors are more likely to initiate management. 
 
Hypotheses one through six relate to the first dependent variable; the duration of the crisis 
prior to one or both of the actors changing to a management strategy. Hypotheses seven 
and eight deal with the second dependent variable; which actor within a crisis will initiate 
conflict management first. 
 
                                                 
24
 The hypotheses derived from Propositions 3 and 4 are fundamentally arguments based on expectations 
regarding the effects of the scope of political franchise on the potential for opposition to a particular policy. 
The more restrictive a regime’s franchise, the fewer interests it encompasses. Opposition would be, 
therefore, less likely than in an open franchise regime.       
25 Salience and relative power are expected to have a compounding effect on a decision maker. Thus, 
hypotheses 1 and 5 are not contradictory.  
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Testing the Model: Experimental Design 
The first purpose of the experimental analysis in this research is to isolate and 
examine two of the variables central to the theory – issue salience and regime 
characteristics26. Salience is theorized to have a direct effect on the extent to which actors 
will tolerate pain in pursuit of a goal – their pain threshold. Regime characteristics, 
operationalized as public support, or lack thereof, for the use of military action to resolve a 
crisis, is predicted to affect the sensitivity of the decision maker to the costs of conflict. 
Both these variables area highly suited to an experimental analysis as empirical data for both 
is sparse and problematic.  
The second purpose of the experimental analysis is to create a simple means by 
which to address and test the second part of the research question: does the offer of 
negotiation by an opponent change the timing of an actor’s move from a conflictual to a 
management strategy. A series of three interrelated experiments has been designed to 
examine the effects of issue salience, public support and an opponent’s offer on a decision 
maker’s crisis behavior. A three-part design was chosen as it allows for comparison of all 
three key independent variables while retaining a 2x2 design, thus simplifying the 
experimental procedure and interpretation of the results. The overall experimental design 
and the relationship between the three individual experiments are shown in Figure 3.4. 
                                                 
26 Relative power is held constant in the experimental design. Reasons for this decision will be discussed in the 
experimental chapters.  
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FIGURE 3.4 Overall Experimental design 
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Experimental Analysis  
All three experiments were carried out using the Dec-tracer, a web-based computer 
platform27. Dec-tracer allows subjects to view information and make choices at their own 
pace. The order in which information can be accessed however, is linear and unidirectional, 
giving the experimenter much greater control over how subjects acquire information and 
enabling a greater uniformity across subjects28. This feature is particularly important in this 
second experiment, as it enables control over if and when a subject receives an offer to 
negotiate, from his or her opponent.  
Experimental Procedure29 
Subjects were informed that they were to play the role of chief foreign policy 
advisor to the President of the United States, and instructed that it was their job to advise 
the President on the best action to take, given the current circumstances.  They were then 
exposed to an unfolding foreign policy crisis over a fictional island archipelago – the Kell 
Islands - with a fictional South American country – Hendara30. Subjects were randomly 
assigned to one of the four experimental conditions. The individual conditions for each 
experiment are listed in Table 3.1. 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 Dec-tracer program developed by Uri Geva and Infinity Design 
28 Compared to a paper and pencil based experiment where subjects can flip back and forward through the 
information and amend previous answers. 
29 The procedure of each experiment will be the same, all that changes is the variables manipulated and 
whether or not the subjects receive an offer of negotiation from their opponent. 
30 The 1982 Falkland / Malvinas war between Great Britain and Argentina was used as the basis of this 
scenario and a source of information regarding the escalation of the conflict and international response.   
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Before beginning their decision process, subjects were provided with background 
information regarding the history of the dispute, their opponent, the event which triggered 
the current crisis, and their task in the experiment. The subjects were then exposed to the 
first of a series of events detailing an escalation in the crisis as well as the current cumulative 
number of casualties suffered by the US forces. In order to progress through the 
experiment, each event prompted them to indicate their recommended strategy, given the 
updated information they had just received. These choices reflected the two strategy options 
proposed in the model – continue with the conflict or offer to negotiate. The structure of 
the experiment is represented graphically in Figure 3.5. 
TABLE 3.1 Manipulated Variables for Individual Experiments 
VARIABLE EXPERIMENT I EXPERIMENT II EXPERIMENT III 
SALIENCE  
High  
Low 
High  
Low 
---Constant--- 
(High) 
INFORMATION 
Pub. Op. & 
Casualties 
Casualty only 
---Constant--- 
(casualty only) 
Pub.Op. & 
Casualties 
Casualty only 
OFFER 
---Constant--- 
(no offer) 
Offer 
No Offer 
Offer 
No Offer 
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FIGURE 3.5 Schematic Representation of Experimental Procedure 
 
 
Subjects begin to work through the event set, 
continuing until they chose to negotiate. 
 
PAIN INFORMATION MANIPULATION INTRODUCED 
 
Day 7 
 
Do you advise the 
President to: 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Experimenter explains topic of experiment and role subjects are to play. Subjects read 
and sign informed consent forms. 
EXPERIMENT 
Subjects seat themselves at a computer, thus randomly 
assigning themselves to one of the four experimental 
conditions. They then begin the computer-based experimental 
scenario using the Dec-Tracer program. 
 
 
 Subjects are given 5 screens of 
information on the crisis, their 
opponent, the issue and their 
decision task. 
SALIENCE MANIPULATION 
INTRODUCED 
Continue military 
action 
Day 11 
 
Do you advise the 
President to: 
 
 
Continue military 
action 
Day 13 
 
Do you advise the 
President to: 
 
Continue military 
action 
Day 15 
 
Do you advise the 
President to: 
 
POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
Subjects complete a short questionnaire (23 questions) which provides measures for 
some of the dependent variables as well as manipulation checks. 
Subjects are then thanked for their participation.  
Day 16 
Offer of negotiation received  
(offer conditions only) 
Do you advise the President to: 
Continue military 
action 
Accept Leopold’s 
offer of 
negotiation 
Day 17  
Event Information 
Do you advise the President to: 
Continue military 
action 
Offer to negotiate 
with Hendara 
FINAL SCREEN 
Once Subjects chose to negotiate at 
screen appears telling them they have 
successfully completed the experiment 
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 The experiment terminated when either the subject chose to advise negotiation, or 
all 27 events (28 in the case of offer conditions) were accessed. In the first case, the subject 
were told their opponent had agreed to negotiate. In the second, they were told that their 
opponent has surrendered. In both cases the outcome was presented as a success. The 
subjects were then given a post-experimental questionnaire. They were then asked to 
indicate their responses to a number of inferential statements about the opposing country, 
the crisis, and their perception of the costs incurred prior to the end of the crisis. 
Experimental Hypotheses 
Together, the three experiments test all of the hypotheses derived from the model 
except for Hypothesis 8. In all experimental scenarios the relative power of the parties is 
kept constant for two reasons. First, power is one of the variables that lends itself to 
relatively objective empirical measurement and thus is suited to empirical testing. Clear 
experimental design requires limiting the number of manipulated variables, so excluding 
relative power was judged to be the least detrimental to the overall research design, as it 
could be examined in more detail in the empirical design anyway.  
Second, holding relative power constant in the experimental designs greatly 
simplified the instructions for the subjects, thus decreasing the probability of error and loss 
of data or reliability. To put it simply, when designing a foreign policy experiment, having 
the subjects “play” the US eliminates the need for them to absorb and remember their 
fictional country’s capabilities, regime characteristics, national interests and such, relative to 
their fictional opponent. This greatly decreases the possibility that there will be confusion 
over such issues, as well as avoiding the possibility that, despite who they are told they are, 
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they will “play” as the US regardless. Table 3.2 lists the hypotheses tested in the individual 
experiments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Empirical Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Testing the Model: Empirical Analysis 
 
The empirical analysis used in this research is drawn from data in Bercovitch’s 
International Conflict Management (ICM) data set and Frank Sherman’s SHERFACS: A Cross-
Paradigm, Hierarchical, and Contextually Sensitive International Conflict Dataset, 1937-1985. As 
Bercovitch provides a direct case match between both data sets, combining them is not 
overly problematic. Furthermore, both use similar theoretical bases for the coding of central 
variables. Due to nature of the questions to be tested, some restructuring of the ICM data 
was required. A detailed discussion of the construction of the data set and case selection is 
provided in the empirical chapter. 
Empirical Measurement and Model Specification 
The first question addressed by the model is; in a crisis situation, when will an actor 
offer conflict management? There are two mechanisms in the model which predict the 
TABLE 3.2 Hypotheses Tested in Each Experiment 
 
EXPERIMENT I EXPERIMENT II EXPERIMENT III 
 
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 5 
Hypothesis 7 
 
 
Hypothesis 1 (r) 
Hypothesis 2 (r) 
Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 4 
 
Hypothesis 3 (r) 
Hypothesis 4 (r) 
Hypothesis 5 (r) 
Hypothesis 7 (r) 
 
  (r) = Replicated from previous experiment 
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change from a conflictual to a negotiating strategy – the rate of accumulation of pain (slope) 
and the actor’s pain threshold; these are presented graphically in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, 
discussed earlier.  
The rate of pain accumulation predicts which actor within an individual conflict will 
initiate conflict management. The pain threshold predicts at what point in a crisis conflict 
management will be initiated. Model 1, dealing with pain accumulation, compares actors 
within crises and the unit of analysis is the crisis. Model 2, which deals with expectations 
regarding pain thresholds, compares the timing of conflict management initiations between 
crisis cases, and the unit of analysis is the initiating actor31.   
The data available for empirically testing the model and derived hypotheses 
presented here are less than ideal. This is one of the reasons behind breaking down the first 
question posed by the model (When will a crisis actor initiate conflict management?) into 
the two individual questions specified in Models 1 and 2. This approach also helps maintain 
the distinction between the expected effects of the accumulation of pain (slope) and the 
pain threshold.  A full list of variables and their source used in the empirical models is 
provided in Table 3.3. 
                                                 
31 In cases where both actors are coded as conflict management initiators, both actors are included in the 
analysis. In cases where one initiates, only the initiating actor is included.  
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TABLE 3.3 Empirical Models: Variables and Sources  
VARIABLES MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
DEPENDENT 
 
• Conflict management 
initiator: ICM 
o A (conflict initiator) 
o B (conflict target) 
o Both A and B 
• Duration of conflict prior to 
first acceptance of  
negotiation offer  
     ICM 
INDEPENDENT 
Relative 
Power 
• RECODE from P 10A; P10B 
PwrA / PwrA + PwrB 
Range: 0 – 1 
• RECODE from P 10A; P10B 
PwrA / PwrA + PwrB 
Range: 0 – 1 
Issue 
Salience 
• Core issue of dispute 
          ICM:  D14 
• Gravity of threat 
           S: THT_VALUE 
• Core issue of dispute 
          ICM:  D14 
• Gravity of threat 
           S: THT_VALUE 
Cost • Relative economic costs for A 
   S: COSTSA - COSTSB 
• Relative domestic political 
costs 
        S: DISSENTA - DISSENTB 
• International political costs 
       ICM: CM 12 
• Economic costs related to 
conduct of dispute 
   S: COSTSA; COSTSB 
• Casualties 
         S: FATALITIES 
• Domestic political costs 
        S: DISSENTA; DISSENTB 
• International political costs 
       ICM: CM 12 
Sensitivity 
to costs 
• Regime type: demo / non-
demo 
       ICM: P14a; P14b 
• Relative Homogeneity of 
party 
       ICM: P20a - P20b 
• Relative 3rd party support for 
conflict 
       ICM: P19a - P19b 
• Relative political rights of A 
       ICM: P21a – P21b 
• Relative civil liberties of A 
       ICM: P22a – P22b 
• Regime type: demo / non-
demo 
           ICM: P14a; P14b 
• Homogeneity of party 
           ICM: P20a; P20b 
• Support for conflict 
          ICM: P19a; P19b 
• Political Rights 
          ICM: P21a; P21b 
• Civil Liberties 
          ICM: P22a; P22b 
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Model 1 
 Model 1 identifies which actor within an individual crisis initiates conflict 
management. Given that the universe of cases examined are crises in which one or both 
primary parties initiate conflict management, there are three possible outcomes, or values 
for the dependent variable; actor A (conflict initiator) initiates conflict management; actor B 
(conflict target) initiates conflict management; both A and B initiate conflict management. 
Due to the nominal nature of the dependent variable, the most appropriate estimation 
model is one designed for categorical and limited dependent variables. As there is no 
theoretical or logical reason to expect that there is any underlying order to the three 
outcomes, the use of multinomial logit (MNL) is indicated (Long 1997).  
Three elements are theorized to contribute to an actor’s accumulation of pain 
during a crisis; their power, the costs they incur and their sensitivity to those costs. As 
Model 1 compares the behavior of actors within a crisis, what is of relevance to the analysis 
is the relative level of these elements, not their absolute value. That is, as salience (thus the 
pain threshold) is assumed to be constant across actors, the model predicts that the actor 
who experiences higher costs, relative to his/her opponent, will be more likely to initiate conflict 
management. There is also expected to be a relationship between relative power and the 
accumulation of pain, such that weaker actors experience a more rapid accumulation of 
pain.  As both the ICM and SHERFACS variables used in Model 1 are actor level variables, 
all required recoding in order to reflect this relativity32.  
 
                                                 
32 In order to facilitate interpretation of these relative variables, all of the recoded variables were constructed 
so that a higher number indicated a greater constraint on continued conflictual action (higher costs or 
higher sensitivity) for Actor A. 
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Model 2  
The focus of Model 2 is on explaining differences in the duration of crises prior to 
the initiation of conflict management. While Model 1 focuses on testing the theoretical 
model’s predictions regarding the rate of pain accumulation between crisis actors and the 
probability of initiating crisis management, Model 2 tests the predictions regarding the pain 
threshold of actors. Specifically, does issue salience affect pain tolerance, and is there a 
systematic difference in conflict duration (prior to the initiation of conflict management) as 
a function of issue salience.    
In contrast to Model 1, the unit of analysis is the crisis actor(s) initiating conflict 
management in a specific crisis, and the comparison is between crises, rather than crisis 
actors. This creates several advantages in light of the existing data limitations: variables, 
such as casualties and issue, which are only available for the crisis as a whole, not the 
individual crisis actors can be incorporated. While many of the independent variables used 
in Model 2 are the same as those used in Model 1, their structure is different. As the 
comparison in this model is between crises, rather than between actors within a crises the 
actor level variables are not measured relative to the other crisis actor.  
The dependent variable for Model 2 is the duration in days of the crisis prior to the 
first conflict management event initiated by a primary actor in the crisis. This variable was 
coded by calculating the difference between the conflict management start date (ICM CM 
2a[day]; 2b[month]; 2c[year]) from the crisis start date (ICM D2a[day]; 2b[month]; 2c[year]). 
As the dependent variable in this second model is continuous, a simple OLS regression is a 
suitable estimation technique to use.  This makes interpretation of the results simpler and, 
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along with the larger number of observations, increases the power of the statistical test of 
the model expectations regarding threshold effects.  
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CHAPTER IV 
EXPERIMENT ONE: ISSUE SALIENCE AND PUBLIC SUPPORT 
 
This research sets out to answer two central questions: 1) when will states involved 
in conflicts offer to negotiate, and 2) when will states involved in conflicts accept an 
opponent’s offer of negotiation. It is proposed that an actor’s decision to either offer or 
accept negotiation is motivated by the degree of pain the conflict is causing him. His/hers 
tolerance for pain is, in turn predicated by the importance s/he places on the issue at stake.  
An experimental design offers the potential to clearly manipulate the two central concepts 
that underlie this model – salience and pain. It therefore provides a clear test of to what 
extent these two factors influence an actor’s decision to change from a fighting to a 
negotiation strategy. 
 
Experimental Design 
The first experiment in this series is designed to examine the effects of issue salience 
and pain on the timing of decisions to offer negotiation in a militarized conflict addressing, 
therefore the first question raised by the theory. Although there is no theoretical reason 
proposed to suggest that there is a substantive difference between militarized and non-
militarized conflicts the scenario developed for this experiment presents subjects with a 
crisis that has already evolved to the use of force. This decision was driven by the need to 
ensure that each subject was at least minimally exposed to the pain manipulation. As 
discussed below, the pain manipulation chosen for the experiment was casualties.  
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Salience 
Salience is theorized to have a direct effect on the extent to which actors will 
tolerate pain, or losses, in pursuit of a goal. Secondly, as has been previously discussed, 
there is no direct measure of salience in the empirical data. While there is both precedence 
and theoretical support for the ranking of issues used in the empirical analysis, the clearer 
and more directly manipulable treatment of the variable designed in the experiment 
provides a means of comparing results across methods.  
To test the relevance of issue salience on an actor’s decision to move from a 
fighting to negotiating strategy two versions of the crisis scenario were developed for the 
experiment. The text of the manipulations is given in Figure 4.1 below. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.1   Salience Manipulation 
 
LOW SALIENCE HIGH SALIENCE 
 
At the end of WWII, the US revoked its territorial 
claim to Kell. During the Cold War the 4,700 
square-mile territory of windswept, almost treeless 
bog and boulder was considered to be of no 
significant strategic value.  
The 54,000 Kellites, many of American and 
European descent, have continued their rural 
lifestyle, farming and raising sheep and alpaca for 
wool. They trade with Hendara and other near-by 
countries and also rely on their neighbors for 
advanced education and health care services.  
The United States has no official representative in 
Kell, but there is a small, unmanned 
communications post on the island used for satellite 
tracking.  
 
 
With the increasingly diffuse nature of security 
threats facing the US in the post-Cold War era Kell 
remains a strategically important military 
intelligence base. The significance of Kell has been 
demonstrated on numerous occasions since 
September 11th 2001. Its location enables the US 
military to maintain continuous, real-time satellite 
surveillance of politically critical areas, including the 
Middle East and South East Asia.  
Since 1947 the United States has maintained a 
garrison of approximately 80 marines at the capital, 
Port Lincoln. There is also a communications post 
on the island, used for satellite surveillance, which is 
manned by air force intelligence personnel.    
A recent geological survey indicates concentrated 
off-shore petroleum deposits near the main island. 
Joint development of these reserves with the 
Kellites could decrease US dependence on Middle 
East oil. 
The 540,000 Kellites, many of American and 
European descent, live a primarily rural lifestyle, 
farming and raising sheep and alpaca for wool. They 
trade with Hendara and other near-by countries.  
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In one condition the issue at stake was designed to reflect high salience, in the other low 
salience. The relationship between the United States and fictional island of Kell was set out 
with the following information.  
Each condition contains information expected to elicit a certain assessment of 
salience by the subject. In the high salience condition the importance of the island is 
indicated on the strategic (intelligence collection), economic (petroleum), and cultural 
dimensions. These are structured around more general contemporary foreign policy 
concerns - terrorism and dependence on Middle East oil. In the low salience conditions 
these general concerns are not mentioned. Discussion of the importance of the island is 
restricted to the cultural dimensions, with mention of a former strategic purpose. 
In all other respects the background information given to the subjects was identical. 
The information provided in the “events” which followed the instructions and briefing 
materials was the same for both high and low salience conditions. This ensured that the 
manipulation was consistent across all subjects and not a function of how far into the 
conflict, or “event set” they progressed before choosing to negotiate. 
Pain 
What is important in the context of this experiment is not the direct relationship 
between public opinion and casualties. Rather it is the effect that public opinion has on a 
decision maker’s reaction to costs, represented by casualties. So, the general prediction is 
that when the majority of the public supports a policy, then public opinion will act as an 
anesthetic and decrease the impact of casualties on a decision maker’s perception of the 
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painfulness of a conflict. When a majority do not support of a policy, however, the decision 
maker, feeling the pressure of public disapproval, will become more sensitized to casualties.            
The effects of public opinion are also not directly measurable in an empirical 
context33, but can be clearly manipulated in an experimental context. This was done by 
creating two versions of the event sets. In the casualty condition, information about the 
progress of the crisis included the number of cumulative casualties, updated after each 
event. In the public opinion condition subjects were also given information regarding the 
current level of public support for the conflict. No instructions were given regarding how 
much, if any attention the subjects should pay to these figures when that made their 
decisions. So, unlike the salience manipulation, the pain manipulation was undertaken 
during the course of the experiment itself. This is particularly important to keep in mind 
when it comes to the public opinion variable, as public support does not drop below 50% 
until event 16.  
 
Experimental Procedure 
The experiment, introduced as a study of foreign policy decision making, was 
conducted in regular political science classes at Texas A&M University. Subjects were 
informed that they were to play the role of chief foreign policy advisor to the President of 
the United States, and instructed that it was their job to advise the President on the best 
action to take, given the current circumstances34.  They were then exposed to an unfolding 
                                                 
33 Although public opinion data is available for some more recent crises it is extremely limited.  
34 The process of the experiment is represented graphically in Figure 3.5. 
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foreign policy crisis over a fictional island archipelago – the Kell Islands with a fictional 
South American country – Hendara35.  
The experiment was carried out on a web-based computer platform which enabled 
the subjects to view information and make choices at their own pace. The order in which 
information can be accessed however, is linear and unidirectional, giving the experimenter 
much greater control over how subjects acquire information and enabling a greater 
uniformity across subjects.  
Before beginning their decision process subjects were provided with information 
regarding: 1) the history of the dispute; 2) their opponent – a fictional South American 
country called Hendara: 3) the event which triggered the current crisis; 4) their task in the 
experiment. The subjects then moved to the first of a series of events, which detail an 
escalation in the crisis. After reading each event they chose between one of two 
recommendations to make to the President: 1) continue military action; 2) offer to negotiate 
with the Hendarans. These alternatives represent the two strategies identified by the theory 
as available to countries involved in a dispute: a conflictual strategy, or a cooperative 
strategy, and examples are given in Figure 4.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 The 1982 Falkland / Malvinas war between Great Britain and Argentina was used as the basis of this 
scenario and a source of information regarding the escalation of the conflict, public opinion levels and 
international response.   
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The experiment terminates when either the subject chooses to advise negotiation, or 
all 27 “events” are accessed36. In the first case, the subject was told their opponent had 
agreed to negotiate, in the second they were told that their opponent had surrendered. In 
both cases the outcome was presented as a success. The subjects were then given an 
anonymous post-experimental questionnaire and asked to indicate their responses to a 
number of inferential statements about the country and their perception of the costs 
incurred prior to the end of the crisis (see Appendix C). 
As well as providing information on the progress of the conflict each event in the 
event set was matched with changes in the cumulative casualty count and public support for 
                                                 
36 For full text of all instructions see Appendix A, for a full text of all “events” see Appendix B. 
FIGURE 4.2 Experiment I: Example of Events  
 Public Opinion Condition         Casualty Condition 
 
DAY 18 of the CONFLICT   
 
A 12-man team of US Special Forces struck a 
Hendaran installation on Pebble Island, blowing 
up an ammunition dump and destroying 8 planes.  
 
After the severe damage sustained by its ships 
over the past two days, the newly arrived 
Hendaran fleet has withdrawn from Kell and all 
indications are it is retreating to Hendara. Military 
intelligence indicates that the Hendaran forces 
have been hard-hit by recent US attacks and face 
shortages of food and ammunition. 
 
DoD CUMULATIVE CASUALTY COUNT: 94 
Do you advise the President to: 
 
Continue military 
action 
Offer to negotiate 
with Hendara 
DAY 18 of the CONFLICT   
 
A 12-man team of US Special Forces struck a 
Hendaran installation on Pebble Island, blowing 
up an ammunition dump and destroying 8 planes.  
 
After the severe damage sustained by its ships 
over the past two days, the newly arrived 
Hendaran fleet has withdrawn from Kell and all 
indications are it is retreating to Hendara. Military 
intelligence indicates that the Hendaran forces 
have been hard-hit by recent US attacks and face 
shortages of food and ammunition. 
 
DoD CUMULATIVE CASUALTY COUNT: 94 
CURRENT PUBLIC SUPPORT for CONFLICT:  67% 
 
Do you advise the President to: 
 
Continue military 
action 
Offer to negotiate 
with Hendara 
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the conflict. These two measures enabled manipulation of the pain variable. In the casualty 
condition subjects were only provided with the casualty data. In the public opinion 
condition they received both the casualty and public support data. Figure 4.3 provides a 
graphical representation of these measures over the course of the 27 events.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Logically, casualties increased over the course of the conflict. Public, opinion, as discussed 
above decreased over the course of the conflict. It is important to keep in mind when 
interpreting the results, however, that public support for the conflict remained above 50% 
until the sixteenth event.   
 
FIGURE 4.3 Casualty and Public Opinion Patterns for the Event Set 
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Internal Validity – Manipulation Check 
Fifty-seven undergraduate students participated in this experiment. Subjects were 
randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions. Before evaluating the effect 
of the pain and salience variables it was first necessary to determine whether the 
manipulated variables were perceived accurately by the subjects. Responses to the post-
experimental questionnaire provide manipulation tests across a variety of questions. 
Sensitivity to Issue Salience: Sensitivity to issue salience was tested by three questions37 
and perceived accurately in all cases. The one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the 
subjects’ responses to the question regarding the overall importance of the Islands to the 
US yielded a significant effect of the manipulation. The findings suggest that subjects in the 
high salience condition evaluated the Islands to be of greater importance38 to the US 
(M=9.83) than did subjects in the low salience condition (M=4.63), [F (1, 52) = 3.36, p 
=.036 (one tailed)]. When the results for all three salience questions are examined, they too 
yield a significant effect for the manipulation. Once again the findings suggest that subjects 
in the high salience condition regard the conflict to be more important to the US in terms 
of national security, international position and reputation (M = 7.95), than did subjects in 
the low salience condition (M = 5.00), [F (1, 52) = 8.47, p = .002 (one tailed)].  
The difference between the salience measures was not significant, but the order was 
as expected. Overall importance was greatest (M = 7.32), then international reputation (M = 
7.10), with national security scoring lowest (M = 5.18). It may initially seem counter-
                                                 
37 8. Overall, how important do you consider the conflict over Kell to be to the United States? 
   9. How important do you consider control of Kell to be to the national security of the United States? 
  10. How important do you consider maintaining control of Kell to be to the international position and 
reputation of the United States? 
38 Unless otherwise noted all questions are rated on a ten-point scale:  1: not at all important – 10: extremely 
important.  
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intuitive that international reputation was considered to be more important than national 
security it must be remembered that the subjects were representing the United States and 
creating a realistic scenario in which the contemporary United States’ national security is 
seriously threatened is extremely difficult.  
Sensitivity to Public Opinion. The public opinion manipulation was tested by a 
question39 regarding the extent to which loss of domestic support for the President 
influenced the subject. The one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the subjects’ 
responses to the question regarding the influence of domestic support on their advice to the 
President yielded a significant effect of the manipulation. The findings suggest that subjects 
in the public opinion condition, who were given updated figures regarding public support 
for the conflict, reported their advice as being more influenced by loss of support for the 
President (M = 6.03). Subjects in the casualty condition, who were given no information 
regarding public support levels reported loss of domestic support as having a lesser affect 
on their advice to the President (M = 4.04), [F = (1, 52) = 9.33, p = .001 (one tailed)]. 
 
Results 
This experiment provides a means by which to test the most general proposition 
presented in this research: that people will fight harder and endure more pain for something 
they hold to be important. In doing so, however, it also provides considerable insight into 
the relationship between pain, casualties and issue salience. Furthermore, the post-
experimental questionnaire raises some interesting inconsistencies between individual’s 
                                                 
39 To what extent did the following factors influence the advice you gave to the President? 
 12: Loss of domestic support for the President. 
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choices and pain thresholds and their self-reported thresholds. The first step, however, is to 
determine the extent to which the findings support the theoretical expectations.  
Extent of Military Action 
One of the most basic tests of the theory is whether or not subjects in high salience 
conditions progressed further with military action than did those in low salience conditions. 
This can be determined by looking at the number of events subjects viewed before 
choosing the option to negotiate. As shown in Figure 4.4, participants in the high salience 
condition did in fact continue longer with military action (M = 12.10) than did those in the 
low salience condition M = 7.0). The between-subject ANOVA yielded a significant main 
effect for issue salience [F = (1, 52) = 4.97, p = .015 (one tailed)].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.4 Experiment I: Mean Number of Events Prior to 
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This finding supports the theoretical expectation that people will fight harder for 
something they consider important. It is also supported by the findings regarding casualties. 
Subjects in high salience conditions incurred more casualties before moving to negotiation 
(M = 241.45) than did subjects in low salience conditions (M = 132). Once again the 
between-subject ANOVA showed a significant main effect for issue salience [F = (1, 52) = 
5.26, p =. 012 (one tailed)].  
Perceptions of Pain  
The second central factor that the experiment is designed to examine is how public 
opinion and issue salience affect decision makers’ perceptions of pain. Within the 
experimental instructions, scenario and events no direct mention was made of pain. In the 
post-experimental questionnaire, however, subjects were asked a number of questions 
regarding their perception of the painfulness of the specific conflict presented in the 
experiment and such conflicts in general.    
Pain Responses to the Experimental Conflict 
The most direct indication of pain was responses to a question regarding how 
painful the subjects considered the conflict with Kell40. In line with the theoretical 
expectations subjects in the low salience conditions regarded the conflict to be more painful 
(M=46.7) than did those in high salience conditions (M = 39.3), however, these results were 
not significant. Those subjects who received information regarding public support found 
the conflict to be slightly less painful (M = 40.51) than did those who only received casualty 
data (M= 45.41). Again, as shown in Figure 4.5, this difference was not significant. 
                                                 
40 On a scale of 0 -100 mark and indicate with a number how painful you consider this conflict to be to the 
United States. 
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Keeping in mind that public support in the experiment did not drop below 50% 
until event 16, and the mean number of events viewed in the public opinion conditions was 
9.44. It does suggest, however, that majority support for a conflict can have an anesthetizing 
effect on a decision maker’s perception of pain. Figure 4.6 indicates the mean stopping 
points for each condition, relative to both casualties and public opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.5 Experiment I: Mean Reported Pain of Conflict  
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Interpreting Pain in the Experimental Context 
It must be remembered that one of the central ideas in the theory is that pain is 
conceptually different from costs. In particular, that it is context dependent in nature. For 
this reason, simply assessing the experimental findings on the basis of these self-reported 
levels of pain does not tell the whole story. In order to obtain a closer test of the theory it is 
necessary to determine what underlies those pain measures. In this case such a measure can 
be gained by examining the number of casualties which resulted in the particular level of 
pain for each subject. That is, for each subject, dividing the number of casualties 
experienced (as a function of the event at which they chose negotiation and the experiment 
ended), by their self-reported evaluation of the painfulness of the conflict they experienced.  
FIGURE 4.6 Mean Negotiation Event by Condition 
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The variable constructed from the casualty and pain variables will be referred to as 
the relative casualty value. This variable indicates that, in high salience conditions, it took a 
greater number of casualties to move a subject one unit of pain (M = 7.37) than it did in 
low salience conditions (M = 3.48). The between-subjects ANOVA showed a significant 
main effect for issue salience [F = (1, 52) = 5.52, p =. 012 (one tailed)].  
Those subjects in conditions where public opinion information was provided 
required more casualties (M= 6.0) to achieve a unit increase in pain than did those who only 
received casualty information (M = 4.9), although the results were not significant. These 
results may at first appear inconsistent with the literature, but they do reflect two separate 
components of public opinion studies. First, most of the subjects in the public opinion 
condition only saw public support figures above 50%41. Consequently, theory would lead us 
to expect that knowledge of public opinion would have an anesthetizing effect on pain, as 
indicated in the pain results above. This would, in turn, be translated in a higher relative 
casualty value. The accuracy of this assumption is supported by the finding that in all but 
one case subjects in all conditions indicated that the US public supported the President42. 
Furthermore, both the literature and common wisdom tell us that Americans will 
not support the loss of US soldiers in foreign conflicts. This is an attitude that is assumed to 
be known to, if not shared by, most subjects. Consequently, in the absence of evidence to 
the contrary (high public support information), we can expect subjects to be more sensitive 
to casualties. This assumption is supported by responses to the question regarding the 
                                                 
41 77% of subjects chose to negotiate prior to event 16, after which public support dropped below 50%. 
42 Post-experimental questionnaire, Q3: Overall, how did the American public and media respond to the 
conflict?  Supported the President/Did not support the President/were indifferent to the conflict. 
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influence of military losses on advice given to the President43. The findings, although not 
significant, indicate that military losses had more influence on the subjects’ advice in the 
public opinion conditions (M = 9.6) than they did in the casualty condition (M = 6.0). 
Similarly, those subjects in the public opinion conditions considered the cost of military 
action to be more important to their decision to negotiate (M=5.70) than did those in the 
casualty condition (M= 4.92).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7 suggests that, when assessing the impact of casualties on an actor’s 
decision to offer negotiation, context matters. That is, the pain associated with incurring 
                                                 
43 To what extent did the following factors influence the advice you gave to the President? 
 11: Military losses suffered by the US. 
FIGURE 4.7 Experiment I: Relative Casualty Values  
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casualties is related to the salience of that conflict. In conflicts that are considered to be 
important, subjects indicated that their perception of pain, as measured in casualties was 
lower, than it was in less important conflicts. Furthermore, subject’s assessment of pain is 
influenced by the level of public support a conflict elicits.  
What Influenced the Advice Subjects Gave?  
The model predicts that pain and issue salience will influence the timing of a 
subject’s assessment of a crisis decision and whether fighting or talking is the best strategy 
to adopt. Several of the questions in the post-experimental questionnaire were specifically 
designed to provide an indication of how subjects processed and evaluated such 
information. They were asked to rate the extent to which military losses, domestic support, 
the issue itself and the international reputation of the US influenced the advise they gave the 
President. According to the theory, military losses and the issue itself should be the most 
influential factors. Furthermore, the issue should carry greater weight in high salience 
conditions, and military losses in cases where there were more casualties.  
The findings from a within-subjects ANOVA indicate that there is a significant 
difference between these factors, [F= (3, 156) = 6.97, p = .000]. The issue itself was the 
most influential (M = 6.7), followed by military losses (M = 6.45), international reputation 
(M = 5.3) and domestic support (M = 5.1). This supports the expectations of the model. 
Furthermore, there is a significant (p=.02) negative correlation between cumulative 
casualties and the influence of military losses. In cases where subjects “fought” less and 
sustained fewer casualties, military losses were reported as having a greater influence on 
their advice, indicating a greater sensitivity to costs. Again, as Figure 4.8 demonstrates, 
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although not significant this relationship is supported by the greater emphasis placed on 
military losses shown in low salience conditions.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparing Subjects’ Motivations for Negotiating  
The final question which must be addressed regarding the theory is the extent to 
which subjects’ decision to negotiate was influence by the costs they experienced during the 
course of the conflict. The model this experiment is designed to test proposes that the pain 
an actor experiences during a conflict drives his/her decision to negotiate. How much pain 
the actor is willing to endure is largely determined by the importance of the issue at stake. 
This pain is a function of the costs accumulated during the conflict, translated by the 
decision maker’s sensitivity to those costs.  
FIGURE 4.8 Relative Influences on Advice 
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Several of the questions in the post-experimental questionnaire were specifically 
designed to provide an indication of how subjects processed and evaluated the information 
they received during the course of the experiment. They were asked to rate to what extent 
military losses, domestic support, the issue itself and the international reputation of the US 
influenced the advise they gave the President. According to the theory, military losses and 
the issue itself should be the most influential factors. Furthermore, the issue should carry 
greater weight in high salience conditions and military losses in cases where there were more 
casualties.  
Thus, several predictions can be made regarding the findings concerned with both 
the factors which influenced the advice subjects gave to the President and those which 
motivated their decision to negotiate. First, costs will become increasingly important as 
subjects progress further into the conflict. Second, costs will be more influential on subjects 
in low salience and casualty44 conditions.  
There was a significant (p = .009) negative correlation between cumulative casualties 
and the extent to which subject’s were motivated to negotiate as a result of military losses. 
This supports the theoretical expectation that the costs of conflict make negotiation a more 
attractive alternative. Overall, subjects in low salience conditions proved to be more 
motivated to negotiate45 across all dimensions (M = 6.0), than did those in high salience 
                                                 
44 It must be remembered that the majority of subjects only experienced majority public support for the 
conflict and so we expect knowledge of public opinion to have an anesthetizing effect on the impact of cost 
and pain. 
45 Analysis is based on answers to three questions in the post-experimental questionnaire: To what extent did 
the following considerations match your main reason for negotiating:  
1. Maintaining control of Kell through military action was not worth the cost (in terms of lives, 
expenditure, public opinion and international opinion). [cost] 
2. The belief that negotiation should be attempted before engaging in military action. [SOP] 
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conditions (M=5.6), although the finding was not significant it lends general support to the 
expectation that actors involved in low salience conflicts will be more motivated to 
negotiate. There was little or no difference between the level of motivation felt by subjects 
in the casualty condition (M=5.7) and those in the public opinion condition (M=5.84). As 
figure 4.9 demonstrates, comparing across dimensions, no significant difference was found 
in the impact between costs, SOP, or information as a rationale for offering negotiation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
3. A desire to gain more information about what the Hendaran’s wanted before committing to further 
military action. [information] 
 
FIGURE 4.9 Reasons for Offering to Negotiate 
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Discussion 
Before moving to a discussion of how this research can be expanded, the question 
of the ability of experimental methodology to examine questions such as those raised in this 
model must be addressed. The internal validity of experimentation as a means of testing 
hypotheses can be directly tested46 and is accepted by international relations scholars and 
political scientists more generally (Kinder and Palfrey 1993). Debate remains, however, over 
the method’s external validity. Particularly relevant to this design is the criticism of the use 
of “novice” decision makers (undergraduates), as a proxy for “expert” decision makers47.  
The basis of this criticism lies in the belief that the greater experience and 
knowledge of policymakers and politicians influences their problem-solving processes and 
thus is reflected in their decisions (Wagner and Hollenbeck, 1998; Klein 1989; DeFong and 
Ferguson-Hessler 1987; Phelps and Shanteau, 1978). This debate really boils down whether 
or not there is a substantive difference between how experts and novices process 
information.  The findings from several experiments suggest this is not the case. Experts 
have been found to be likely to use heuristics in a similar manner to novices (Gaeth and 
Shanteau, 1984; Christensen-Szalanski, et.al. 1983). The literature also suggests that, in 
general expert judgment is sub-optimal and naive and expert subjects demonstrate the same 
biases48. 
Such debate aside, it should also be noted that, much like formal models, 
experiments are designed primarily to tests hypotheses deduced from a given theory and 
                                                 
46 See discussion of the results of the manipulation checks of salience and information reported in this results 
section. 
47 This discussion of external validity is taken from Geva and Skorick 2001. 
48 Discussed by Wright, Bolger and Rowe (1993: 217). 
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model. Additionally, experiments can also be employed to explore the consequences of 
controlled counterfactual scenarios that are derived from more loosely defined theories. 
Again, as with formal modeling, this gives us potential insight into what may happen, but 
did not as yet actually happen, in the real world (Mook 1983). In cases where the 
experiment is an appropriate representation and thus test of the theory, the findings merely 
support the logic of the theory. “What we seek to generalize is not the findings but the 
theory” (Geva and Skorick 2001).  
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CHAPTER V 
EXPERIMENT TWO: ISSUE SALIENCE & RECEIVING AN OFFER OF 
NEGOTIATION 
 
The results of Experiment I clearly demonstrated that, when the stakes are high, 
people fight both longer and harder before they offer to negotiate a resolution. That is, their 
pain threshold is higher. This suggests that the timing of negotiation offers are effected by 
both the duration and intensity (measured in terms of casualties) of the conflictual action. 
 The actual, self-reported levels of pain that Experiment I subjects felt, however, did 
not vary significantly between high and low salience conflicts. Subjects reported a similar 
mean level of pain, (within 7 points on a 100-point scale), whether the crisis was over a high 
or low salience issue. The underlying metric, however, was very different. It took 
approximately twice as many casualties to generate the same level of pain in high salience 
conditions than it did in low salience conditions.  In terms of the model, this supports the 
expectation that the accumulation of pain (measured in casualties) is slower in high salience 
conflicts than in low.  
Experiment I, therefore, begins to shed some light on the first research question: 
when will states involved in a conflict offer to negotiate? The context of the conflict is 
demonstrated to have a significant impact on the timing of negotiation offers. Both the 
salience of the issue itself, and the subject’s awareness, or lack thereof, of public support for 
the conflict effected when they chose to instigate negotiation49. What Experiment I cannot 
                                                 
49 Knowledge that public support for the conflict remained above 50% appeared to have a tranquilizing effect 
of pain, decreasing subject’s perception of the painfulness of the conflict and the relative pain value of 
individual casualty. As 81% of subjects in the public opinion conditions chose to negotiate before support 
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tell us, however, the likely response an offer of negotiation from their opponent would have 
been. That is, it cannot shed any light on the second research question: what effect receiving 
an offer of negotiation from one’s opponent will have on the timing of the move to 
negotiation. 
 
Experimental Design 
Experiment II addresses this issue directly, by introducing an offer to negotiate into 
the event sequence. Half of the subjects are exposed to the same scenario and events as 
those in the casualty conditions in Experiment I.  The other subjects receive the same 
introductory information and initial events. In addition, however, after the fourth event an 
offer of negotiation from the opposing actor is introduced. This provides an initial means 
of gauging if and how an actor’s willingness to negotiate is influenced by the demonstrated 
willingness of the opponent to negotiate. In terms of the model structure: whether receiving 
an offer of negotiation affects either the speed with which a decision maker reaches his/her 
pain threshold, and, whether such an event changes the decision maker’s threshold for pain 
itself.  
How Will Receiving an Offer of Negotiation Change an Actor’s Pain Threshold? 
There are two conflicting expectations regarding the timing of negotiation. The first 
argues that it is best to negotiate from a position of strength; implying that power on the 
battlefield translated into power at the negotiating table. The second contends that actors 
will seek to negotiate in order to avoid the costs of continued fighting. This interpretation 
                                                                                                                                                
for the conflict dropped below 50% Experiment I cannot tell us much about the effects of negative public 
opinion on a decision maker’s pain perception. 
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would imply that the actor offering to negotiate either a) no longer believes he can win the 
fight; or b) does not value the issue at stake enough to justify the costs of continued 
fighting. In either case, it is assumed that the actor’s perception has changed to one in 
which negotiation, rather than fighting, is the preferred strategy. In the first case, this 
change is driven by a comparison of gain, while in the second it is the desire to avoid 
further costs which motivates the actor’s strategy change.  
Therefore, there are two possible, competing effects that the opponent’s 
presentation of an offer may have on the decision maker’s own pain threshold. The first 
assumes the decision maker to be willing to increase his/her pain threshold in order to 
achieve a greater payoff. The second assumes that the prospect of avoiding further pain will 
outweigh the costs of compromising inherent in the agreement to negotiate, (at least in the 
abstract). This raises the interesting possibility that both expectations may be right, but that 
the decision maker’s choice is influenced by the importance s/he places on the issue. That 
is, is high salience conflicts, where decision makers have been shown to be more resilient to 
pain50, an offer is more likely to trigger a strategic response, increasing the decision maker’s 
own pain threshold. In low salience conflicts, however, when decision makers are more 
sensitive to pain, the domestic constraint explanation will hold and decision makers will be 
more likely to decrease their pain threshold in response to an offer of negotiation.  
H1A:  Actors in highly salience disputes will respond to an offer of negotiation from their 
opponent by fighting longer than they would have if no offer had been made, 
whereas in low salience conflicts, actors will respond to an offer of negotiation from 
an opponent by fighting for less time than they would have if no offer had been 
made.  
 
                                                 
50 See salience results for Experiment I. 
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The interactive effect of issue salience and offer derives from the decision maker’s 
interpretation of this information signal, which is expected to be affected by his/her own 
preferences and perceptions of the conflict. In essence, an offer is interpreted as a signal 
that the opponent has little or no reserve strength or motivation left, suggesting that, if the 
actor can increase his/her own pain tolerance (threshold) even marginally, there is a greater 
opportunity to win decisively. How the decision maker responds to this opportunity, that is 
how an increase in incurred costs is perceived, is theorized to be a function of the 
importance of the issue at stake. If the issue is highly salient, the increase in expected pain is 
expected to be outweighed by the benefits of a potential military victory. Winning on the 
battlefield increases the actor’s bargaining power, enabling him/her to make higher 
demands at settlement, thus preserving or gaining more of a highly valued good.  
In contrast, when the conflict is over a low salience issue an opponent’s offer of 
negotiation is expected to have the opposite effect; decreasing the decision maker’s pain 
threshold. The difference arises due to the increased sensitivity to costs (painfulness) and 
the decreased pain of compromising, implied in the willingness to negotiate. If a conflict is 
of little importance to an actor, an offer from the opponent presents an opportunity to 
avoid further pain either temporarily or permanently, if terms of settlement can be agreed 
upon. Furthermore, if the conflict is of low salience, public support for its resolution 
through use of force is likely to be lower, thus increasing the pain of costs incurred through 
fighting (sensitivity). The decision maker has, therefore, greater incentive to move to a 
negotiating strategy, and an opponent’s offer decreases the uncertainty over whether 
changing strategies will be successful, this decreasing the risk involved in moving to a 
negotiating strategy.  
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It is also possible, however, that regardless of the importance of the issue, decision 
makers behave strategically in response to an offer. An offer of negotiation would, 
therefore, be interpreted as a signal that the opponent had reached his/her own pain 
threshold. The value of continuing to fight would consequently be increased, as the 
certainty that complete victory through force was possible would be likewise greater. This 
creates an alternate hypothesis regarding the effect of an offer on the duration of conflict.  
H1B:  Actors will respond to an offer of negotiation from their opponent by fighting 
longer than they would have if no offer had been made.  
 
Regardless of which version of Hypothesis 1 gains support, the theory predicts that 
salience will influence the decision maker’s willingness to incur further pain if an alternative, 
in the form of an offer of negotiation, is presented. For this reason, it is expected that an 
offer will be accepted with greater alacrity in low salience conditions.  
H2:  In low salience conflicts, the delay between the receipt of an offer of negotiation 
from an opponent and its acceptance will be shorter than the delay in high salience 
conflicts.  
 
Salience and Pain 
The model developed in this research proposes that there is a relationship between 
an actor’s willingness to sustain and the context in which that pain is experienced. An 
actor’s pain threshold for a conflict is directly influenced by the importance s/he places on 
the issue at stake. This relationship is supported by the findings of Experiment I, and they 
are expected to be consistent in Experiment II. The hypotheses from Experiment I 
regarding the effects of issue salience on subjects’ perceptions of the painfulness of a 
conflict and the costs underlying that pain are carried over into Experiment II and provide a 
means of cross-validation by repetition.   
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H3:  Actors in highly salient disputes will progress further into a conflict before offering 
to negotiate.  
 
H4:  High salience conflicts will be associated with higher casualty levels than low 
salience conflicts. 
 
H5:  The number of casualties required to reach a particular level of pain will be lower in 
low salience conflicts than in high. 
The second experiment in this series was designed to examine how the receipt of an 
offer of negotiation effects an actor’s decision to move from a fighting strategy to a 
negotiation strategy. This decision is, in turn, expected to be influenced by the salience of 
the issue at stake and the subsequent willingness of the actor to endure pain. The 
experiment, introduced as a study on foreign policy decision making, was conducted with 
students from political science classes at Texas A&M University. Eighty-two51 
undergraduate students participated in this second experiment.  
The experiment uses a 2x2 between-groups design. The two factors are issue 
salience and whether an offer of negotiation was made by the opponent. As the model seeks 
to explain at what point in a conflict actors switch to a negotiation strategy the dependent 
variables were chosen to capture different elements of timing. Four specific measure of time 
were used: 1) the stage in the conflict at which the subject chose to negotiate52; 2) the 
cumulative number of casualties prior to negotiation; 3) the level of pain (self- reported) the 
subject associated with the conflict; and, for the offer conditions 4) how far after an offer 
was received was that offer accepted. 
                                                 
51 The results for fifteen subjects had to be discarded from the analysis of results for the following reasons: 1) 
their questionnaires were incomplete; 2) their answer to question 4 indicated they did not understand the 
terms of the offer; or 3) their answer to question 11 indicated they did not register that an offer of 
negotiation had been made. Sixty-seven subjects were therefore used in the analysis of results. 
52 Measured by the number of events subjects viewed before choosing the negotiate option and ending the 
experiment. 
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As with Experiment I, Experiment II was carried out using the Dec-tracer, a web-
based computer platform. Dec-tracer allows subjects to view information and make choices 
at their own pace. The order in which information can be accessed, however, is linear and 
unidirectional, giving the experimenter much greater control over how subjects acquire 
information and enabling a greater uniformity across subjects53. This feature is particularly 
important in this second experiment, as it enables control over if or when a subject receives 
an offer to negotiate, from his or her opponent.  
 
Experimental Procedure 
Subjects were informed that they were to play the role of chief foreign policy 
advisor to the President of the United States, and instructed that it was their job to advise 
the President on the best action to take, given the current circumstances.  They were then 
exposed to an unfolding foreign policy crisis over a fictional island archipelago – the Kell 
Islands - with a fictional South American country – Hendara54. Subjects were then randomly 
assigned to one of the four experimental conditions55.  
Before beginning their decision process, subjects were provided with background 
information regarding the history of the dispute, their opponent, the event which triggered 
the current crisis, and their task in the experiment. As with Experiment One, the salience 
manipulation was introduced at this stage56. The subjects were then exposed to the first of a 
                                                 
53 Compared to a paper and pencil based experiment where subjects can flip back and forward through the 
information and amend previous answers. 
54 The 1982 Falkland / Malvinas war between Great Britain and Argentina was used as the basis of this 
scenario and a source of information regarding the escalation of the conflict and international response.   
55 High salience/Offer; High salience/No Offer; Low salience/Offer; Low salience/No Offer. 
56 See Figure 4.1 for details of salience manipulation. 
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series of events, detailing an escalation in the crisis as well as the current cumulative number 
of casualties suffered by the US forces. In order to progress through the experiment each 
event prompted them to indicate their choice of strategy to recommend, given the 
information they had just received57. These choices reflected the two strategy options 
proposed in the model – continue with the conflict or offer to negotiate. Examples of such 
events, including the text of the negotiation offer, are given in Figure 5.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
57 The structure of the experiment is represented graphically in Figure 3.5. 
FIGURE 5.1 Experiment II: Example of Events  
Event 5, No Offer Condition       Event 5, Offer Condition 
 
DAY 16 of the CONFLICT  
 
 
 
You have received word from the Hendaran 
Foreign Minister that Pesident Leopoldi is 
interested in finding a negotiated solution to the 
conflict over Kell. He has indicated that the 
Hendaran offer will remain open indefinitely.  
 
 
Do you advise the President to:  
 
Continue military 
action 
Offer to negotiate 
with Hendara 
 
DAY 17 of the CONFLICT  
 
US forces continued to press the Hendaran 
occupying the main island as the Hendaran fleet 
came into range of the US fleet and the main 
Island. US ships and fighters sank a trawler, 
tanker and supply ship within hours of the fleet’s 
arrival. This leaves the Hendaran ground forces 
potentially short on food and ammunition.  
Extreme bad weather and low visibility has 
grounded US planes, leaving ground forces 
without air support or reconnaissance. 19 marines 
were killed and 22 soldiers wounded after being 
ambushed by Hendaran forces in a deserted 
village late yesterday afternoon.  
UN Secretary general Kofi Annan, meeting with 
high level US and Hendaran officials, again urged 
Hendara and the US to find a peaceful resolution 
to the crisis.  
 
DoD CUMULATIVE CASUALTY COUNT: 78 
 
Do you advise the President to:  
 
Continue military 
action 
Offer to negotiate 
with Hendara 
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The experiment terminated when either the subject chooses to advise negotiation, 
or all 27 events (28 in the case of offer conditions) were accessed58. In the first case, the 
subject was told their opponent has agreed to negotiate. In the second, they were told that 
their opponent has surrendered59. In both cases, the outcome was presented as a success. 
The subjects were then given a post-experimental questionnaire and asked to indicate their 
responses to a number of inferential statements about the country and their perception of 
the costs incurred prior to the end of the crisis (see Appendix C). 
As in Experiments One and Three, pain was manipulated through increases in 
casualties, which logically increased over the course of the conflict, the pattern of 
accumulation matching that used in Experiment I60. 
Offer Manipulation 
To test the effect of an offer to negotiate by an opponent (Hypotheses 1&2), two 
versions of the event set were created. The first was the same as that used in the casualty 
conditions in Experiment I. The second was based on this event set but had an additional 
event – the offer - inserted after the fourth event. The placement of the offer as the fifth 
event was chosen by analyzing the cases from Experiment I. A balance needed to be 
achieved between: 1) introducing the offer too early, thereby indicating a level of 
commitment on the part of the opponent incompatible with their action in invading the 
Islands; and 2) introducing the offer too late, leaving many of the offer condition subjects 
without exposure to the manipulation, thus rendering analysis and interpretation of results 
problematic. A frequency analysis of when subjects in Experiment I chose to negotiate 
                                                 
58 For full text of all instructions see Appendix A, for full text of “events” please see Appendix B. 
59 Of the sixty-seven subjects, only two reached the final event.   
60 See Figure 4.2 for casualty pattern over course of event set. 
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indicated that, overall (all conditions), 57.2 % reached or passed the 5th event. Consistent 
with the general findings regarding conflict duration, this percentage was significantly 
different between high salience conditions (69% at or beyond 5 events) and low (44.5% at 
or beyond 5 events). These results suggested that, although placing the offer at event 5 
would, in effect, move some subjects from the offer to the non-offer category, it would still 
ensure enough reached the offer to enable meaningful analysis. More importantly, it 
provided enough opportunities for developing the conflict and providing indications to the 
subject of their opponent’s conflictual performance.  
There were also modifications made to the instructions subjects were given 
regarding their decision task, prior to beginning the experiment. In all conditions, subjects 
were informed that they might receive an offer of negotiation from their opponent, which 
did not have to be accepted immediately. It was further explained that they had the option 
to continue with military action and negotiate at a later point61. There was also a question 
added to the post-experimental questionnaire designed to check the subjects’ understanding 
of the terms of the offer. If their answer indicated they had not accurately understood their 
response options, their results were excluded from the final analysis62.    
The subjects were given no instruction regarding how much attention they should 
pay to these casualty figures when making their decisions. Unlike the salience manipulation, 
the pain manipulation was undertaken during the course of the experiment itself. This is 
particularly important to keep in mind when interpreting the findings, as the point at which 
                                                 
61 Text in instructions read: “Please Note: If you receive an offer of negotiation from the Hendarans you do 
not have to accept it immediately. You have the option to continue with military action after an offer is 
made and choose to negotiate at a later time of your choosing.” 
62 See footnote 3. 
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the subject chose negotiation, thus ending the experiment, varied creating variance in the 
exposure to pain-inducing factors.  
 
Internal Validity – Manipulation Check 
As with Experiment I, this experiment provides a means by which to test the most 
general proposition presented in this research: that people will fight harder and endure more 
pain before offering to negotiating when the issue at stake is highly salient. In addition, it 
provides a means by which to examine the second research question regarding acceptance 
of an offer of negotiation, and how acceptance of an opponent’s offer was influenced by 
the salience of the issue in dispute.   
As expected, subjects in high salience conditions progressed further into the conflict 
and endured more casualties (Hypotheses 3 and 4) than did those in low salience conditions, 
regardless of whether they received an offer or not. The relationship between pain and 
casualties does suggest that there is a contextual component to pain (Hypothesis 5). It took 
significantly fewer casualties to induce the same level of pain in low salience conditions as it 
did in high salience conditions. Before discussing the results in any detail, however, it is 
important to check that the subjects responded to the manipulation of salience measures. 
Sensitivity to Issue Salience. Sensitivity to issue salience was tested by three questions63 and was 
perceived accurately in all cases. The 2x2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the subjects’ 
responses to the question regarding the overall importance of Kell to the US yielded a 
                                                 
63 Overall, how important do you think this conflict is to the United States? 
  To what extent would losing access to Kell and the US military base there negatively affect the national 
security of the United States? 
  Will the international position of the US be negatively affected if the US is not able to maintain control of 
Kell and deter the Hendarans? 
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significant effect of the manipulation. The finding, shown in Table 5.1, suggests that 
subjects in the high salience condition evaluated the Islands to be of greater importance to 
the US64 (M=6.44) than did subjects in the low salience condition (M=5.03), [F (1, 63) = 
8.908, p < .004]. When the results for all three salience questions are examined, they too 
yield a significant effect for the manipulation. Subjects in the high salience condition regard 
the conflict to be more important to the US in terms of national security, international 
position (M = 7.76), than did subjects in the low salience condition (M = 5.64), [F (1, 63) = 
10.88, p < .002].  
 There was also a significant interaction between the three salience measures and the 
salience condition [F (1, 63) = 3.75, p = .026], when they were analyzed as a repeated 
measure.  In high salience conditions, national security was rated as most important 
(M=9.32), followed by international reputation (M=7.53) and overall importance of the 
crisis (M=6.44). In low salience conditions international reputation was regarded as the 
most important factor (M=7.45), almost as important as in the high salience conditions. In 
contrast overall importance was lower (M = 5.03). The greatest difference, however, is seen 
in the ratings of importance for national security, which were almost 5 points lower in the 
low salience condition (M= 4.42). Thus, the salience manipulation worked, with subjects 
clearly distinguishing between low and high salience conditions. 
 
 
                                                 
64 Unless otherwise noted all questions are rated on a ten-point scale:  1: not at all important – 10: extremely 
important.  
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 Understanding of the Terms of an Offer by the Opponent. Subject’s comprehension of the 
implications of receiving an offer from their opponent was tested in the post-experimental 
questionnaire. The first manipulation check was conducted by asking all subjects the 
following question: 
4. According to the instructions, an offer of negotiation from the Hendarans: 
 ____  would remain open for the duration of the conflict. 
 ____  had to be accepted immediately or it would be withdrawn. 
 
All but six subjects correctly indicated the first answer. Of these six, only two were in offer 
conditions. A later question was designed to test whether the subjects were sensitive to the 
receipt of an offer: 
11. Did the offer of negotiation from the Hendaran government make you more willing 
to consider recommending negotiating to the President? 
    ___   no 
    ___   yes, more willing to recommend negotiation 
    ___  I did not receive an offer of negotiation 
TABLE 5.1    Issue Salience Measures:  Means for Repeated Measures 
Questionnaire wording High Salience Low Salience 
Overall, how important do you think this conflict 
is to the United States? 
6.44 5.0 
To what extent would losing access to Kell and 
the US military base there negatively affect the 
national security of the US? 
9.32 4.42 
Will the international reputation of the US be 
negatively affected if the US is not able maintain 
control of Kell and deter the Hendarans? 
7.53 7.45 
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 That is, did they register whether they had received an offer or not. If subjects in 
the no offer conditions answered yes or no, their results were excluded from the analysis65. 
Nine subjects fell into this category, (one also incorrectly answered question 4), meaning 
that fourteen subjects were excluded from analysis as a result of the offer manipulation. The 
offer manipulation can, therefore, be considered completely effective. All subjects analyzed 
understood the terms of an offer from their opponent and accurately reported whether or 
not they received such an offer during the course of the experiment.  
 
Results 
At What Point in the Conflict Did Subjects Offer to Negotiate?  
 One of the most basic tests of the model is whether the results regarding conflict 
duration are consistent with the expectations of Hypothesis 3 and the findings of 
Experiment I. This simplest way to determine this is by looking at the number of events 
subjects viewed before choosing the option to negotiate. Participants in the high salience 
condition did in fact continued longer with military action (M= 8.91) than did those in the 
low salience condition, (M = 5.85). The between-groups ANOVA yielded a significant main 
effect for issue salience [F (1, 63) = 4.04, p < .05], as shown in Figure 5.2.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
65 Subjects in the offer conditions, who reached the 5th event (the offer), but responded that they had not 
received an offer  would also have been excluded, except that no subjects fell into this category.  
  
100
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In high salience conditions, people fight harder as well as longer. That is, the 
findings indicate that willingness to suffer casualties is influenced by the perceived 
importance of the conflict. Subjects in high salience conditions incurred more casualties66 
before moving to negotiation (M = 149.21) than did subjects in low salience conditions (M 
= 98.61). The effect is significant for a one-tailed test, which is appropriate given the 
directional nature of Hypothesis 4, [F (1, 63) = 2.79, p < .05].  
 
 
                                                 
66 Analysis was done using the actual cumulative number of casualties incurred by the event at which the 
subject chose to negotiate, enabling comparison across subjects. In order to make sure that this manipulated 
casualty level was perceived by the subjects they were asked in the post-experimental questionnaire to 
indicate how many casualties the US sustained during the conflict. A correlation analysis indicates that their 
estimates were very close to the actual cumulative casualty level (r = .917, P<.0001). 
FIGURE 5.2 Experiment II: Mean Number of Events Prior to 
Negotiating 
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Is There a Relationship Between Issue Salience and Pain Thresholds?  
The second central factor that the experiment is designed to examine is how issue 
salience affects decision makers’ perceptions of pain. As with Experiment I, the 
experimental instructions, scenario, and events, made no direct mention of pain. In the 
post-experimental questionnaire, however, subjects were asked a number of questions 
regarding their perception of the painfulness of the specific conflict presented in the 
experiment. 
The most direct indication of pain was indicated by responses to a question 
regarding how painful the subjects considered the conflict with Kell67. In line with the 
theoretical expectations subjects in the low salience conditions regarded the conflict to be 
more painful (M=39.5) than did those in high salience conditions (M = 31.7), as with 
Experiment I, these results, shown in Figures 5.3 and 5.4, were not significant [F (1, 63) = 
2.88, p = .097]. However, as we know from the discussion of Experiment I, this finding, 
does not really tell us much. All conflicts are expected to induce pain, what is expected to 
change is the cost metric underlying that measure of pain.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
67
Consider the cost of military action, the risk of public disapproval of the President and death of US troops 
that were described in the events you just reviewed.  
 Given all these factors, mark and number on the scale below, how painful this conflict was to the United 
States. 
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Does Pain Mean Different Things in Different Conflicts?  
One of the central ideas proposed in the model is that pain is conceptually different 
from costs and is, in fact, context dependent in nature. By examining the number of 
casualties resulting in the particular level of pain for each subject, we can achieve an 
indication of the metric underlying perceived levels of pain68. The relative casualty variable 
indicates that, in high salience conditions, it took a greater number of casualties to move a 
subject one unit of pain69 (M = 5.96) than it did in low salience conditions (M = 2.79). The 
                                                 
68 As discussed in Experiment I, this measure was constructed by dividing the number of casualties 
experienced by each subject, (as a function of the event at which they chose negotiation and the experiment 
ended), by their self-reported evaluation of the painfulness of the conflict they experienced. The variable 
constructed from the casualty and pain variables will be referred to as the relative casualty value. 
69 Pain was measured on a scale of 0-100. 
FIGURE 5.3 Experiment II: Mean Reported Pain of Conflict 
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between-subject ANOVA showed a significant main effect for issue salience [F (1, 63) = 
7.25, p =. 009]. These figures are consistent with Experiment I. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 5, these results indicate that context matters when 
assessing the impact of casualties on an actor’s decision to offer negotiation. As shown in 
Figure 5.5, the perceived pain of incurring casualties is related to the salience of a particular 
conflict.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Does Receiving an Offer of Negotiation Change Things? 
The expectations regarding the effects of an offer on the strategy choice of an actor 
were not as clear as the expectations regarding issue salience. Two competing hypotheses 
FIGURE 5.4 Experiment II: Relative Casualty Values 
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were developed. Hypothesis 1A predicted an interactive effect between issue salience and the 
receipt of an offer. Hypothesis 1B predicted a simpler, main effect of an offer. The results 
were consistent with Hypothesis 1 B: subjects progressed further into the crisis in high 
salience condition when they received an offer (M = 9.65) than when they did no (M = 
8.18), and this relationship carried over into the low salience condition as well, (offer M = 
6.0; no offer M = 5.69), although its effect is negligible. Overall, the interaction between 
issue salience and the presence of an offer predicted in Hypothesis 1A is not significant [F 
(1, 63) = < 1.0, p = .70).  
Another way of determining how an offer of negotiation affects decision makers’ 
strategy choice is to look at the delay between receiving an offer of negotiation and 
accepting it. According to Hypothesis 2, we would expect to see a longer delay in high 
salience conditions than in low. As an offer was only incorporated into the event sets for 
offer conditions, this analysis looks at the subset of cases in which an offer was made. The 
findings indicate that, as predicted, there is a longer delay between the receipt of an offer 
and its acceptance in high salience conditions (M = 4.65), than in low salience conditions 
(M = 1.00), although this relationship is not significant [F (1, 32) = 2.39, p = .132). 
What Influenced the Advice Subjects Gave? 
Several of the questions in the post-experimental questionnaire were specifically 
designed to provide an indication of how subjects processed and evaluated the information 
they received during the course of the experiment. They were asked to rate to what extent 
military losses, domestic support, the issue itself and the international reputation of the US 
influenced the advise they gave the President. According to the theory, military losses and 
the issue itself should be the most influential factors. Furthermore, the issue should carry 
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greater weight in high salience conditions and military losses in cases where there were more 
casualties.  
The findings from a 2x2x4 mixed between-within subjects ANOVA indicate that 
there is a significant difference between these factors, [F(3, 189) = 13.39, p < .0001]. The 
issue itself was the most influential (M = 6.7), followed by military losses (M = 5.9), 
international reputation (M = 5.0) and domestic support (M = 4.4). The repeated measures 
analysis also indicates that there is a significant interaction between the categories of 
influence (issue, military losses, international reputation and domestic support) and issue 
salience [F (3, 189) = 13.39, p = .0002]. This relationship is driven by the increased 
importance placed on military losses in low salience conditions and the issue in high salience 
conditions, which provides further support for the theory. These findings, illustrated in 
Figure 5.5, support the general proposition of the model regarding the importance of the 
issue at stake and the pain experienced on a decision makers’ move to a negotiation strategy. 
They also replicate the findings of Experiment I, providing cross-validation. 
Analysis of the independent influence of military losses indicates that  this cost factor was 
rated as significantly more influential on advice by subjects in the low salience condition (M 
= 6.64), compared to those in high salience conditions (M = 5.14), [F(1, 63)  7.92, p = .007]. 
This finding provides further support for Hypothesis 5. Furthermore, there is a significant 
(r = -.276, p =.023) negative correlation between cumulative casualties and the influence of 
military losses. 
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In cases where subjects “fought” less and sustained fewer casualties, military losses 
were reported as having a greater influence on their advice, indicating a greater sensitivity to 
costs. When the correlation is split by salience, it can be seen that, as expected, the strength 
of the relationship is driven by the low salience cases (r = - .372, p =. 03), rather than the 
high, (r = .053, p = .771). As figure 5.5 demonstrates, although not significant this 
relationship is supported by the greater emphasis placed on military losses in low salience 
conditions.   
Consistent with the findings regarding issue salience, the issue itself also shows an 
independent effect on subjects’ advice [F (1, 63) 6.87, p = .011]. Matching the expectations 
of the theory, subjects rated the issue itself as having a greater influence over their advice in 
FIGURE 5.5 Interaction Between Relative Influences on Advice and 
Issue Salience 
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high salience conditions (M = 7.38), than in low (M = 5.97). International opinion also 
proves to have a significantly different influence on subjects’ advice, according to their 
salience condition [F (1, 63) 4.9, p = .031]. In low salience conditions international opinion 
was more influential on subjects’ advice (M = 5.85) than it was in high salience conditions 
(M = 4.15). This is consistent with the expectation that in low salience conflicts, actors may 
consider the resort to use of force to be less justified, thus exacerbating the pain associated 
with fighting. The effects of domestic opinion were not significantly different between high 
and low salience conditions when analyzed independently. The difference was, however, in 
the direction expected, with domestic opinion having a greater influence on advice in low 
salience conditions. 
 
Comparing Subjects’ Reasons for Negotiating 
The results discussed so far support the theoretical expectation that what drives an 
actor involved in a conflict to move from a fighting strategy to one of negotiation is the 
pain experienced because of the costs involved in conflictual action. However, other factors 
are considered to influence an actor’s decision to negotiate. The post-experimental 
questionnaire asked subjects to rate the importance of three additional motivations for 
negotiation on their advice to the President; information, standard operating procedure 
(SOP) and strategic considerations70. 
                                                 
70 Information: “Negotiation provides an opportunity to gain useful information about you opponent and 
their demands.” 
SOP: “The belief that military action can only be justified if all other means of resolving a conflict have 
been attempted.” 
Strategic: “US forces had inflicted considerable damage on the Hendarans and this placed the US in a strong 
position to negotiate a settlement favorable to the US.” 
All questions are rated on a 10-point scale: 1 = not al all important – 10: extremely important. 
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When analyzed individually, neither information nor strategic considerations were 
effected by either salience or an offer. Where SOP is concerned, however there is a 
significant effect of salience [F (1, 63) 7.1, p = .01]. In high salience conditions SOP is 
considered as a less important motivation for negotiation (M = 5.91) than it is in low 
salience conditions (M = 7.46). This finding is also consistent with the expectation that in 
low salience conflicts actors are more sensitive to the expectations of others and take 
greater care to appear to be doing the right thing.  
Although, when considered together, there is no main effect of issue salience or 
offer on the importance of these motivations, a repeated measure analysis indicates that 
there is a significant difference in importance between them [F (2, 126) 3.116, p = .05]. 
Overall, strategic considerations have the greatest influence on subjects’ advice (M=7.0), 
followed by SOP (M = 6.67) and information (6.1). There is also a significant interaction 
between the motivation for negotiation and the salience condition [F (2, 126) 3.245, p < 
.05]. As Figure 5.6 illustrates, the interaction is driven largely by the variation in impact of 
SOP. As the individual analysis indicated, in high salience conditions, SOP is considerably 
less influential (M = 5.91) than it is in low salience conditions (M = 7.5). By contrast, high 
salience increases the importance of information (High: M = 6.21; Low: M = 5.91) and 
strategy (High: M = 7.12; Low: M = 7.0). 
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Discussion 
This experiment was designed to accomplish two things. First, it provides a means 
of cross validation through replication of the findings regarding issue salience from 
Experiment I. Second, it extends the experimental testing of the theory and model by 
addressing the second question raised by the model; will an offer from an opponent change 
the timing of an actor’s move to negotiation? As discussed earlier, in the context of the 
model change in the timing of negotiation implies a change in preference for fighting over 
negotiation, which can only occur if there is a change in either the actor’s tolerance for pain 
(threshold), or the speed of pain accumulation (slope). 
FIGURE 5.6 Interaction Between Motivation for Negotiation and Issue 
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Regarding the first issue, this experiment generated results for the effects of issue 
salience that were uniformly consistent with those of Experiment I. This provides a further 
indication of the strength of the effect of issue salience, as well as the stability of the 
salience manipulation used in both experiments. Issue salience proves to be an important 
predictor of the extent to which decision makers will pursue a conflictual strategy prior to 
offering, or accepting an opponent’s offer of, negotiation. The results of this second 
experiment consistently indicate that people will fight longer before negotiating when the 
issue they are fighting over is important to them. This finding holds across all measures of 
issue salience and all analyses of the relationship between conflict duration and salience. 
Issue salience also affects decision makers’ willingness to incur costs. Those who consider a 
conflict to be highly salient will sustain higher costs before searching for an alternative 
means of resolving the crisis.  
This finding lends support to the first expectation of the model; that the rate of pain 
accumulation will be faster (the slope of the line steeper) in low salience conflicts, as 
compared to high. This implies that the timing of offers of negotiation is affected not only 
by the duration of the conflict, but its intensity, measured in terms of casualties sustained. 
Both Experiments I and II demonstrate that subjects involved in high salience conflicts 
tolerated significantly more casualties prior to negotiating than did those in low salience 
conflicts. These findings regarding issue salience support the theoretical proposition that 
decision makers have pain thresholds associated with conflicts and that these thresholds are 
dependent on the importance they place on the issue at stake.  
While the theoretical expectations regarding issue salience were quite 
straightforward, those concerning the effects of an opponent’s offer of negotiation were 
  
111
more complex, and two alternate hypotheses were generated from the model. The first 
predicted an interactive effect of the opponent’s offer with the salience of the conflict. The 
second predicted a main effect of receipt of an offer increasing the duration of conflict 
prior to negotiation. The experimental findings supported the latter hypothesis: in both 
conditions the receipt of an offer from the opponent increased the duration of the conflict, 
although the relationship was not significant. There was, however, support for the 
prediction of Hypothesis 2 that the delay between receiving and accepting such an offer 
would be less in low salience conflicts than in high. 
These results provide a cross-validation by replication of the effects of issue salience 
and pain on the timing of offers to negotiate in militarized conflicts. They build on the 
findings of Experiment I by enabling examination of the effects of receipt of an offer of 
negotiation from an opponent affects the decision maker’s pain threshold and consequently 
his/her behavior and choices. In order to complete the experimental testing of the model, 
however, it remains to examine how the information an actor has available (casualty levels 
alone, or casualty and public support levels), influences his/her response to an offer of 
negotiation by the opponent. This analysis was carried out in Experiment III. 
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CHAPTER VI 
EXPERIMENT THREE: RECEIVING AN OFFER OF NEGOTIATION AND 
PUBLIC SUPPORT 
 
Experiment I provides an initial test of the basic proposition that the effect of 
objective costs – the pain they produce - is context dependent. It demonstrates that people 
will indeed fight harder and longer when they are fighting for something they consider 
important.  Further supporting the theoretical assumptions of the model are the findings 
regarding the effect of information regarding public support for the conflict. These findings 
suggest that awareness of public opinion further sensitizes decision makers to costs. This 
interpretation is supported by the literature (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995) which 
suggests that leaders are motivated by the desire to maintain power. More specific to the 
model, public opinion is demonstrated to have a tranquilizing effect on pain when there is 
majority support for a conflict. The fact that, when given no public support information, 
subjects rated the conflict as more painful may indirectly suggest that decision makers 
anticipate public aversion to casualties and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, 
factor it in to their calculation of the impact of such costs.  
Experiment I, therefore, begins to shed some light on the first research question: 
when will states involved in a conflict offer to negotiate? What it indicated, however, is the 
likely response to such an offer from the opponent. It does not address the second research 
question: what effect will receiving an offer of negotiation from one’s opponent will have 
on the timing of the move to negotiation? 
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Experiment II addresses this issue directly by introducing an offer to negotiate into 
the event sequence. This provides an initial means of gauging if and how an actor’s 
willingness to negotiate is influenced by the demonstrated willingness of the opponent to 
negotiate. In terms of the model structure: whether receiving an offer of negotiation affects 
either the speed with which a decision maker reaches his/her pain threshold, and, whether 
such an event changes the decision maker’s threshold for pain itself.  
The findings from Experiment II generated results for the effect of issue salience 
that were uniformly consistent with Experiment I, lending further support to the model’s 
expectation that the rate of pain accumulation will be faster in low salience conflicts, leading 
actors to offer to negotiate sooner that they would in a high salience conflict. The model 
proposed two possible effects of receiving an offer of negotiation from one’s opponent. 
First, that in high salience conflicts receipt of an offer would increase the duration of the 
conflict, while in low salience conflicts it would decrease duration. Second, that the effect of 
an offer would be in increase the duration of conflict, regardless of issue salience. The 
findings of Experiment II support the expectations of the second hypothesis of a main 
effect of receipt of an offer71. The expectation that offers will be accepted more quickly in 
low salience conflicts than in high is, however, supported by the findings of Experiment II.  
This third experiment is designed to close the circle and provide a means of cross-
validation by replication of the information findings from Experiment I and the offer effect 
in high salience conflicts of Experiment II72. As with Experiment I, the information given 
                                                 
71 In both high and low salience conditions the receipt of an offer from the opponent increased the duration 
of the conflict.  
72 High salience was chosen as the modal category because it is expected to be more reflective of the reality of 
the conflict environment. In terms of experimental cross-validation it also ensures that more of the subjects 
progress far enough into the event set to receive and react to the negotiation offer. 
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to subjects was manipulated. In the event set some received information on the current 
level of public support for the conflict as well as cumulative casualty reports, while others 
received only the cumulative casualty reports. Similar to Experiment II, half the subjects 
received an offer of negotiation from their opponent after the fifth event, and half did not.  
How Will Receiving an Offer of Negotiation Change an Actor’s Pain Threshold? 
Experiment III replicates Experiment II by introducing an offer to negotiate from 
the opponent into the event sequence. So, how is this additional factor expected to affect 
the actor’s pain threshold? 
We know from the findings of Experiment II, that in both high and low salience 
conflicts the receipt of an offer from the opponent increased the duration of the conflict. 
The findings regarding the speed with which an offer was accepted also supported the 
hypothesis that offers in low salience conflicts will be more quickly accepted than those in 
high salience conflicts. As all the subjects in this experiment are presented with a high 
salience conflict, only the first hypothesis from Experiment II can be replicated73.  
The domestic constraint explanation is indirectly supported, however, by the 
findings of Experiment I concerning public opinion. It was demonstrated that majority 
public support for a conflict appears to have a desensitizing effect on decision makers’ 
perception of costs. At the same time, the responses of subjects who did not receive the 
public support information conformed to the widely held belief that the US public is 
intolerant of casualties. These two findings suggest that there will be an interactive effect 
                                                 
73 It should be noted that, in the context of this experiment the effect will not be interactive, but will be a main 
effect. 
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between the information condition and an offer. This provides the second and third 
hypotheses for Experiment III. 
H1:  Actors in highly salient disputes will respond to an offer of negotiation from their 
opponent by fighting longer than they would have if no offer had been made.  
 
H2:  Actors who have public support information (when support ≥ 50%), will respond 
to an offer of negotiation from their opponent by fighting longer than they would 
have if no offer had been made.  
 
H3:  The delay between receipt of an opponent’s offer to negotiate and its acceptance 
will be shorter in conditions where the subject does not have public support 
information.  
 
Public Opinion 
As discussed in detail earlier, public opinion reacts to and is affected by the costs 
involved in a military conflict, in particular by casualties. In the context of this research, 
what is of interest is not the direct relationship between public opinion and casualties; rather 
it is the effect that public opinion has on a decision maker’s reaction to costs. The general 
prediction is that when the majority of the public supports a policy, then public opinion will 
act as a tranquilizer and decrease the impact of casualties on a decision maker’s perception 
of the painfulness of a conflict. When a majority do not support of a policy, however, the 
decision maker, feeling the pressure of public disapproval, will become more sensitized to 
casualties.  
H4:   When public support is above 50%, it will decrease the pain a decision maker 
associates with a conflict, thus increasing the duration of the conflict. 
      
If a decision maker is not given information regarding levels of support, we would 
expect his/her perceptions of pain to reflect the belief that the US public will respond badly 
to casualties. This leads to the final expectation of the model:  
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H5:   When a decision maker does not have public support information he will be more 
sensitive to casualties than decision makers with public support information when 
that support is above 50%.          
 
 
 
Experimental Design 
The third experiment in this series was designed to examine how the receipt of an 
offer of negotiation effects an actor’s decision to move from a fighting strategy to a 
negotiation strategy in high salience conflicts. This decision is expected to be influenced by 
the information available to the decision maker and the subsequent sensitivity of the actor 
to costs. The experiment, introduced as a study on foreign policy decision making, was 
conducted with students from political science classes at Texas A&M University. Fifty-
four74 undergraduate students participated in this third experiment.  
The experiment uses a 2x2 between-groups design. The two factors are information 
and whether an offer of negotiation was made by the opponent. As the model seeks to 
explain at what point in a conflict actors switch to a negotiation strategy the dependent 
variables were chosen to capture different elements of timing. Four specific measure of time 
were used: 1) the stage in the conflict at which the subject chose to negotiate75; 2) the 
cumulative number of casualties prior to negotiation; 3) the level of pain (self- reported) the 
subject associated with the conflict; and, for the offer conditions 4) how far after an offer 
was received was that offer accepted. 
                                                 
74 The results for three subjects had to be discarded from the analysis of results for the following reasons: 1) 
their questionnaires were incomplete; 2) their answer to question 3 indicated they did not understand the 
terms of the offer; or 3) their answer to question 18 indicated they did not register that an offer of 
negotiation had been made. Fifty-one subjects were therefore used in the analysis of results. 
75 Measured by thee number of events subjects viewed before choosing the negotiate option and ending the 
experiment. 
  
117
As with Experiments I and II, Experiment III was carried out using the Dec-tracer. 
As with Experiment II, the ability to control the order of information is particularly 
important in this experiment, as it enables control over if and when a subject receives an 
offer to negotiate.  
Experimental Procedure 
Subjects were informed that they were to play the role of chief foreign policy 
advisor to the President of the United States, and instructed that it was their job to advise 
the President on the best action to take, given the current circumstances.  They were then 
exposed to an unfolding foreign policy crisis over a fictional island archipelago – the Kell 
Islands - with a fictional South American country – Hendara76. Subjects were then randomly 
assigned to one of the four experimental conditions77. 
Before beginning their decision process, subjects were provided with background 
information regarding the history of the dispute, their opponent, the event which triggered 
the current crisis, and their task in the experiment. The subjects were then exposed to the 
first of a series of events, detailing an escalation in the crisis as well as the current 
cumulative number of casualties suffered by the US forces. In order to progress through the 
experiment each event prompted them to indicate their choice of strategy to recommend, 
given the information they had just received78.  
                                                 
76 The 1982 Falkland / Malvinas war between Great Britain and Argentina was used as the basis of this 
scenario and a source of information regarding the escalation of the conflict and international response.   
77 Public Opinion/Offer; Public Opinion/No Offer; Casualty/Offer; Casualty/No Offer. 
78 The structure of the experiment is represented graphically in Figure 3.5. 
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These choices reflected the two strategy options proposed in the model – continue 
with the conflict or offer to negotiate. Examples of such events, including the text of the 
negotiation offer, are given in Figure 6.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The experiment terminated when either the subject chooses to advise negotiation, 
or all 27 events (28 in the case of offer conditions) were accessed79. In the first case, the 
                                                 
79 For full text of all instructions see Appendix A, for full text of “events” please see Appendix B. 
FIGURE 6.1 Experiment III: Example of Events  
Event 5, No Offer Condition       Event 5, Offer Condition 
 
DAY 16 of the CONFLICT  
 
 
 
You have received word from the Hendaran 
Foreign Minister that Pesident Leopoldi is 
interested in finding a negotiated solution to the 
conflict over Kell. He has indicated that the 
Hendaran offer will remain open indefinitely.  
 
 
Do you advise the President to:  
 
Continue military 
action 
Offer to negotiate 
with Hendara 
 
DAY 17 of the CONFLICT  
 
US forces continued to press the Hendaran 
occupying the main island as the Hendaran fleet 
came into range of the US fleet and the main 
Island. US ships and fighters sank a trawler, 
tanker and supply ship within hours of the fleet’s 
arrival. This leaves the Hendaran ground forces 
potentially short on food and ammunition.  
Extreme bad weather and low visibility has 
grounded US planes, leaving ground forces 
without air support or reconnaissance. 19 marines 
were killed and 22 soldiers wounded after being 
ambushed by Hendaran forces in a deserted 
village late yesterday afternoon.  
UN Secretary general Kofi Annan, meeting with 
high level US and Hendaran officials, again urged 
Hendara and the US to find a peaceful resolution 
to the crisis.  
 
DoD CUMULATIVE CASUALTY COUNT: 78 
 
Do you advise the President to:  
 
Continue military 
action 
Offer to negotiate 
with Hendara 
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subject was told their opponent had agreed to negotiate. In the second they were told that 
their opponent had surrendered80. In both cases the outcome was presented as a success. 
The subjects were then given a post-experimental questionnaire and asked to indicate their 
responses to a number of inferential statements about the country, and their perception of 
the costs incurred prior to the end of the crisis (see Appendix C). 
Offer Manipulation 
To test the effect of an offer to negotiate by an opponent (Hypotheses 1-3), two 
versions of the event set were created. The first two were the same as those used in the 
casualty and public information conditions in Experiment I. The third and forth were based 
on these event set but had an additional event – the offer - inserted after the fourth event. 
As with Experiment II, the placement of the offer as the fifth event was chosen by 
analyzing the cases from Experiments I and II.  
The instructions subjects were given regarding their decision task, prior to beginning 
the experiment were the same as those used in Experiment II. In all conditions subjects 
were informed that they may receive an offer of negotiation from their opponent, which did 
not have to be accepted immediately. It was further explained that they had the option to 
continue with military action and negotiate at a later point81. There was also a question 
added to the post-experimental questionnaire designed to check the subjects’ understanding 
of the terms of the offer. If their answer indicated they had not accurately understood their 
response options, their results were excluded from the final analysis82.    
                                                 
80 Of the fifty-four total subjects, only seven reached the final event.   
81 Text in instructions read: “Please Note: If you receive an offer of negotiation from the Hendarans you do 
not have to accept it immediately. You have the option to continue with military action after an offer is 
made and choose to negotiate at a later time of your choosing.” 
82 See footnote 3. 
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Internal Validity – Manipulation Check 
 Information Manipulation: Casualties and Public Opinion. In the context of this 
experimental design the cost component of pain was expressed in terms of casualties. The 
perceptual component was operationalized as public opinion. As well as providing 
information on the progress of the conflict each event in the event set was matched with 
changes in the cumulative casualty count and public support for the conflict. These two 
measures enabled manipulation of the pain variable. In the casualty condition, subjects were 
only provided with the casualty data. In the public opinion condition, they received both the 
casualty and public support data83.  
No instructions were given regarding how much, if any attention the subjects should 
pay to these figures when making their decisions. It is important to keep in mind that the 
pain manipulation, like the offer manipulation, was undertaken during the course of the 
crisis events.  
This experiment provides a means by which to examine the second research 
question regarding acceptance of an offer of negotiation, and how acceptance of an 
opponent’s offer is influenced by the salience of the issue in dispute.   
 Understanding of the Terms of an Opponent’s Offer: Subject’s comprehension of the 
implications of receiving an offer from their opponent was tested in the post-experimental 
questionnaire. The first manipulation check was conducted by asking all subjects the 
following question: 
                                                 
83 Figure 5.3 provides a graphical representation of these measures over the course of the 27 events. Casualties 
logically increase over the course of the conflict. Public, opinion, as discussed above decreased over the 
course of the conflict.  
 
  
121
3. According to the instructions, an offer of negotiation from the Hendarans: 
 ____  would remain open for the duration of the conflict. 
 ____  had to be accepted immediately or it would be withdrawn. 
 
All but two subjects correctly indicated the first answer; both of the two were in No Offer 
conditions. A later question was designed to test whether the subjects were sensitive to the 
receipt of an offer: 
18. Did the offer of negotiation from the Hendaran government make you 
more willing to consider recommending negotiating to the President? 
  ___   no 
  ___   yes, more willing to recommend negotiation 
  ___  I did not receive an offer of negotiation 
 
 That is, did they know whether they had received one or not. If subjects in the no 
offer conditions answered yes or no, their results were excluded from the analysis. If 
subjects in the offer conditions, who reached the 5th event, (the offer), responded that they 
had not received an offer there results were likewise excluded. Three subjects fell into this 
category, (two also incorrectly answered question 3), meaning that three subjects were 
excluded from analysis as a result of the offer manipulation. The offer manipulation can, 
therefore, be considered completely effective. All subjects analyzed understood the terms of 
an offer from their opponent and accurately reported whether or not they received such an 
offer during the course of the experiment.  
 Sensitivity to Public Opinion. The public opinion manipulation was tested by a 
question84 regarding the extent to which domestic support for the President influenced the 
subject. The expectation that high levels of public support will desensitize decision makers 
to the costs of conflict is based on the theoretical contention that leaders, particularly 
                                                 
84 To what extent did the following factors influence the advice you gave to the President? 
 Loss of domestic support for the President. 
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democratic leaders want to stay in power. So, another way of testing the effects of public 
opinion on decision makers is by analyzing their responses to the question regarding their 
preference for fighting over talking85. If subjects in the public opinion conditions showed a 
greater proclivity for use of force, then the theoretical explanation for the effects of 
majority public support for a conflict are supported. The findings do in fact indicate that 
there was a greater preference for use of military action (M = 4.6) in the public opinion 
conditions than in the casualty conditions (M = 3.35). This finding was significant (one-
tailed) [F (1, 47) 2.1, p = .05]. 
 
Results 
At What Point in the Conflict Did Subjects Offer to Negotiate?  
One of the most basic tests of the model is whether the results regarding conflict 
duration are consistent with the expectations of Hypotheses 1 and 4 and their counterparts 
in Experiments I and II. The most direct way to do this is by looking at the number of 
events subjects viewed prior to choosing to negotiate, as shown in Figure 6.2. Consistent 
with Hypothesis 1 and the findings of Experiment II, subjects did continue to fight longer 
in the Offer conditions (M = 14.7) than in the No Offer conditions (M = 4.4). This 
relationship is significant [F (1, 47) = 22.6, p < .0001]. The findings for Hypothesis 4 and 
Experiment 1 (high salience conditions only) regarding the effects of information were 
consistent with expectations and previous findings, but not significant. When given positive 
(≥ 50%) information regarding public support for the conflict, subjects continued with 
                                                 
85 8. To what extent would you prefer to resolve this crisis through military action?  On a scale of 1 -10. 
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military action longer (M = 11.7) than they did when they received no information 
regarding public opinion (M = 8.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Does Receiving an Offer of Negotiation Change Behavior? 
Overall, the general findings of Experiment III regarding the effect of an offer 
support Hypothesis 1 and provide cross-validation through replication of the findings for 
high salience conflicts in Experiment II. There is, however, another way in which the 
receipt of an offer is predicted to change conflict behavior. According to Hypothesis 3, the 
delay between offer and acceptance is expected to be longer in casualty conditions than it is 
when the decision maker is given public opinion information. As an offer was only 
incorporated into the event sets for offer conditions, this analysis looks at the subset of 
FIGURE 6.2 Experiment III: Mean Number of Events Prior to 
Negotiating 
15.75
13.18
4.33 4.44
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
No Offer Offer
Experimental Condition
M
e
a
n
 
N
u
m
be
r 
Ev
e
n
ts
Casualty
Public Opinion
 
  
124
cases in which an offer was made. The findings indicate that, as predicted, there is a longer 
delay between the receipt of an offer and its acceptance in public opinion conditions (M = 
10.75), than in casualty conditions (M = 8.18). This relationship is not significant however, 
[F (1, 25) = .439, p = .513]. 
An interactive effect between information and offer conditions was also predicted in 
Hypothesis 2; specifically, that the effect of an offer would be greater in the public opinion 
condition than in the casualty condition. As shown in Figure 6.2, the effect appears to be 
there, however it is not significant. While the results show that subjects given public opinion 
information who received an offer did fight longer (M = 15.75) than those receiving an 
offer who were only given casualty information (M = 13.18), this relationship was not 
significant [F (1, 47) = .336, p = .565]. These results can also be seen in Figure 6.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.3 Mean Negotiation Points by Condition 
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Does Receiving an Offer of Negotiation Effect Perceptions of Pain? 
None of the hypotheses dealing with the effects of an opponent’s offer on a 
decision maker’s conflict behavior explicitly predict effects on pain perception. The 
rationale underlying the strategic response explanation used to establish the Hypothesis 
regarding the effects of an offer in high salience conditions does assume some change in a 
decision maker’s translation of costs into pain. It predicts that an offer will increase the 
resolve of a decision maker to “win” the conflict through use of force, thereby increasing 
his/her bargaining power at the final settlement stage.  
This explanation would gain support if a difference can be shown in the metric 
underlying subjects’ self-reported levels of pain in Offer and No Offer conditions. That is, 
does it take a different level of costs (in this case casualties) to induce the same level of pain 
in cases where the subject receives an offer of negotiation; or does the relative value of a 
casualty vary by condition. This relative casualty variable was calculated for each subject by 
dividing the cumulative casualty count prior to their decision to negotiate by their self-
reported level of pain. It indicates the number of casualties it took to move each subject, 
(on a scale of 1 -100), one unit of pain. 
The results indicate that, in conditions where the subjects received an offer of 
negotiation it took them more casualties to move one unit of pain (M = 7.34), than it did 
when they did not receive an offer (M = 3.71). This relationship was not significant, 
however [F (1, 47) 5.543E-5, p = .994]. There is directional support, however, for the logic 
underlying the strategic response explanation. Subject’s response to a direct question 
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regarding the effect of an offer on their conflict behavior86, however, elicited a contradictory 
response. Overall, 66.5% (64% casualty condition, 69% public opinion condition) of 
subjects who received an offer of negotiation indicated that their opponent’s offer had 
made them more willing to recommend negotiation.  
Does Public Opinion Effect Perceptions of Pain? 
The experiment used selective provision of information regarding levels of public 
support for the conflict as a means of analyzing decision makers’ sensitivity to the costs of 
conflict. In order to assess the effects of this information half of the subjects were given 
both updated levels of public support and cumulative casualty levels with each event, while 
the others received only the casualty information. The expectation was that positive (≥50%) 
public support would desensitize subjects to the costs of conflict, thus increasing the time 
they took to reach their pain threshold (indicated by the choice to negotiate).  
Those subjects who received public support information did indicate the conflict to 
be slightly less painful (M = 35.72) than did those who only received casualty data (M= 
38.27), however this difference is not significant [F (1, 47) = .719, p =.400]. It is important 
to note that in the event set, public support did not drop below 50% until event 16, and the 
mean number of events viewed in the public opinion conditions was 11.68. This suggests, 
some support for Hypothesis 4; that majority support for a conflict can have a tranquilizing 
effect on a decision maker’s perception of pain. Figure 6.4 indicates the mean pain for each 
condition, relative to both casualties and public opinion.  
 
                                                 
86 Q18: Did the offer of negotiation from the Hendaran government make you more willing to consider 
recommending negotiating to the President? (no; yes, more willing to recommend negotiation; I did not 
receive an offer of negotiation) 
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Does Public Opinion Affect the Costs Behind Pain? 
When interpreting subjects’ pain perception, their self-reported levels of pain are 
not the most sensitive measure, as they can be expected to be affected by the duration of 
the conflict itself. As casualties increase over the course of the conflict, the longer a subject 
pursues a conflictual strategy, the greater the costs s/he experiences. As subjects in public 
opinion conditions fought longer (M = 11.68 events) than those in casualty conditions (M = 
8.1 events), this difference could be driving the differences in self-reported pain levels. For 
this reason, a better measure of pain is provided by the constructed variable relative casualty 
variable. 
The findings regarding relative casualty values across conditions provide support for 
Hypothesis 5.  Subjects in conditions where public opinion information was provided 
FIGURE 6.4 Mean Reported Pain Prior to Negotiation 
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required more casualties (M= 9.74) to achieve a unit increase in pain than did those who 
only received casualty information (M = 3.71). These results were significant in a one-tailed 
test [F = (1, 47) = .502, p = .035]. The prediction that, when subjects had information 
regarding the level of public support and that support was above 50%, they were less 
sensitive (reported lower levels of pain) to casualties than if they did not receive such 
information.  
As discussed earlier, the literature and common wisdom tell us that Americans will 
not support the loss of US soldiers in foreign conflicts. This is an attitude that is assumed to 
be known to, if not shared by most subjects. Consequently, subjects are expected to be 
more sensitive to casualties in the absence of evidence indicating public support for the 
conflict remains high. This assumption is supported by responses to the question regarding 
the influence of military losses on advice given to the President87. A 2x2 between subject 
ANOVA indicates that military losses had slightly more influence on the subjects’ advice in 
the casualty conditions (M = 6.385) than they did in the public opinion conditions (M = 
5.36), although this relationship is not significant [F = (1, 47) = 1.99, p =.165]. The effects 
of both offer and information conditions on the relative value of casualties is shown in 
Figure 6.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
87 To what extent did the following factors influence the advice you gave to the President? 
 Military losses suffered by the US. 
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What Influenced the Advice Subjects Gave? 
The post-experimental questionnaire was designed to shed light on how subjects 
processed and evaluated information received during the course of the experiment. Among 
the questions was a series relating to the possible factors which influenced their decision 
process, in particular; the extent to which military losses, domestic support, the issue itself 
and the international reputation of the US influenced the advice they gave the President. 
According to the theory behind the model, military losses and the issue itself should be the 
most influential factors. Furthermore, military losses should have a greater impact in cases 
where there were more casualties and conditions where the subjects were not aware of 
public support levels88.  
                                                 
88 Again, it should be kept in mind that this relationship holds for conditions where public support is ≥ 50%. 
FIGURE 6.5 Experiment III: Relative Casualty Values 
4.93
2.81
11.07
9.00
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
No Offer Offer
Experimental Condition
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
C
a
su
a
lt
ie
s
Casualty
Public Opinion
  
130
A repeated measures test of the relative influence of these four factors (military 
losses, the issue, domestic support and international reputation89) demonstrates a significant 
main effect off the category. As the model predicts for high salience conflicts, the issue 
itself had the greatest influence on subjects’ advice (M = 7.37), followed by military losses 
(M = 5.9), international reputation (M = 5.75) and finally domestic opinion (M = 5.18), and 
the difference was significant [F (3, 141) 7.086, p =. 0002]. So, as illustrated in Figure 6.6, 
the model’s expectations regarding what factors subjects give greatest weight to when 
deciding between continuing to fight and offering to negotiate or accepting an opponent’s 
offer, is supported by these findings. They also replicate the findings of Experiments I and 
II, providing cross-validation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
89 Subjects were asked to rate on a scale of 1 – 10 the extent to which each of these factors influenced the 
advice they gave the President. Full text of all post-experimental questionnaire questions is provided in 
Appendix C. 
FIGURE 6.6 Relative Influence of Factors on Advice 
5.88
5.18
7.37
5.75
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Casualties Domestic Opinion Intn'l Reputation Issue
Factor
M
e
a
n
 I
n
flu
e
n
c
e
 (
1
-1
0
)
 
  
131
The influence of military losses is also expected to vary according to the information 
available to the subjects. The expectation is that subjects without positive public opinion 
information will be more sensitive to military losses. The interaction between influences on 
advice and the information condition (casualty / public opinion) indicates that in casualty 
conditions military losses do indeed have a greater influence on subjects’ advice (M = 6.39) 
than in public opinion conditions (M = 5.36), although the interaction as a whole is not 
significant.  This relationship is also repeated in the ANOVA analysis of the independent 
effects of military losses on advice. Subjects in casualty conditions again demonstrate a 
greater sensitivity to military losses (6.39) than those in public opinion conditions (M = 
5.36), although this relationship is not significant either.  
Another difference in impact suggested by the theory and model is, of course, the 
impact of domestic support on subjects’ decision processes. This may work in several ways. 
First, consistent with the logic used to predict greater sensitivity to military losses in the 
casualty conditions, we may find that uncertainty regarding the degree of public support for 
military action would lead subjects in the casualty conditions to place greater emphasis on 
loss of domestic support. Those in the public opinion conditions knew that, for the great 
proportion of the conflict there was majority popular support, and this knowledge could 
logically be expected to assuage fears of domestic backlash against the President and 
decrease the influence of this factor on subjects’ advice. Second, is the possibility that the 
provision of public support information sensitizes subjects to the issue of domestic support, 
thus increasing the influence this factor plays in their decision process. In this scenario 
subjects in the casualty condition face greater uncertainty only if they think to consider 
public opinion at all. What we find from the ANOVA analysis of the domestic support 
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variable is virtually no difference between casualty (M = 5.11) and public opinion (M = 
5.24) conditions. This may perhaps indicate support for both, conflicting expectations, or, 
alternately, be a reminder that there are limitations to the inferences to be wrung from such 
data.   
Comparing Subjects’ Reasons for Negotiating 
The results discussed so far support the theoretical expectation that what drives an 
actor involved in a conflict to move from a fighting strategy to one of negotiation is the 
pain experienced as a result of the costs involved in conflictual action. However, other 
factors are considered to influence an actor’s decision to negotiate. The post-experimental 
questionnaire asked subjects to rate the importance of three additional motivations for 
negotiation on their advice to the President; information, standard operating procedure 
(SOP) and cost considerations90. 
The results of Experiments I and II indicate that the only factor which generates 
any difference in the importance placed on these factors is issue salience. There is no 
rationale to be derived from the model that would lead to an expectation of difference 
driven by either of the variables manipulated in this third experiment. Moreover, when 
analyzed individually, neither information, cost, nor SOP considerations generate any 
significant effect of either information or offer. When considered together in a repeated 
                                                 
90 Information: “Negotiation provides an opportunity to gain useful information about you opponent and 
their demands.” 
SOP: “The belief that military action can only be justified if all other means of resolving a conflict have 
been attempted.” 
Cost: “Maintaining US control of Kell through military action was not worth the cost (in terms of lives, 
expenditure, public opinion and international reputation).” 
All questions are rated on a 10-point scale: 1 = not al all important – 10: extremely important. 
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measures ANOVA , there is also no main effect of information or offer on the importance 
of these motivations.  
 
Discussion 
The first purpose of this experiment was to extend the experimental testing of the 
model by examining how information (public opinion and casualty, or casualty alone) 
influences the effects of the receipt of an offer of negotiation from an opponent in high 
salience conflicts.  By doing so, it brings the experimental design full-circle and enables 
cross validation of all three key variables; issue salience, information and the presence of an 
offer of negotiation.   
Consistent with the findings of Experiment II (high salience conditions), subjects 
did continue to fight longer when they received an offer of negotiation. There is also 
directional support for the theoretical contention that the reason for this effect is increased 
the resolve of a decision maker to “win” the conflict through use of force, thereby 
increasing his/her bargaining power at the final settlement stage. The findings regarding the 
effects of an offer were simpler in Experiment III than Experiment II, as the salience was 
held constant and high, thus eliminating the interactive effects predicted in the earlier 
experiment.  
There was, however, an interactive effect predicted between receipt of an offer and 
the information provided to the subject. Specifically, Hypothesis 2 predicted that, when 
public support for the conflict was ≥ 50%, knowledge of public opinion levels would 
increase the delay between receiving and accepting an offer of negotiation. The logic for this 
expectation is similar for that regarding issue salience and related to the underlying salience 
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condition. In high salience conditions, it is theorized that an offer from an opponent 
increases the resolve of a decision maker, decreasing his/her sensitivity to pain, thus 
increasing the pain threshold. Public support information, when positive, (≥ 50%), is 
expected to magnify this effect. being theorized to be one of the determining factors in the 
translation of costs into pain. So, if a decision maker is aware that his/her current strategy 
(fighting) is supported, his/ her sensitivity to pain is decreased. At the same time, there is an 
implicit indication that accepting an offer of negotiation or offering to negotiate one’s self, 
may not meet with popular approval, thus decreasing the attractiveness of this alternate 
strategy. The results of this experiment lend some support to this idea, indicating a greater 
delay between offer and acceptance in the public opinion/offer condition, although this 
relationship was not significant. 
As with Experiment I, the results for the effects of information on the duration of 
conflict were in line with the model’s prediction that, when the majority of the public 
supported the conflict actor’s would fight longer. Majority public support also 
demonstrated, as predicted a tranquilizing effect on sensitivity to pain. On average, it took 
more casualties to induce the same level of pain in public opinion conditions than it did in 
casualty conditions.   
At first glance, these results may appear inconsistent with the literature, but they do 
reflect two separate components of public opinion studies. First, most of the subjects in the 
public opinion condition only saw public support figures above 50%91. Consequently, 
theory would lead us to expect that knowledge of public opinion would have a tranquilizing 
effect on pain, as indicated in the pain results above. In turn, this would be translated in a 
                                                 
91 70.5% of subjects chose to negotiate prior to event 16, after which public support dropped below 50%. 
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higher relative casualty value. The accuracy of this assumption is supported by the finding 
that, in all but two cases, subjects in both public opinion conditions indicated that the US 
public supported the President92. 
                                                 
92 Post-experimental questionnaire, Q3: Overall, how did the American public and media respond to the 
conflict?  Supported the President/Did not support the President/were indifferent to the conflict. In one of 
the cases where the subject indicated that the public did not support the President, s/he continued with a 
fighting strategy up to the last event, at which stage public support was below 50%. 
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CHAPTER VII 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: PREDICTING THE TIMING OF CONFLICT 
MANAGEMENT 
 
 
The goal of this research is to explain when and why parties involved in 
international crises will attempt crisis management. This move is conceptualized as a change 
in strategy - from fighting (conflictual) to talking (management) - rather than as an outcome 
in itself. That is, the model does not distinguish conflict and crisis management as two 
separate processes, rather, as a continuous, evolutionary process of dispute resolution. As 
discussed above, actors’ preferences over strategies are considered to be a function of the 
amount of pain they are experiencing as a result of pursuing a conflictual strategy, relative to 
the salience they place on the issue(s) in dispute. Two basic questions define the scope of 
the model:  
1. In a crisis situation, when will an actor offer conflict management? 
2. In a crisis situation, when will an actor accept an offer of conflict management? 
 
The experimental tests in previous chapters demonstrate that the expectations of 
the model are supported in the controlled environment of the experiment. The next step, 
therefore, is to see whether these findings are reflected in testing of data from historical 
crises. This transition raises several difficult problems, however, due to the type and 
structure of data available on international crises and disputes, relative to the questions 
being asked. Although the model to be tested examines actor behavior in a crisis, the 
structure requires that the unit of analysis be the crisis management event within the crisis, 
not the crisis itself.  
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Both questions addressed by the model are linked intrinsically to the notion of time 
and the dynamic process of the conflictual interaction between the actors in a dispute. 
Duration analysis would be, therefore, the most appropriate form of statistical analysis to 
test the model empirically. Two central issues emerge when considering the optimal data for 
testing the model presented. First, the data would need to be time series in nature and 
second, the data for specific crises must incorporate both conflict characteristics and 
conflict management characteristics. Unfortunately, there is no available source of conflict 
data that fits all these requirements. 
Most of the data collected on international crises93 is not times series in nature, 
instead measuring variables at either the start or end of the conflict. Furthermore, both the 
MID and COW data projects do not focus on the issues under contention in crises, 
adopting more of a realist framework for their data collection and concentrating on factors 
such as relative power, strategic and great power involvement. Moreover, both of these data 
sets do not incorporate conflict management variables; instead they consider negotiation, 
mediation, or arbitration as conflict outcomes. This approach is in direct opposition to the 
assumptions of the model developed in this research.  
Data sets focusing on conflict management are rarer and present similar limitations 
in respect to this research. That is, just as conflict data sets ignore conflict management 
variables, conflict management data sets are similarly brief in their treatment of conflict 
variables. Bercovitch’s International Conflict Management (ICM) dataset does incorporate 
variables describing dispute characteristics, but as with the COW and MID data sets does so 
only at the cumulative level.  
                                                 
93 See for example the MID and COW data projects. 
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As the questions tested by this model require variables measured at the time of the 
conflict management event, this can cause problems. An example may serve to better clarify 
this problem. One of the basic predictions of the model is that actors have a threshold for 
pain that is a function of the costs they are incurring during a dispute and their sensitivity to 
those costs, all conditioned by the salience of the issue at stake. In order to test this 
prediction empirically several things are necessary. First, we must be able to identify the 
conflict management attempt, and which of the parties was the initiator (of the conflict 
management attempt). Second, we must be able to calculate the costs (economic, casualty, 
political) at the time of the conflict management attempt. Third, we must be able to evaluate the 
sensitivity of each actor to the costs experienced up to that point. Fourth, there must be a 
variable, which indicates the central issue at stake in the dispute.  
The Bercovitch ICM data enables partial identification of the first requirement. All 
conflict management attempts within the data set include a variable (ICM CM12) coding the 
identity of the conflict management initiator94. However, the structure of the dataset is such 
that, although cost measure are included in the “dispute characteristics” subset of the 
dataset, they are cumulative in nature, indicating the overall costs at the end of the dispute, 
not the costs at the time of a specific conflict management attempt. Thus, as with the COW 
and MID datasets this is not an appropriate source for the cost variables. ICM includes, 
however, some variables, which are appropriate to measure the sensitivity of actors to such 
costs. As these are regime characteristics, they are not expected to change significantly over 
                                                 
94 CM12: “Initiated by” Request for conflict management initiated by: (0) no management; (1) one party; (2) 
both parties; (3) mediator/ third party; (4) regional organization; (5) international organization; (6) 
unspecified. 
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the duration of the conflict (prior to initiation of conflict management) and therefore can be 
used to test the model95.  
This leaves the issue of the cost variables to be addressed. The data set which best 
enables the identification of costs at specific stages of a conflict is Frank Sherman’s 
SHERFACS: A Cross-Paradigm, Hierarchical, and Contextually Sensitive International Conflict 
Dataset, 1937-1985.  This data set is unique among conflict data sets as it takes a dynamic 
approach to conflict data, modeling the escalation and de-escalation of crises; dividing crises 
into phases and measuring variables at each phase in the conflict. This is the closest to a 
time series data structure available, although it still does not permit times series analysis as 
the phase structure is defined by the conflict behavior of the actors, rather than a set 
measure of time, such as months or weeks96. However, it does provide the best source for 
intra-conflict measures of cost.  
 
Data 
The empirical analysis used in this research are, therefore, drawn from data in 
Bercovitch’s International Conflict Management (ICM) data set and Frank Sherman’s 
SHERFACS: A Cross-Paradigm, Hierarchical, and Contextually Sensitive International Conflict 
Dataset, 1937-1985. As Bercovitch provides a direct case match between both data sets, 
combining them is not overly problematic. Furthermore, both use similar theoretical bases 
for the coding of central variables. Unlike most conflict data sets, neither the SHERFACS 
                                                 
95 Specifics regarding the choice and measurement of these sensitivity measures are given in the measurement 
section below.  
96 Conflict phases represent one of six levels of disagreement and conflict, (dispute, conflict, hostility, post-
hostility conflict, post-hostility dispute, settlement) and a given crisis may pass (repeatedly) through one or 
all of these phases.  
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nor ICM impose a minimum number of fatalities to qualify as a conflict. The logic for this is 
set out in the ICM codebook: 
This project has thus adopted the generic term of “conflict”, rather than 
“war, or “dispute” to denote our cases, as “conflict” recognizes the dynamic 
and diverse nature of international interactions and confrontations that 
characterize threats to international peace and security. (Bercovitch 2000: 10) 
 
This broader definition of conflict is in keeping with the theoretical model, which does not 
assume that military action must take place97 in order for the expectations of the model to 
hold.  
One of the key variables required for testing the hypotheses derived from the model 
developed here is the identity of the party who initiates negotiation. Unfortunately, this 
variable is not coded in either data set. As discussed above, however, the ICM dataset does 
include a variable indicating the identity of the initiator of the specific conflict management 
attempt. However, this variable only codes98 whether one or both parties to the dispute 
requested conflict management, not the identity of that party. For this reason it was 
necessary to code the identity of the initiator for all cases coded as “one party” initiation 
according to the ICM data. This was done using a variety of sources, primarily Facts on File, 
Keesings Record of World Events and Brecher and Wilkenfeld’s International Crisis Behavior (ICB) 
dataset. 
Case Selection 
Due to nature of the questions to be tested, some restructuring of the ICM data was 
required. Discussions with the author indicate that such a transformation is not out of 
                                                 
97 It should be noted, however, that in all three experimental designs subjects begin the decision process after 
military action has been initiated. 
98 See footnote 2. 
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keeping with its content.  Currently the data is set up with the unit of analysis being the 
crisis management attempt. For this research, the unit of analysis will be the crisis itself. 
Currently there are 309 cases of interstate and internationalized civil conflicts included in 
the data set. All cases that do not involve states as the primary actors were removed99. An 
additional nine cases were excluded as they involved no conflict management attempts100, 
and finally eight cases were excluded as the date matches between the two data sets were 
inconsistent101.  
The cases selection process for this analysis presented a number of additional 
challenges. As discussed above, the variables required limited the choice among available 
datasets. Once the ICM and SHERFACS datasets had been identifies as the most 
appropriate to the model and specific research questions, an additional issue arose. That is, 
all of the crises included in the ICM data set that involve states as primary parties and can 
be matched to SHERFACS cases, are associated with multiple conflict management 
attempts. So the question arises; which conflict management event should be chosen for the 
analysis. The model is designed explicitly to test predictions regarding the actions of the 
central actors in a crisis, not how they might react to the actions of third parties. Conflict 
management events initiated by outside parties102, therefore, were deemed inappropriate, as 
they required the very strong assumption that either one or both of the primary actors 
                                                 
99 Seven case matches between the data sets were excluded for this reason: Yemeni Civil War, 1948-1972; 
Timorese Independence, 1974-?; Lebanese/Jordanian Civil Wars, 1943-1958; Cypriot Civil War, 1960-1974; 
Namibia, 1946-?; Iraqi-Kurdish War, 1958-1974; Zaire Independence, 1960-1964 
100 Thai-Laotian Border, 1975-1979; US-Yugoslavian Air Incidents, 1946-1948; Chinese Off-Shore Islands, 
1949-1958; Tibetan Autonomy #1, 1955-1958; China Seas Islands, 1951-?; Cuban Revolution, 1946-1959; 
Paraguayan Exiles, 1959-1962; West Irian #2, 1961-1969; Ghanaian Border, 1963-1966. 
101 Chinese Off-Shore Islands, 1949-1958; Status of Taiwan, 1949-?; American-Vietnamese War, 1962-1975; 
The Cyprus Conflict: Invasion and Partition Jan 74-Jun 78; Chilean-Argentine Border, 1958-?; African 
Territories – Portugal; US Bombing of Soviet Airfield, 1950; Korean Invasion, 1950-1953 
102 Those instances of ICM CM 12 coded (0) no management; (3) mediator/ third party; (4) regional 
organization; (5) international organization; (6) unspecified. 
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involved had reached their pain threshold and would have initiated conflict management 
themselves if not so pre-empted. This, however, leaves the question of how cases in which 
one or both of the primary actors never initiated conflict management should be treated.  
One possible solution to this problem would be to interpret such cases as never 
having induced enough pain in the actors to raise them to their pain threshold. In such an 
interpretation, the appropriate cost measures would be those at the end-point in the 
conflict. However, this approach implies an equally strong, but opposite assumption that 
any third party initiated conflict management event did not correspond to the pain 
threshold of either actor. Without considerably more detailed information regarding the 
specifics of the initiation, this assumption was felt to be unsupportable. Given that the cost 
measures are calculated at the point in time at which conflict management is initiated, 
measuring costs in cases where there were no direct conflict management attempts at the 
end-point of the conflict has no theoretical justification in light of the model and would 
considerably skew the data. For this reason, cases where there was no direct conflict 
management initiation by either or both primary actors were dropped from the analysis. 
This resulted in eight additional cases103 being dropped from the case list used for analysis. 
Once cross-referencing with the SHERFACS cases and research of the initiator identity was 
completed this left a total of 66 cases for analysis, covering the period 1942 - 1975. A full 
list of cases and the primary parties involved is provided in Table 7.1. 
 
                                                 
103 The specific cases, included in both the SHERFACS and ICM datasets, dropped due to lack of direct conflict 
management initiation were: Pakhtunistan, 1947; Turkish Syrian Frontier, 1955-1957; Lake Tiberias, 1955-
1956; Afghanistan – Pakistan 1960-63; Mayaguez Seizure, 1975; Mosul Revolt, 1958-1963; Israel - Syria 
Yom Kippur War, 1973-1974; South Yemeni Borders, 1969-1978. 
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TABLE 7.1     Cases For Empirical Analysis 
CASE Conflict Initiator (A) Conflict Target (B) 
French in Levant, 1945-1946 France Syria-Lebanon 
Azerbaijan, 1941-1946 USSR Iran 
Indonesian Independence, 1945-1950 Netherlands Indonesia 
Indochinese Recolonization Attempt, 
1945-1956 France Indochina  
Corfu Channel, 1946-1949 Albania Britain 
Kashmir Accession, 1947-1965 Pakistan India 
Soviet-Yugoslav Rift, 1948-? USSR Yugoslavia 
Israeli Independence, 1941-1949 Egypt Israel 
Berlin Blockade, 1948-1949 USSR USA 
Costa Rican Exiles #1, 1948-1949 Nicaragua Costa Rica 
Syrian-Lebanese Tensions, 1949-1950 Syria Lebanon 
Chinese Aggression in Tibet, 1949-1956 PRC Tibet 
Lake Huleh Dispute, 1951 Syria Israel 
Tunisian Independence, 1945-1956 Tunisia France 
British in Suez, 1951-1956 Egypt Britain 
Trieste, 1952-1954 Yugoslavia Italy 
 The Macao Conflict Jul 1952 - Aug 
1952 PRC Portugal 
Temple of Preah Vihear, 1953-? Cambodia Thailand 
Algerian Independence, 1947-1962 Algeria France 
Costa Rican Exiles #2, 1955-1959 Nicaragua Costa Rica 
The Enosis Movement Sept 1955- Feb 
1959 Cyprus Britain 
 The Aden Conflict 1956--60 Yemen / Aden Britain 
Polish October, 1956-1957 USSR Poland 
Suez War, 1953-1957 Israel Egypt 
Hungarian Intervention, 1955-1958 USSR Hungary 
Honduran Border, 1957-1961 Nicaragua Honduras 
India-Pakistan Borders, 1958-1960 India Pakistan 
Quemoy-Matsu, 1958-1960 PRC USA 
Mexican Shrimp Boats, 1958-1959 Guatemala Mexico  
Sino-Nepalese Border, 1959-1961 PRC Nepal 
Haitian Exiles, 1959-1960 Cuba  Haiti 
Sino-Indian Border, 1958-1962 PRC India 
Mali-Mauritanian Border, 1960-1965 Mauritania Mali 
Bay of Pigs, 1959-1962 USA Cuba 
Kuwaiti Independence, 1961-1963 Iraq Kuwait 
Berlin Wall, 1960-1967 USSR USA 
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TABLE 7.1 cont.      
CASE Conflict Initiator (A) Conflict Target (B) 
Bizerte. 1958-1963 Tunisia France 
Goa, 1947-1974 India Portugal 
Malaysian Confrontation, 1961-1966 Indonesia Malaysia 
Guyanese Border, 1962-1970 Venezuela Guyana 
Lauca River, 1962-1965 Chile Bolivia 
Missiles in Cuba, 1962-1963 USA USSR 
Sino-Indian War, 1962-1978 PRC India 
Intervention in Haiti, 1962-1963 Haiti Dominican Republic 
Algerian-Moroccan Border, 1962-1970 Algeria Morocco 
Nigerian-Dahomean Border, 1959-1965 Niger Benin 
Panama Canal #1, 1959-1970 Panama USA 
Ghanaian Border, 1963-1966 Ghana Burkina-Faso 
War of Secession 1965-May 1993 Eritrea Ethiopia 
Kashmir War, 1965-1970 India Pakistan 
Six Day War June 1967 Israel Egypt 
Biafran Civil War, 1966-1970 Biafra Nigeria 
Zaire-Rwanda Mercenaries Dispute, 
1967-1968 Demo Repub Congo Rwanda 
Pueblo Seizure, 1968-1969 North Korea USA 
Czech Invasion, 1968-1969 USSR Czechoslovakia 
Football War, 1969-1980 El Salvador Honduras 
Bangladesh Independence, 1947-1974 Bangladesh Pakistan 
Cod War, 1971-1974 Iceland Britain 
Iranian Borders, 1961-1975 Iran Iraq 
Corisco Bay Islands, 1972-1975 Equatorial Guinea Gabon 
Ethiopia - Somalia Ogaden War, 1974-
???? Ethiopia Somalia 
Iraqi-Kuwaiti Border, 1972-1977 Iraq Kuwait 
Yom Kippur War, 1973-1974 Israel Egypt 
Malian-Upper Voltaic Border, 1960-? Mali Burkina-Faso 
Euphrates Waters, 1975-1978 Syria Iraq 
 
 
 
Model Specification 
The first question addressed by the model is; in a crisis, when will an actor offer 
conflict management? There are two mechanisms in the model which predict the change 
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from a conflictual to a negotiating strategy – the rate of accumulation of pain (slope) and 
the actor’s pain threshold 
The rate of pain accumulation predicts which actor within an individual conflict will 
initiate conflict management. The pain threshold predicts at what point in a crisis conflict 
management will be initiated. Model 1, dealing with pain accumulation, compares actors 
within crises and the unit of analysis is the crisis. Model 2, dealing with expectations 
regarding pain thresholds, compares the timing of conflict management initiations between 
crisis cases, and the unit of analysis is the initiating actor104.   
Model 1: Pain Accumulation: Who Will Initiate Conflict Management? 
The slope of the line indicates the rate of accumulation of pain for each actor within 
a conflict. Pain is conceptualized as a composite measure of how the objective costs of a 
conflictual strategy (loss of life, materiel and economic costs) are translated by an actor, 
thought consideration of less tangible negative factors such as loss of public support or 
international reputation. In the strategic environment of a dispute, actors’ expectations are 
also conditioned by their power, relative to their opponent. The slope of the line in figure 1 
is therefore based on the following equation:  
SlopeA (pain accumulation) = (relative powerA + costsA)* sensitivityA 
These components become the key measures needed to predict which actor within an 
individual conflict will initiate conflict management. Holding issue salience constant within 
the crisis, (both actors are assumed to have the same pain threshold), the predictions of the 
model are as follows: 
                                                 
104 In cases where both actors are coded as conflict management initiators, both actors are included in the 
analysis. In cases where one initiates, only the initiating actor is included.  
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If SlopeA > SlopeB:  A will offer first 
If SlopeA < SlopeB:  B will offer first 
If SlopeA = SlopeB:  Both A and B will offer 
The slope equation and predictions enable testing of hypotheses five through seven 
derived from the theoretical model and concerning the behavior of individual actors within 
a single conflict. For the purposes of empirical testing these hypotheses are expressed as 
follows: 
H1:  Within an individual crisis, there is a negative relationship between relative power 
and the probability that an actor will initiate conflict management. 
 
H2: Within an individual crisis, if an actor experiences higher costs than his/her 
opponent the probability that s/he will initiate conflict management increases. 
 
H3. Within an individual crisis, if an actor experiences domestic dissent as a result of the 
crisis, the probability that s/he will initiate conflict management increases. 
 
H4. Within an individual crisis, there is a negative relationship between relative political 
sensitivity to costs and the probability that an actor will initiate conflict 
management. 
 
Model 2: Pain Threshold: When Will Conflict Management Occur? 
The model predicts that actors’ tolerance for pain will vary across crises. More 
specifically, that actors will be willing to endure more pain when the issue of dispute is 
highly salient than they will when the issue is of little salience. The pain threshold is the 
element of the model that is associated with issue salience; as issue salience increases, so 
does the actor’s pain threshold. Consequently, irrespective of the rate of accumulation of 
pain (slope), the model predicts that conflict management will be initiated later (after more 
pain has been experienced) in high salience conflicts than in low. Three hypotheses 
regarding the timing of conflict management are generated from the theoretical model.  
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H1: Actors in highly salient disputes will take longer to move from a conflictual strategy 
to a negotiating strategy than actors in a low salience conflict. 
 
H2: Actors in highly salient disputes will incur greater costs before offering to negotiate 
than actors in low salience disputes.  
 
H3: Actors in low salience disputes will have a lower threshold for pain than those in 
high salience disputes, resulting in an earlier offer of negotiation. 
 
Empirical Measurement  
 As discussed earlier, the data available for empirically testing the model and derived 
hypotheses presented here are less than ideal. This is one of the reasons behind breaking 
down the first question posed by the model (When will a crisis actor initiate conflict 
management?) into the two individual questions specified in Models 1 and 2. This approach 
also helps maintain the distinction between the expected effects of the accumulation of pain 
(slope) and the pain threshold.    
 Model 1: Pain Accumulation: Who Will Initiate Conflict Management? 
Dependent Variable and Estimation Technique. This model identifies which actor within an 
individual crisis initiates conflict management. Given that the universe of cases examined 
are crises in which one or both primary parties initiate conflict management, there are three 
possible outcomes, or values for the dependent variable; actor A (conflict initiator) initiates 
conflict management; actor B (conflict target) initiates conflict management; both A and B 
initiate conflict management. Due to the nominal nature of the dependent variable, the 
most appropriate estimation model is one designed for categorical and limited dependent 
variables. As there is no theoretical or logical reason to expect that there is any underlying 
order to the three outcomes, the use of multinomial logit (MNL) is indicated (Long 1997).  
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Independent Variables. Three elements are theorized to contribute to an actor’s 
accumulation of pain during a crisis; their power, the costs they incur and their sensitivity to 
those costs. As Model 1 compares the behavior of actors within a crisis, what is of relevance 
to the analysis is the relative level of these elements, not their absolute value. That is, as 
salience (thus the pain threshold) is held constant across actors, the model predicts that the 
actor who experiences higher costs, relative to his/her opponent, will be more likely to initiate 
conflict management. A relationship is expected also between relative power and the 
accumulation of pain, such that weaker actors experience a more rapid accumulation of 
pain.  As both the ICM and SHERFACS variables used in Model 1 are actor level variables, 
all required recoding in order to reflect this relativity. In order to facilitate interpretation of 
these relative variables, all of the recoded variables were constructed so that a higher 
number indicated a greater constraint on continued conflictual action (higher costs or 
higher sensitivity) for Actor A. 
It should be noted that the small number of cases (66) used in this analysis imposes 
certain additional limitations on the empirical testing of Model 1. In particular, the restricted 
degrees of freedom, makes the specification of the model particularly important. Both data 
sets provided many potential independent variables both as measures of the theoretical 
elements of the model and as controls. It was crucial, however, to choose the variables for 
analysis as carefully as possible in order to balance the operationalization requirements of 
the model with the limitations brought about due to the small n.   
Relative Power. The theoretical model predicts that the weaker an actor is, relative to 
his/her opponent, the greater the costs he will incur (or expect to incur) through pursuing a 
conflictual strategy. Thus, s/he will reach accumulate pain more rapidly; reaching his/her 
  
149
threshold faster than if more evenly matched. As discussed earlier, the expectations 
regarding power are internal to the relationship between the primary actors in the crisis. 
Thus, what is of interest is not the actual power of the individual actors, but its value, 
relative to their opponent. 
The variables used to calculate relative power will be ICM variables P10a and P10b. 
This is a modified version of the Cox-Jacobson Scale, which has been extended to 
accommodate non-state international actors and limited to measures of tangible resources. 
The resulting “power index score” is calculated for each actor based on the following 
factors: GNP, GNP per capita, military spending, population and territory. The index 
ranges from 3 (lowest possible score) to 40 (highest possible score) (Bercovitch 2000).  
In order to convert the individual power scores for each actor to a relative power measure 
the following formula was used: 
r_pwr_a = PwrA / PwrA+PwrB 
This created a ratio measure ranging from 0.769 (actor A weakest) to 0.824 (Actor A 
strongest), with 0.5 indicating power parity between A and B. Thus, as r_pwr_a increases, 
the constraints on A can be thought to decrease and with them the probability that A will 
initiate conflict management.  
Costs of Conflictual Action. Measures of the cost associated with conflictual action are 
commonly operationalized as casualties, materiel and more general economic costs. 
Unfortunately, neither the ICM of SHERFACS data sets include a casualty variable at the 
level of the individual actor; consequently, it is not possible to include this element of costs 
in Model 1. SHERFACS, however, does have an ordinal measure of the economic costs 
experienced by each actor at each phase of the conflict. Variables COSTSA and COSTSB 
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measure the severity of the respective actor’s economic costs related to the conduct of the 
dispute during that phase. Costs are coded according to a 6-point scale105. These variables 
were used to construct the relative economic cost variable “r_cost” used in Model 1. 
The first step required in recoding this variable was to identify the phase in which 
the relevant conflict management attempt (from the ICM dataset) took place106. As the 
slope measure the accumulation of pain an actor experiences, the question of how to code 
r_cost in crises that have passed through multiple phases must be addressed. The decision 
was made to take the highest value COSTSA or COSTSB of as the value for r_cost.  Due to 
the categorical nature of the original variable adding or aggregating the values did not make 
sense. Examination of the movement of the cost variable for a specific actor across the 
relevant conflict phases revealed that in most cases costs only varied by one category. In the 
majority of case this was either between 4 (insignificant, minor, or none) and 5 (moderate: 
3-9% GNP), or 5 and 6 (Severe: 10% or more GNP). In all cases the higher value occurred 
in the phase at which the conflict management took place. This distribution further 
supported the coding of r_cost at the most recent phase value. Similarly, it is consistent with 
the cumulative notion of costs inherent in the model. 
Once the cost variable had been determined for both actors, it was necessary to 
transform it into a relative measure. This was done by subtracting the chosen value of 
COSTSA from the chosen value of COSTSB for each crisis case. As there were no cases in 
which the costs between actors differed by more than one category, this created a three 
category ordinal variable. As with the variable for relative power, this variable was coded 
                                                 
105 1 = not relevant; 2 = no information; 3 = debatable; 4 = insignificant, minor or none; 5 = moderate (3-9% 
GNP, roughly); 6 = severe (10% or more of GNP) 
106 This is the first conflict management attempt initiated by one or both of the primary actors in the crisis. 
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such that higher values indicate greater constraint on Actor A. Specifically; 0 = A’s costs 
lower; 1 = costs equal for A and B; 2 = A’s costs higher.   .  
Sensitivity to Costs: Domestic Factors. Ideally the effect of a crisis on the domestic 
support for a leader would be accounted for by a variable directly measuring level of public 
support for a particular crisis. Although such data is not available, SHERFACS does include 
a less sensitive variable – DISSENTA and DISSENTB - indicating whether the crisis actor 
suffered “any internal division and/or dissentions during this phase”107.  In the context of 
the model, such dissent is expected to reduce the actor’s confidence regarding his/her 
domestic political position, thus increasing his/her sensitivity to the costs of continued 
conflictual action. On the other hand, awareness that an opponent faced such domestic 
discontent would have the inverse effect.  
In order to test the effects of the dissent variables a relative measure was 
constructed – “r_diss”, from the two SHERFACS variables. This was done in two stages; 
first the two variables DISSENTA and DISSENTB were recoded dichotomously (0 = no 
dissent; 1 = dissent). This was then used to code r_diss, with the variable in such a way that 
higher values indicated a greater constraint on actor A. This created four possible values for 
r_diss; 0 = A no dissent |B dissent; 1 = A no dissent |B no dissent; 2 = A dissent |B 
dissent; 3 = A dissent | B no dissent. 
 Regime Type. Consideration of the effects of regime type provides some insight into 
how various factors contribute to the pain a decision maker experiences in response to 
                                                 
107 1 = no information; 2= debatable; 3 = no divisions; 4 = its leaders and/or top government; 5 = its type of 
government; 6 = its social order. 
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choosing a conflictual dispute resolution strategy108. In democratic regimes, a government’s 
ability to use force to resolve international disputes is contingent upon public support. That 
is, those who will bear the brunt of the economic and human cost of fighting must either 
actively approve of, or passively acquiesce to, their government’s decision. It is widely 
accepted that public support for military action is influenced strongly by the costs of that 
action, and that the clearest indicator the public has of those costs is the number of 
casualties their military forces are sustaining109.  
Regime type is therefore a possible indicator of the sensitivity an actor has to the 
objective costs incurred during conflictual action. The ICM dataset includes variables 
indicating the regime type of each actor (P14a, P14b), as the theoretical distinction being 
operationalized here is between democratic and non-democratic regimes, these variables 
were recoded dichotomously (0 = non-democracy; 1 = democracy).  
While it is common to see regime type measures at the dyadic level in conflict 
studies, the common distinction between democratic, mixed and non-democratic dyads was 
not best suited to the model being tested. The predictions are not those based on 
democratic peace phenomena (Maoz and Abdolali. 1989), but rather are concerned with the 
extent to which an actor’s actions are constrained by domestic institutional structures 
(Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1990) and public opinion (Mueller 1973; 1994). Again, the 
interest is in the degree of constraint relative to the opponent. The dyadic variable “dyad” 
was constructed to reflect this slightly different use of the regime variable. It is coded, as 
                                                 
108 See for example: Maoz and Abdolali. (1989); Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1990); Mueller, (1973); 
Ostrom and Job (1986).  
109 See for example: Mueller (1973; 1994); Nincic (1995; 1997); Gartner, Segura and Wilkening (1997); Gartner 
and Segura (1998) Gartner, Sigmund, and Segura (1998). 
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with the other variables constructed, such that higher values indicate higher relative 
constraints on actor A110.     
Civil Liberties and Political Rights. The use of regime type as an indicator of sensitivity 
to costs rests on the assumption that structural democracy is linked to substantive 
democracy. That is, that people within countries classified as democratic have the rights of 
political expression and civil liberties that we commonly associate with democratic regimes. 
While this assumption may be reasonable for established democracies, it is more 
problematic for newly democratic states. As many of the countries in the data set fall into 
this latter category, it seemed prudent to consider other measure of the actual levels of 
political freedoms enjoyed by citizens, as it is the ability to protest and indicate dissent 
which is theorized to be influencing an actor’s cost sensitivity.   
A way of more directly measuring a population’s actual ability to protest a particular 
government policy (in this case involvement in conflict), is called for. The model, therefore, 
includes variables constructed from the Freedom House political rights and civil liberties 
ratings, included in the ICM dataset. For each actor political rights and civil liberties are 
coded on a seven point scale with one indicating the highest level and 7 the lowest 
(Bercovitch 2000). A variable “r_polr” was constructed for each crisis by subtracting the 
political rights score of actor B from the political rights score for actor A. This created a 
measure running from -6 to 6. Negative scores indicate actor A has more political rights 
than actor B, therefore more constraints on conflictual action. A score of 0 indicates equal 
level of rights for each actor, and a positive score indicates actor A has fewer political rights 
                                                 
110 Dyad coding: 0 = A non-democratic|B non-democratic; 1 = A non-democratic|B democratic; 2 = A 
democratic|B non-democratic; 3 = A democratic|B democratic.   
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than actor B and therefore fewer constraints. The same method was used to construct the 
variable “r_civl”, using the civil liberties scores for both actors, and the scale variable 
created can be interpreted in the same manner.  
 Internal Homogeneity.  It is also possible that the domestic ethnic, linguistic, and 
religious make-up of a state may affect the efficiency and cohesiveness of opposition to 
government policy – and their sensitivity to the costs of conflict. For this reason, the model 
incorporates a variable measuring the relative homogeneity of the crisis actors. This 
variable, based on a Freedom House measure, is constructed from the ICM variables P20a 
and P20b – homogeneity of party111.  The same method was used to construct the variable 
“r_homog” as described above for “r_pol” and “r_civl”. The resulting scale runs from -2 to 
3; negative scores indicate actor A is more fragmented, thus less constrained, 0 that A and B 
are equally constrained and positive numbers that A is less fragmented than B and therefore 
more constrained by domestic factors when choosing conflictual action. 
Sensitivity to Costs: International Reputation.  The final aspect of costs sensitivity that 
remains to be operationalized is that of international reputation. The expectation is that 
actors are cognizant that their actions in the international sphere can have implications for 
how they are viewed by other states and, that this reputation can have ramifications for 
future relations. Particularly, that undertaking aggressive or conflictual action as a means to 
                                                 
111 The variables are coded on a five point scale: 1 = homogeneous; 2 = significant minority (a single 
significant minority (10-25% population) or a combination of smaller minorities (15-25% population)); 3 = 
Majority (majority population (51% or more) but also a large single minority or group of minorities (26-
49% of population)); 4 = Plurality (only one very large minority group (>30% population and >10% more 
of population than any other single group)); 5 = Fragmented (More than one very large minority or several 
smaller minorities, but no majority or plurality population) 
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resolve a dispute may cause a state to be seen by others as a potential threat, or a less 
attractive partner for cooperation.  
Data concerning overall international opinion regarding the behavior of individual 
actors in specific crises is, not surprisingly, unavailable. ICM does, however, code the level 
of third party support that actor’s received over the course of a specific crisis (P19a; P19b). 
This provides a rough indicator of the level of international support that the conflictual 
strategy of each primary actor received.  These variables were combined to create the 
variable “r_supp”, which indicates the relative level of support from third parties received 
by both primary actors. Again this is coded such that 0 = actor A has more support than B, 
and thus less constraint; 1 = equal levels of support for A and B; 2 = A has less support 
than B, thus greater constrain on conflictual action. 
Controls: Type of Conflict. Model 1 does not directly address the effects of issue 
salience on the behavior of actors in a crisis. This is primarily because the theoretical model 
assumes that salience is symmetric between actors, and, as Model 1 deals with behavior 
within individual crises, no variation in issue salience would therefore exist to be tested. The 
assumption of symmetric salience, however, may be unrealistic in specific crises contexts. It 
particular, crises that are internationalized civil disputes and those involving colonial 
territories.  
Two variables are included to control for this; “civil” is a dummy variable 
constructed from the ICM variable D17. It is coded 1 for all crises coded by D17 as 
internationalized civil or internal crises, and 0 for all other cases. The second variable 
“colonial” is coded from the ICM variable D14, which categorizes the central issue of 
dispute in a crisis. Colonial is coded 1 for all crises coded as 4 (independence, colonial / 
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post-colonial) for D14, and 0 for all other issue categories.  The expectation is that the cost 
variables, as well as the relative power variable, will be less effective indicators in case coded 
as internationalized civil and colonial conflicts, as there is likely to be a negative relationship 
between the relative power of the actors in such crises and the importance they place on the 
issue of dispute.  
Model 2: Pain Threshold: When Will Conflict Management Occur? 
The focus of Model 2 is on explaining differences in the duration of crises prior to 
the initiation of conflict management. While Model 1 focuses on testing the theoretical 
model’s predictions regarding the rate of pain accumulation between crisis actors and the 
probability of initiating crisis management, Model 2 tests the predictions regarding the pain 
threshold of actors. Specifically, does issue salience affect pain tolerance, and is there a 
systematic difference in conflict duration (prior to the initiation of conflict management) as 
a function of issue salience?  
In contrast to Model 1, the unit of analysis is the crisis actor(s) initiating conflict 
management in a specific crisis, and the comparison is between crises, rather than crisis 
actors. This creates several advantages in light of the existing data limitations: First, as 
several of the cases are coded as having both parties initiating conflict management, this 
raises the n to 84 for Model 2112.  Second, variables such as casualties and issue, which are 
only available for the crisis as a whole not the individual crisis actors, can be incorporated113. 
While many of the independent variables used in Model 2 are the same as those used in 
Model 1, their structure is different. As the comparison in this model is between crises, 
                                                 
112 18 of the 66 crises used in the analysis are coded as having both actors as conflict management initiators. 
113 The treatment of the casualty variable will be discussed in more detail in the section on independent 
variables.  
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rather than between actors within a crises the actor level variables are not measured relative 
to the other crisis actor.  
Dependent Variable and Estimation Technique.  The dependent variable for Model 2 is 
the duration (in days) of the crisis prior to the first conflict management event initiated by a 
primary actor in the crisis. This variable was coded by calculating the difference between the 
conflict management start date (ICM CM 2a[day]; 2b[month]; 2c[year]) from the crisis start 
date (ICM D2a[day]; 2b[month]; 2c[year]). As some crises did not have a specific day code 
for either date, this created possible variance in the actual duration in days these crises. To 
overcome this problem when the either or both D2a and CM2a were coded as a range, this 
value was coded separately at the first and last day of the range. When computing the 
duration variable, four possible values were therefore possible. The smallest (early conflict 
management start - late crisis start) was used in the variable “cm_s” and the largest (late 
conflict management start - early crisis start) was used in the variable “cm_l”. Model 2 is 
tested using both of these duration measures.  
Additionally, from these initial duration variables, a categorical variable “length” was 
constructed in order to enable an initial comparison of the duration of conflicts over 
different core issues. The variable is coded 1 = 1 month; 2 = 1-2 months; 3 = 2-6 months; 
4 = 6-9 months; 5 = 9-12 months; 6 = 12-18 months; 7 = 18-24 months, 8 = >24 months. 
As the dependent variable in this second model is continuous, a simple OLS regression is a 
suitable estimation technique to use.  This makes interpretation of the results simpler than 
those of Model 1 and, along with the larger number of observations, increases the power of 
the statistical test of the model expectations regarding threshold effects.  
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Independent Variables: Issue Salience. Central to the model to be tested is the idea that 
people will fight harder and suffer more pain for something that is important to them. 
Testing this basic proposition requires an empirical model that incorporates a variable, or 
variables, which capture the concept of issue salience. That is, a measure that identifies not 
only what the dispute is about, but how important that “what” is to the primary actors. 
Coding even the “what” part of issue salience is difficult enough (Diehl 1992:333-44). 
Bercovitch’s ICM dataset does, however, provide a variable that identifies the core or 
source of a dispute, categorizing it as either: 1) territory/sovereignty; 2) ideological/political; 
3) security/ military; 4) independence/colonial, post-colonial; 5) resources/economic; 6) 
ethnic/cultural.    
The closest match that could be found to the concept of issue salience developed in 
this research, is the SHERFACS variable THT_VALUE: “what was the gravity of the threat 
as perceived by the parties involved in the dispute or quarrel?” This is coded on a nine-
point scale from “threat to existence” to “threat (limited) to population or property”114. 
Although there is some overlap between this variable and the ICM coding of issue 
(specifically the colonial and economic categories) it does represent a theoretically different 
aspect of issue salience.  
Combined, the ICM issue variable and the SHERFACS variable THT_VALUE 
capture the basic components of the concept of issue salience presented in the theoretical 
model. The structure of the variable THT_VALUE seems somewhat amenable to 
                                                 
114 Full coding of THT_VALUE is as follows: 1) threat to existence; 2)threat of grave damage; 3) threat to 
influence in international system; 4) threat of loss of colonial territory; 5) threat to territorial integrity; 6) 
threat to political system; 7) threat to diplomatic personnel or process; 8) threat to economic interests; 9) 
threat (limited) to population or property. 
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interpretation according to rank order. As discussed earlier, however, the ICM issue variable 
requires theoretically unsubstantiated assumptions if ordering is to be imposed. So, although 
measures have been found to differentiate between crises on the basis of the issue at stake, 
how exactly to compare these differences remains problematic. For this reason, the analysis 
will assume no specific meaning to the order of the variable categories. Rather, comparisons 
are made regarding the behavior of actors across the different categories of disputes.  
Relative Power. The relative power variable was calculated in the same manner as it 
was for Model 1. However, whereas Model 1 consistently used the relative power of actor A 
[r_pwr_a], in Model 2 the relative power scores for the specific actor were used. That is, in 
crises where actor B initiated conflict management, the variable “r_pwr” refers to the 
relative power of B, in cases where A initiated it refers to the relative power of A.  Thus, in 
either case as r_pwr increases, the constraints on the conflict management initiating actor 
can be thought to decrease.  
Economic Costs. The SHERFACS dataset includes an ordinal measure of the 
economic costs experienced by each actor at each phase of the conflict. Variables COSTSA 
and COSTSB measure the severity of the respective actor’s economic costs related to the 
conduct of the dispute during that phase, coded according to a 6 point scale115. For Model 2 
the value of the cost variable for the conflict management initiating actor, during the phase 
in which the conflict management event was initiated116, was used as the value of “cost” for 
the individual case.   
                                                 
115 1 = not relevant; 2 = no information; 3 = debatable; 4 = insignificant, minor or none; 5 = moderate (3-9% 
GNP, roughly); 6 = severe (10% or more of GNP) 
116 For a full explanation of the phase coding rule used for this variable see the discussion of the cost variable 
for Model 1. 
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Casualties. As discussed at some length in the theoretical and literature chapters, 
casualties are a commonly used measure for the costs of a conflict. In particular, when there 
is interest in the public support or disapproval off a particular policy action, casualties are 
regarded often as a key explanatory factor. However, data on casualty rates, particularly for 
less recent wars, lower-intensity conflicts, and those not involving major powers, are hard to 
come by. Even when such data is available for a crisis as a whole, it is rare to find it 
disaggregated over the course of the conflict. 
The SHERFACS dataset does include a measure of fatalities at the phase level117; 
however, this variable is measured at the level of the crisis, not the actor. So, it is possible to 
identify the total casualty count prior to the conflict management attempt, but not how 
those casualties were distributed between the two primary actors. It was this structure, 
which prevented the use of the casualty variable in Model 1. In Model 2, the problem is a 
little less severe, as the analysis is between crisis cases. If the FATALITIES variable is 
employed in the analysis of Model 2, however, the structure of the variable must be kept in 
mind when it comes to interpretation. Rather than interpreting “death” as the actual 
casualty cost incurred by an actor, it should be interpreted as an indicator of the severity of 
the conflict and the potential for loss of public support.  
Sensitivity to Costs: Domestic Factors, Domestic Dissent, Civil Liberties, Political Rights & 
Internal Homogeneity. The rationale for the inclusion of these four variables as measures of 
domestic sensitivity to the costs of conflictual action remains consistent with that discussed 
for Model 1. As with the other independent variables in Model 2, it is the variable value for 
                                                 
117 FATALITIES  is an ordinal variable coded as follows: 0) no known; 1) no information; 2) debatable; 3) 
none; 4) 1-25; 5) 26-100; 6) 101-1000; 7)1001-2000; 8) 2001- 10,000; 9) 10,001 – 100,000; 10) 100,001 – 
1,000,000; 11) over 1,000,000. In the cases used for analysis the values ranged from 3 – 10. 
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the conflict management-initiating actor, which is used in this model, not the relative 
measure calculated for and used in Model 1.  
Sensitivity to Costs: International Factors, Third Party Support; UN Involvement. The third 
party support variable was also discussed in relation to Model 1 and is used in the same 
manner in Model 2 except that, once again, it is the level of support for the crisis 
management initiating actor that is used in Model 2, not the relative level of support 
between the primary actors.  The between crises nature of the analysis in Model 2 allows for 
the inclusion of additional measures of international opinion. In particular, it becomes 
possible to include variables that account for the behavior of international actors.  
The ICM data provide two variables describing UN involvement in the dispute, the 
first “un_involv” indicates whether there was UN involvement in managing the dispute 
(1=yes; 2=no). Crises in which there is UN management are considered to place greater 
constraints on the conflictual behavior of crisis actors, thus increasing their sensitivity to the 
costs of continued conflictual behavior. The second variable, “un_op” indicates whether 
there was a UN peacekeeping operation, sanctions or embargoes in place either prior to the 
dispute or established as a result of the dispute118. For Model 2, this variable was recoded as 
a dichotomous indicator (0 = no UN operation; 1= UN operation).  
Controls:  Previous Relations; Previous Conflict Management Attempts. Finally, two control 
variables were included in Model 2, both from the ICM dataset. Both of these are 
concerned with the context of the crisis, and possible additional factors that may indirectly 
indicate the salience of the issue in dispute. The first of these – “prev_rel” [ICM P12] - is a 
                                                 
118 Original coding: 0) no UN operation; 1) Peacekeeping established in this dispute; 2) Peacekeeping already 
operating from a previous dispute; 3) Peacekeeping established and already operating; 4) peacekeeping 
/sanctions/embargoes established; 5) peacekeeping/sanctions/embargoes already operating 
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variable that codes the nature of the relationship between the primary actors, prior to the 
dispute119. This variable is coded from “friendly” to “more than one prior dispute”. It is 
expected that, all other factors held constant, crises in which the value for prev_rel is 
higher, would be regarded as more serious, and therefore more salient. The second control 
variable is “#_prev_cm” [ICM CM 8], which measure the number of previous mediation or 
negotiation attempts in the particular dispute120.  
 
Model 1 Results: Pain Accumulation: Who Will Initiate Conflict Management? 
The dependent variable for Model 1 is the conflict management initiator for the 
specific crisis – either Actor A, Actor B or Both. The analysis is between actors within a 
specific crisis and the independent variables are structured as relative measures (between the 
two actors). In terms of the theoretical model, Model 1 is testing predictions regarding the 
effects of pain accumulation on the behavior of crisis actors, specifically, their move from a 
conflictual to a negotiating strategy. The basic prediction being tested is that conflict 
management initiation will be influenced positively be the speed of accumulation of costs, 
relative to the opponent.  
Model Specification 
As discussed above, the independent variables fall into three basic categories; 
relative power, costs, and sensitivity to costs, both domestic and international. Because 
there are multiple potential indicators of domestic sensitivity, several different versions of 
Model 1 were run. In addition, the control variable for potential asymmetry of issue salience 
                                                 
119 Coded as follows: 1) friendly; 2) no previous relationship; 3) antagonism; 4) previous conflict, no military 
hostilities; 5) 1 previous dispute; 6) more than 1 previous dispute. 
120 Coded as follows: 0 = 0; 1 = 1-2;  2= 3-4;  3= 5-6;  4 = 7-8;  5 = 9-10;  6 = 11+. 
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–“colonial” – is introduced121. There are serious restrictions on the number of independent 
variables that can be included in one model, due to the very small number of cases. The 
choice was made, therefore to specify and test different versions of Model 1122.  
Initial Results 
An initial comparison of the results of the various multinomial models specified in 
indicates that the variable measuring the level of internal fragmentation (“homog”) is a 
better measure of domestic sensitivity that the variable “dyad”, which is based on the 
regime type of the primary actors123. The variable for internal sensitivity (“r_supp”) was not 
significant in any of the model specifications124. Furthermore, its inclusion did not improve 
the overall fit of the model or its predictive power. For this reason, it was decided not to 
include this variable in the final version of Model 1. Unfortunately, this makes it impossible 
to test Hypothesis 4125. The effects of domestic dissent will, however be tested in Model 2, 
enabling an examination across crises. Table 7.2 presents the results from Model 1B2 (no 
third part support variable) and 1B3 (third party support variable included).  
                                                 
121 This is a dummy variable constructed from the ICM variable D14, which indicates the central issue of 
dispute. The constructed variable was coded 1 for all cases coded 4 (independence/colonial, post-colonial) 
for D14 and 0 for all other cases. In all, 9 cases fell into the colonial category.  
122 All statistical testing was run in Stata 8.  
123 The various models were estimated and then their relative measures of fit were compared across a variety 
of statistics of fit including; adjusted count R2, Pseudo R2, Akaike’s information criteria and the Baysian 
information criteria.   
124 Part of the poor performance of the variable r_diss may be a result of the lack of variation in the variable. 
Of the 66 cases, 49 were coded as neither actor experiencing domestic dissent. There were 9 cases in which 
B alone experienced dissent, 6 in which A alone experienced dissent and 2 in which both actors 
experienced dissent. 
125 Within an individual crisis, is an actor experiences domestic dissent as a result of the crisis, the probability 
that s/he will initiate conflict management increases.   
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TABLE 7.2 Multinomial Logit Models of Crisis Management Initiation: Models 1B2 and 1B3 
 MODEL 1B2 MODEL 1B3 
 Ln [A | both] Ln [B | both] Ln [both |B] Ln [A | both] Ln [B | both] Ln [both |B] 
 
Relative Power A 
 
-4.10* 
 (2.80) 
 
-4.99** 
 (2.65) 
 
 4.99** 
 (2.65) 
 
-4.10* 
 (2.82) 
 
-4.93** 
 (2.66) 
 
 4.93** 
 (2.67) 
Relative Cost  0.05 
 (1.37) 
-1.27 
 (1.15) 
 1.27 
 (1.14) 
 0.06 
 (1.39) 
-1.28 
 (1.15) 
 1.28 
 (1.15) 
Relative Political 
Rights 
-0.04 
 (0.13) 
 0.18** 
 (0.12) 
-0.18** 
 (0.12) 
-0.40 
 (0.13) 
 0.19* 
 (0.12) 
-0.19* 
 (0.12) 
Relative 
Homogeneity 
 0.46** 
 (0.28) 
 0.48** 
 (0.27) 
-0.48** 
 (0.27) 
 0.46** 
 (0.28) 
 0.48** 
 (0.27) 
-0.48** 
 (0.27) 
Colonial Conflict  2.34** 
 (1.45) 
 2.10* 
 (1.52) 
-2.10* 
 (1.52) 
 2.36** 
 (1.48) 
 2.02* 
 (1.54) 
-2.02* 
 (1.54) 
Relative 3rd Party 
Support  
   
    -- 
 
   -- 
 
   -- 
 0.05 
 (0.70)  
-0.21 
 (0.66) 
 0.21 
 (0.65) 
Constant  1.67 
 (2.34) 
 3.62* 
 (2.12) 
-3.62* 
 (2.12) 
 1.63 
 (2.50) 
 3.80** 
 (2.24) 
-3.81** 
 (2.24) 
 Log Likelihood -62.59  Log Likelihood -62.46  
 N 66  N 66  
 LR chi2 (10) 15.69  LR chi2 (10) 15.94  
 Prob > chi2  0.10  Prob > chi2  0.19  
 Pseudo R2 0.11  Pseudo R2 0.11  
 Adj Count R2 .017  Adj Count R2 0.11  
* p < 0.1, * *p < 0.05 (one-tailed t-tests) 
 
  
165
 The higher adjusted count R2 for Model 1B2 indicates that the model can correctly 
predict more outcomes (17%), above the number that would be correctly guessed by 
choosing the largest marginal, than can model 1B3 (11%). Furthermore, a comparison of the 
relative measures of fit for the two models indicates that the AIC (Akaike’s information 
criteria) for Model 1B2 is smaller (2.26 compared to 2.32 for Model 1B3) and the BIC 
(Baysian information criteria) more negative (-101.1 compared to -92.9 for model 1B3), both 
comparisons providing positive support for Model 1B2 compared to 1B3. 
So the specification of Model 1 which provides the strongest results is that which 
uses relative homogeneity and relative political rights as measures of domestic sensitivity to 
costs, and does not include a measure for international sensitivity. An assumption has been 
made, however, that there is something fundamentally different about the behavior of 
actors in colonial and post-colonial crises that requires controlling for this type of conflict in 
the specification of the model. In order to test this assumption, Model 1B2 was run without 
the control variable “colonial” (Model 1B). The results of the two models are presented in 
Table 7. 3.  
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TABLE 7.3 Multinomial Logit Models of Crisis Management Initiation: Models 1B and 1B2 
 
 
MODEL 1B MODEL 1B2 
 
Ln [A | both] Ln [B | both] Ln [both |B] Ln [A | both] Ln [B | both] Ln [both |B] 
 
Relative Power A 
 
-2.51 
 (2.51) 
 
-3.80** 
 (2.36) 
 
 3.80** 
 (2.36) 
 
-4.10* 
 (2.80) 
 
-4.99** 
 (2.65) 
 
 4.99** 
 (2.65) 
Relative Cost  0.78 
 (1.26) 
-0.79 
 (1.10) 
 0.79 
 (1.10) 
 0.05 
 (1.37) 
-1.27 
 (1.15) 
 1.27 
 (1.14) 
Relative Political 
Rights 
-0.11 
 (0.12) 
 0.13 
 (0.11) 
-0.13** 
 (0.12) 
-0.04 
 (0.13) 
 0.18** 
 (0.12) 
-0.18** 
 (0.12) 
Relative 
Homogeneity 
 0.36* 
 (0.27) 
 0.41** 
 (0.26) 
-0.41** 
 (0.26) 
 0.46** 
 (0.28) 
 0.48** 
 (0.27) 
-0.48** 
 (0.27) 
Colonial Conflict    ----   ----   ----  2.34** 
 (1.45) 
 2.10* 
 (1.52) 
-2.10* 
 (1.52) 
Constant  0.52 
 (2.15) 
 2.80* 
 (1.94) 
-2.80* 
 (1.94) 
 1.67 
 (2.34) 
 3.62* 
 (2.12) 
-3.62* 
 (2.12) 
 Log Likelihood -64.31 Log Likelihood -62.59 
 N 66 N 66 
 LR chi2 (10) 12.24 LR chi2 (10) 15.69 
 Prob > chi2  0.14 Prob > chi2  0.10 
 Pseudo R2 0.09 Pseudo R2 0.11 
 Adj Count R2 0.17 Adj Count R2 0.14 
* p < 0.1, * *p < 0.05 (one-tailed t-tests) 
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Not only does the model incorporating the colonial dummy (1B2) have stronger 
results for all variables, but the colonial dummy is significant for all three outcome 
categories. Furthermore, a comparison of the relative fit of the models also indicates that 
Model 1B2 performs more strongly than Model 1B (no colonial control). The adjusted 
count R2s indicate that Model 1B2 is a better predictor of outcomes than Model 1B (17% 
above largest marginal, compared to 14%). Although the AIC and BIC scores for Model 1B 
are slightly better, providing support for the model over Model 1B2, the differences are very 
small. Comparison of these two model specifications does not provide, therefore, 
conclusive support for one specification over the other. The increase in predictive power 
provided by Model 1B2, combined with the significant coefficients for the colonial dummy, 
however, were considered to outweigh the results of the comparison of the information 
criteria and Model 1B2 was chosen as the optimal  specification of Model 1, given the 
limitations of the data. This specification will be used for all subsequent analysis and 
interpretation126.  
How Well Does the Overall Model Perform? 
 One way to obtain a general idea about the how well the model performed is to 
compare the predicted and observed outcomes, presented in Table 7.4.  From the table we 
can see that the model predicted both parties would initiate conflict management fifteen 
times. Eight of these were classified correctly, that is the observed outcome was both 
initiating127. A was predicted to initiate ten times, five of these predictions being correct128. B 
was correctly predicted to initiate twenty-three out of the thirty observed cases of B 
                                                 
126 From this point on Model 1B2 will be referred to simply as Model 1. 
127 Two were incorrectly classified as A initiating and five as B initiating. 
128 Three were incorrectly classified as Both initiating and two as B initiating.  
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initiating129. The model demonstrated more accuracy in predicting B’s actions (77%) than it 
did in predicting initiation by A (28%) or both (44%). However, as there were more cases in 
which B initiated than any other outcome, and considering the small number of cases used 
in the analysis, this could be a statistical artifice, rather than an indication of any substantive 
difference in the predictive power of the model across outcome categories. So, as the 
adjusted count R2 measure indicates, knowledge of the independent variables, compared to 
basing prediction only on marginal distributions, does reduce the error in prediction, in this 
case by 17%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effects of Individual Independent Variables 
Examination of the results of the multinomial logit estimated for Model 1130 
indicates that all independent variables were significant for at least one of the comparisons 
between outcomes, with the exception of the measure for relative economic costs. 
                                                 
129 Seven were incorrectly classified as Both initiating and eleven as A initiating.  
130 Model 1B2 in Tables 7.2 and 7.3.  
TABLE 7.4 Predicted and Actual Outcomes 
 Actual  
Predicted Both Initiate A Initiates B Initiates 
Total 
(predicted) 
Both Initiate 8 
(44%) 
2 5 15 
A Initiates 
3 
5 
(28%) 
2 10 
B Initiates 
7 11 
23 
(77%) 
41 
Total (actual) 18 18 30 66 
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Interpreting the substantive meaning of the coefficients produced by the MNL requires 
keeping several factors in mind. First, as the model is non-linear, the magnitude of effect 
cannot be calculated directly from the coefficients. Second, the MNL is, in effect a 
simultaneous estimation of the binary logits for all possible combinations of outcomes 
categories (Long 1997: 149). Any interpretation of a particular coefficient for a particular 
outcome must be made, therefore, in reference to the base category. For example, the 
coefficient in Table 7.2 (Model 1B2) for the effect of the relative power of A indicates that 
the probability of A initiating conflict management decreases significantly (p< .05), compared 
to the probability that both will initiate.  
Interpretation of the effects of individual variables is simplified by considering the 
MNM in terms of odds. To do this the logit model is calculated in its log-linear form. Since 
the model is linear in this form, the coefficients can be interpreted as indicating the change 
in odds of a particular outcome, relative to another, which results from a unit change in X. 
Or “for a unit change in xk, we expect the logit to change by βk, holding all other variables 
constant” (Long 1997: 81). Stata 8 reports both the factor change (e^b) and the 
standardized factor change (e^bStdX) if the “listcoef” command is run after the MNL is 
specified. Table 7.5 presents the factor change in the odds of relative outcomes for all 
Model 1 variables that are significant at the 0.1 (one-tailed) level and above. Stata also 
calculates the percent change in the odds of a particular outcome131, which provides an 
alternate means of interpretation.  
 
 
 
                                                 
131 Stata 8 command: listcoef, percent 
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Relative Power of A 
As Table 7.5 indicates, relative power has a significant effect on the odds that either 
A or B will initiate conflict management compared to the odds that conflict management 
will be initiated by both actors. For a standard deviation increase in the log of relative 
TABLE 7.5 Factor Change in the Odds of A, B or Both Initiating Conflict 
Management 
 
Variable 
(odds comparing group 1 vs group 2) 
β e^b e^bStdX 
Relative power of A 
(sd = 0.187)    
A – Both -4.07* 0.02 0.47 
B – Both -4.99** 0.01 0.39 
Both – A 4.07* 58.46 2.13 
Both - B 4.99** 146.81 2.54 
Relative Political Rights of A 
(sd = 3.10) 
   
A – B -0.22** 0.80 0.50 
B – A 0.22** 1.25 1.99 
B – Both 0.18** 1.20 1.78 
Both - B -0.18** 0.83 0.56 
Relative Internal Homogeneity of A 
(sd = 1.330) 
   
A – Both 0.46** 1.59 1.85 
B – Both 0.48** 1.62 1.90 
Both – A -0.46** 0.63 0.54 
Both - B -0.48** 0.62 0.53 
Colonial / Post Colonial Crisis 
(sd = 0.346) 
   
A – Both 2.34** 10.38 2.25 
B – Both 2.10* 8.20 2.10 
Both – A -2.34** 0.10 0.45 
Both - B -2.10* 0.12 0.48 
* p < 0.1, * *p < 0.05 (one-tailed t-tests) 
e^b = factor change in odds for a unit increase in x. 
e^bStdX = Change in odds for a standard deviation increase in x.  
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power, the odds that A will initiate conflict management are 0.47 times the odds of both 
initiating, holding all other variables constant; a decrease of 98.3% in the odds. For standard 
deviation increase in the log of relative power of A the odds of B initiating, are 0.39, 
compared to both, holding all other variables constant; a decrease of 99.3% in the odds.  
Assessing these findings in terms of Hypothesis 1132 is a little problematic, as the 
only significant relationships involve the outcome category in which both actors initiate. 
The model makes no specific predictions regarding the effects of power on the probability 
that both actors will initiate. An examination of the predicted probabilities of each outcome 
therefore provides more information regarding the performance of Hypothesis 1. As Figure 
7.1 shows, the probability that A will initiate conflict management decreases as its power 
relative to B increase.  
Interestingly, and inconsistent with Hypothesis 1, B’s probability of initiating 
conflict management also decreases as A’s relative power increases although the effect is not 
as pronounced. One possible explanation for this may be found by considering the 
predicted probability results for both initiating. There is a clear increase in the probability of 
both actors initiating as the relative power of A increases, particularly toward the more 
extreme values of A’s power. This outcome category may be capturing cases where both 
actors are willing to negotiate, but for different reasons. B’s motivation for initiating would 
be consistent with the expectations of the Model. A, on the other hand, may see conflict 
management as a low cost, low risk alternative to conflict as the probability of their being 
                                                 
132 Within an individual crisis, there is a negative relationship between relative power and the probability that 
an actor will initiate conflict management.  
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able to return to a conflict strategy and successfully achieve their goals through force if 
negotiated terms were unfavorable would be seen to be high.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 7.1 Predicted Probability of Each Outcome as Relative 
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Relative Domestic Sensitivity 
Two variables were used in Model 1 to measure the level of domestic sensitivity to 
the costs of conflictual action; relative political rights and relative homogeneity. The 
expectation was that actors whose citizens had more political rights, relative to their 
opponent’s citizens, would be more sensitive to the costs of conflict, as their citizen’s would 
have greater freedom to express opposition to government policy, or punish decision 
makers for their policy choices at the ballot box. Conditioning this expectation, however, is 
the effect of the social makeup of the country. The variable for relative homogeneity is 
designed to account for the effects of social cleavages (fragmentation) on the ability of 
citizens and opposition parties to effectively mobilize opposition to government policy.  
As the results reported in Table 7.5 indicate, there is support for Hypothesis 4133. 
Specifically, for each unit decrease134 in the relative political rights of A, the odds of A 
initiating compared to B, decrease by a factor of 0.8, holding all other variables constant; a 
change of 20% in the odds. Similarly, the odds of B initiating compared to A increase by a 
factor of 1.25, holding all other variables constant; an increase of 24.9% in the odds.  
The effects of changes in the relative political rights of A can also be analyzed by comparing 
the predicted probability of each outcome as the value of r_polr changes135. These are 
presented graphically in Figure 7.2. The other dependent variables are set according to the 
same logic as used in the graphs in Figure 7.1136. 
                                                 
133 Within an individual crisis, there is a negative relationship between relative political sensitivity to costs and 
the probability that an actor will initiate conflict management. 
134 The variables “r_polr” and “r_homog” are coded such that a higher value denotes a lower sensitivity for A, 
relative to B.  
135 The decision was made to vary r_polr as the variable spanned a greater range (-6 - 6) than r_homog (-2 - 2). 
136 r_pow-a was set at 0.5 for “costs equal”, one standard deviation (0.187) above 0.5 for “costs lower for A” a 
one standard deviation below 0.5 for “costs higher for A” 
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FIGURE 7.2 Predicted Probability of Each Outcome as Relative 
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 As the graph for the predicated probability of A initiating indicates, A is increasingly 
more likely to initiate as its political rights increase, relative to B. This is consistent with the 
expectations of Hypothesis 4. The results for B are similarly supportive of the hypothesis; as 
B’s rights increase relative to A, the probability B will initiate conflict management 
increases. There is little variation in the probability that both actors will initiate, relative to 
changes in the relative political rights of A.  
As far as the effects of relative internal homogeneity are concerned, the results for 
the behavior of A are supportive of Hypothesis 4, but the relationship is not significant. As 
Table 7.2 indicates, as A becomes more internally fragmented, the probability that it will 
initiate conflict management compared to B decreases. A’s relative internal homogeneity 
does, however have a significant effect on the probability of A or B initiating, compared to 
the probability that both will initiate. Specifically as A’s internal homogeneity decreases by 
one unit, the odds it will initiate (compared to both) increase by a factor of 1.59, holding all 
other variables constant; an increase of 58.7%. The odds of B initiating, compared to both, 
increase by a factor of 1.62 for every unit decrease in the relative homogeneity of A; an 
increase of 62% in the odds.  
Relative Economic Costs 
Although the variable for relative economic cost used in Model 1 was not 
significant, it was in the direction expected. As A’s costs increase, relative to B, so does the 
probability that it will initiate. For each unit increase in the relative costs, the odds of A 
initiating, compared to B, increase by a factor of 3.76; an increase in the odds of 276%. This 
is consistent with the expectations of Hypothesis 2.  
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The graphs in Figure 7.1 provide an overall picture of the effects of relative 
economic costs on the predicted probability of an actor initiating conflict management. In 
all three graphs, the probability of initiation for each actor is shown for three separate costs 
conditions. In the “costs equal” condition the variables for relative political rights, costs and 
internal homogeneity were set equal for both A and B and colonial was set at 0137. In the 
“costs for A higher” condition the variables were set to the value which represented the 
highest relative cost, or greatest sensitivity for A. In the “cost for A lower” condition 
variables were set to values which reflected the lowest cost and sensitivity to costs for A.  
As the graph of the predicted probability of A initiating indicates, when A is less 
powerful (relative power <.5), A is more likely to initiate when its costs are higher than B’s, 
and least likely to initiate when its costs are lower. This is consistent with Hypothesis 5b138. 
This relationship changes when A is more powerful than B (relative power >.5). In such 
cases A is most likely to initiate when it has costs equal to those of B, but still least likely to 
initiate when its costs are lower. The difference in probability between these conditions 
almost converges as the relative power of A becomes greatest, making substantive 
distinction between them difficult.  
The relationship between the probability of B initiating and the relative costs it 
incurs is both clearer and more consistent. B is considerable more likely to initiate when it 
experiences higher costs than A, and highly unlikely to initiate when its costs are lower than 
A’s. This pattern indicates consistent support for Hypothesis 2. Similarly in cases where 
                                                 
137 As only nine cases were coded as colonial or post-colonial crises, it was decided that the modal category 
was most appropriate for this part of the analysis. The effects of colonial crises are discussed later.  
138 Within an individual crisis, if an actor is experiencing higher costs than his/her opponent, the probability 
that s/he will initiate conflict management increases.  
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both actors initiate, the probability of initiating is greatest when A’s costs are higher and 
lowest when A’s costs are lower. As the model makes no specific hypotheses regarding the 
conditions under which both actors will initiate this result is harder to interpret in terms of 
the stated hypotheses.  
The effects of the relative costs incurred by an actor and their probability of 
initiating conflict management can be seen also by considering the graphs in Figure 7.2. In 
the graphs for both A and B, the probability of each actor negotiating is consistently highest 
when their relative costs are highest and lowest when their relative costs are lowest. This 
reinforces the findings supporting Hypothesis 6b discussed above for changes in the relative 
power of A. 
Colonial and Post-colonial Crises 
It was suggested in the discussion of issue salience that there may be a systematic 
difference in the behavior of actors in colonial and post-colonial crises, compared to other 
issues of dispute. As Table 7.5 indicates, the dummy variable does have a significant effect 
on the probability that a either A or B will initiate, compared to both initiating. For A, the 
odds of initiating increase by a factor of 10.38 in colonial conflicts, holding all other 
variables constant; a change in the odds of 938.1%. The odds for B are similar; a factor 
change of 8.20, indicating an increase in the odds of 720.3%. 
As there were only nine cases of colonial crises, the predicted probabilities were 
calculated using the modal values of the variables r_cost; r_homog and r_pwr_a. The 
variable r_polr was chosen as the most suitable variable to move, as there was a relatively 
even distribution of values of the variable for colonial cases. As the graphs for the predicted 
probability of A and B indicate, in both cases the probability of the individual actor 
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initiating is higher in colonial crises than it is in no-colonial crises. Not surprisingly, the 
probabilities are reversed in cases where both actors initiate conflict management.  
 
Model 2 Results: Pain Threshold: When Will Conflict Management Occur? 
The dependent variable for Model 2 is the duration (in days) of the crisis prior to 
the first conflict management event initiated by one of the primary actors in the crisis. As 
with Model 1, the data sets provided multiple possible measures for the key theoretical 
concepts: power, costs, sensitivity to costs and, most centrally, issue salience. However, 
variable selection was limited by the small number of observations. Variable choices were 
made, therefore, according to the following criteria: 1) closeness to theory; 2) consistency 
with Model 1; 3) ability to capture theoretical concepts absent from Model 1.   
Model Specification 
Power 
Rel_pwr:  Relative power of actor(s) initiating crisis management 
Costs 
cost: Economic cost to actor(s) initiating conflict management, measured 
at the  phase which management attempt takes place. 
deaths: Number of fatalities, prior to conflict management initiation, for 
both actors 
Sensitivity to costs 
pol-rights:  Level of political rights initiating actor(s)’ country. 
un_op:  Presence of a UN peacekeeping operation, sanctions or embargo 
prior to or at the time of the conflict management initiation. 
High_Threat: Severity of threat (crisis level) at the time of the conflict 
management attempt 
E_rival: Was the crisis part of an enduring rivalry? 
E_RxThr: Interaction: High_Threat* E_rival 
Control 
#prev_cm: Number of previous conflict management attempts during the crisis 
 
The results of the OLS regression are presented in Table 7.6 below:  
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TABLE 7.6 Model 2: Duration of Conflict Prior to Management Attempt 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(std. error) 
P>|t| 
(2-tailed t-test) 
95% Conf. Interval 
 
Relative power 
 
1511.87 
(598.87) 
 
0.013 
 
330.56       
   
2693.18 
Economic cost 541.57 
(201.78) 
0.009 139.51   943.63 
Deaths 39.40 
(80.6) 
0.626 -121.198        200.00 
Political rights 101.56 
(46.04) 
0.031 9.82   193.31 
UN operation -211.72 
(186.38) 
0.260 -583.09   159.66 
Severity of threat 169.54 
(100.52) 
0.096 -30.75   369.83 
 
Enduring rivalry 1490.28 
(851.49) 
0.084 -206.35   3186.90 
# Prev CM attempts -133.69 
(71.36) 
0.065 -275.89   8.500 
Threat*Enduring 
rivalry 
-305.00 
(187.73) 
0.108 -679.06   69.06 
Constant -3814.94 
(879.83) 
0.000 -5568.04   -2061.84 
 
Dependent variable:     Duration of crisis (in days) prior to initiation of crisis management. 
N 
F (9, 74) 
Prob > F 
R2 
84 
4.40 
.0001 
0.35 
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Issue Salience 
Three variables are used to capture the effects of issue salience on the duration of a 
crisis prior to one or both of the primary actors instigating crisis management; severity of 
threat, whether or not the crisis is part of an enduring rivalry and the interaction between 
the two. The coefficient for severity of threat indicates that, when the crisis is not part of an 
enduring rivalry, a unit increase in the severity of threat increases the duration of a crisis 
prior to a management attempt by 169.54 days. This finding supports Hypothesis 1; that 
actors in highly salient disputes will take longer to move from a conflictual to a negotiating 
strategy than those in lower salience disputes; and is significant at the 0.05 level for a one-
tailed test.  
Interpreting the coefficient for enduring rivalry and its interaction with threat is a 
little more complex139. The coefficient for enduring rivalries reveals the estimated effect of 
the presence of an enduring rivalry when the severity of threat is zero. However, severity of 
threat never takes the value of zero, so there is no logical or substantive meaning to this 
coefficient considered independently. For this reason the effects of this pair of interactive 
variables can be interpreted either through differentiation or differences in the predicted 
values. 
  Analysis of the first derivative of Y with respect to the independent variable 
enduring rivalry yields the effects of enduring rivalry, conditional on the severity of threat. 
The values indicate that at low levels of threat the fact that the crisis is part of an enduring 
rivalry has a positive effect on the duration of the crisis prior to a management attempt. 
This relationship is reversed at high levels of threat, however, with the presence of an 
                                                 
139 Interpretation of interaction effects is taken from Kam and Franzese, 2005. 
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enduring rivalry decreasing the duration of the crisis prior to a management attempt. 
Overall, the conditional effect of an enduring rivalry is larger at low levels of threat. 
Calculation of the differences in the predicted duration of a crisis prior to conflict 
management for both enduring and non-enduring rivalries indicates that in crises that are 
not part of an enduring rivalry, the predicted crisis duration prior to management increases 
as the severity of threat increases. This is consistent with Hypothesis 1. Cases of crises that 
are a part of an enduring rivalry, however, behave differently.      
Costs 
The results for the two cost variables – economic costs and deaths - are not 
consistent with the Model’s expectations. Hypothesis 2 predicted that actors in high salience 
conflicts would incur greater costs before offering crisis management, than would actors in 
low salience crises. The findings indicate that costs do have a significant effect on the 
duration of a crisis prior to management initiation, this effect is positive. That is, for every 
unit increase in costs, the duration of the crisis increases by 541.57 days. However, the 
independent effect of economic costs does not fully capture the relationship proposed by 
Hypothesis, as it does not account for the effects of issue salience on costs. The results for 
the effect of deaths on crisis duration are similarly inconsistent with Hypothesis 2, although 
not significant. There is also the same problem of interpreting the effects of fatalities 
without accounting for the interactive effect of issue salience. 
Sensitivity to Costs 
The variable measuring political rights capture sensitivity to domestic political costs. 
The findings show that as the political rights in the country increase, the duration of the 
conflict prior to management also increases. This contradicts the theoretical expectation 
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that actors in states where the population has a higher level of political rights will be more 
constrained by public opinion and therefore less likely to be able to continue a conflictual 
strategy without the rationale of a high stakes issue. 
Sensitivity to the international reputational costs of continuing a conflictual strategy 
is captured through the variable UN operation, which is a dichotomous variable indicating 
the presence, or not, of a UN peacekeeping mission, sanction or embargo associated with 
the crisis. It is theorized that the presence of such an operation would increase the actors’ 
sensitivity to the costs of conflict. While the coefficient for the UN operation variable is not 
significant, it is in the direction consistent with the theory. The findings indicate that the 
presence of such a UN operation decreases the duration of a crisis prior to the initiation of 
conflict management by 211.72 days.  
Control 
Finally, a variable indicating the number of previous conflict management attempts 
was included in the model. The inclusion of this variable is grounded in the idea that prior 
conflict management attempts increase an actor’s information regarding his/her opponent. 
In turn, this decreases the level of uncertainty associated with initiating an offer of conflict 
management. The finding that a greater number of previous conflict management attempts 
has a significant (p = 0.065) effect on the duration of a conflict prior to the initiation of 
conflict management by one or both of the primary actors, decreasing it by -133.69 days for 
each prior conflict management event is consistent with this idea.  
An alternate explanation of the effect of prior conflict management attempts, related to 
sensitivity to international reputation is also possible. As measurement of the dependent 
variable is based on the first case of conflict management initiated by either one or both 
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primary actors, any previous conflict management events must, by definition involve third 
party intervention. The negative and significant coefficient for this variable is therefore 
consistent with the theoretical expectation that increased international interest and/or 
intervention to encourage the primary actors to move to a negotiation strategy will result in 
a decrease in the time to conflict management initiation. 
 
Discussion 
Model One 
The results from the MNL analysis are generally supportive of the theoretical 
model. As predicted in Hypothesis 1 the probability of A initiating conflict management, 
decreases as A’s power increases relative to B, although this finding is not significant 
overall. There is, however, a significant and negative relationship between relative power 
and the probability of either or B initiating compared to both. The graph for A’s predicted 
probability of initiating in Figure 2 indicates that this relationship is strongest when A’s 
costs are highest, suggesting that there may be a cumulative relationship [interaction?] 
between increased costs and increased relative power.  
Hypothesis 2 predicted that increases in the costs incurred by actors, relative to their 
opponent would increase the probability of their initiating conflict management. Although 
the variable for economic costs is not significant for any pair of outcomes, the graphs in 
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 show that actors are more likely to initiate conflict management 
independently when the costs they incur are higher than the costs their opponent incurs. 
This is consistent with the expectations of Hypothesis 2. 
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As discussed above, it was not possible to test the effects of domestic dissent within the 
structure of Model 1. Consequently, Model 1 did not test Hypothesis 3. This hypothesis will 
be tested, therefore,  in Model 2, where comparison is between crises, rather than between 
actors within a single crisis.  
The graphs of the predicted probabilities for each outcome presented in Figure 7.2 
demonstrate that there is support for Hypothesis 4. For both A and B the probability of 
initiating conflict management increases as the relative political rights of the actor decrease. 
In the comparison between the probability of A and B initiating, this relationship is also 
statistically significant. It is also significant in the comparison of either A or B initiating, 
compared to both initiating.  
Model Two 
The results of the OLS regression offer mixed support for the model. Most 
importantly, the central theoretical contention that actors will fight longer in high salience 
crises is supported by the findings regarding the level of threat and its interaction with the 
contextual variable indicating the crisis to be part of an enduring rivalry. As hypothesized, in 
crises involving high levels of threat actors take longer to move from a conflictual to a 
negotiating strategy.  
The secondary hypotheses regarding actors’ tolerance for costs are less clear. As 
tested, the cost variables do not perform in the manner expected. In fact, both higher 
economic costs and fatality levels are associated with increased conflict duration. This result 
may be partly the result of multicollinearity, although VIF levels do not indicate that this is a 
problem. It is more likely an issue of model specification. The relationship between costs 
and crisis duration is operationalized in Model 2 as a direct relationship. However, 
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theoretically the model proposes that these relationships are conditioned by the importance 
actors place on the issue at stake.  
Expectations regarding actors’ sensitivity to experienced costs were tested. The 
findings support the theoretical proposition that international involvement in crisis 
management (measured by the variable number of previous conflict management attempts) 
and crisis intervention (UN operation) were consistent with the model and the latter 
measure was statistically significant. The findings regarding domestic sensitivity were not 
consistent with theoretical expectations. It was predicted that, as the political rights within a 
state increase, the leader’s sensitivity to the costs of conflict will also increase, resulting in a 
shorter duration of conflictual action prior to initiation of conflict management. This 
expectation is not supported by the empirical findings. In fact, the opposite relationship is 
present and significant. 
Finally, relative power was included as an indicator of the costs an actor might 
expect to incur through a conflictual strategy. The expectation is that actors who are at a 
power advantage, relative to their opponent, will expect to incur lower costs from the 
conflict and a lower probability of failure. The findings support this expectation, with 
increasing relative power resulting in longer conflicts prior to the initiation of management. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
 
This research focused on developing a preliminary model capable of explaining 
what compels actors involved in conflict situations to offer to negotiate. Although this 
initially appeared to be a relatively simple question, it required rethinking how we consider 
both conflict behavior and crisis management behavior and, perhaps more importantly, the 
link between the two. The theory developed in this research contends that, rather than 
discrete, independent events, these two behaviors can be considered as different strategies 
chosen to achieve a single goal.  
If this is, in fact, the case, then what explains actors’ choice of strategy? If the factors 
driving strategy choice can be identified, it should, become possible to better explain and 
predict the point in a crisis at which an actor would be most likely to change from a 
conflictual to a management strategy. This is the first question that is drives the model and 
analysis in this research:  In a crisis, when will an actor offer conflict management, and which actor will 
be the first to instigate negotiation? As the move to negotiation, or crisis management of any 
type, requires the willingness of both parties, however, a second question must also be 
addressed: In a crisis, when will an actor accept an offer of conflict management? 
An online model was developed to test the theory that it is the costs of continued 
conflict that drive the decision process at this stage in a crisis. That is, when faced with the 
choice between continued conflict or extending an offer to negotiate (or accepting an 
opponent’s offer), a decision maker’s choice is determined by his/her tolerance for the pain 
conflict costs inflict, rather than his/her belief regarding the relative benefits of resolution 
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through conflict versus bargaining. It should be stressed at this point that this model does 
not make any predictions regarding the ultimate outcome of a crisis, nor whether conflict 
management, once begun will be successful is achieving resolution. Rather, it seeks to 
explain the mid-crisis behavior of actors; what conditions create an environment in which 
crisis management is more likely to be offered and received.  
The model incorporates four central explanatory variables; relative power, issue 
salience, costs and sensitivity to those costs. Pain captures the impact of costs on the actor, 
and represents the combination of costs and sensitivity. Issue salience is theorized to 
determine the actor’s pain threshold for a specific crisis. Once the threshold is reached, the 
actor’s preference for a conflictual strategy over management changes. How soon the 
threshold is reached – the rate of pain accumulation is determined by the relative power of 
the actor, the intensity of the conflict and their sensitivity to those costs (regime 
characteristics). The final factor theorized to affect the actor’s strategy choice is the receipt 
of an offer from their opponent. 
 
Summary of Findings 
Experiment One   
In the first experiment, salience and information categories were manipulated, while 
the offer condition was held constant at no offer. Manipulation of the salience variable 
enabled testing of the first two hypotheses developed in the model.  
H1: Actors in low salience disputes will have a lower threshold for pain than those 
in high salience disputes, resulting in an earlier offer of negotiation. 
 
H2: Actors in highly salient disputes will sustain greater costs before offering to 
negotiate than those in low salience disputes.  
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The construction of the information condition was designed to test the theoretical 
hypotheses concerning the impact of sensitivity to domestic constraints on an actor’s 
sensitivity to the costs of conflictual action:  
H5: Higher levels of civil liberties and political rights will increase an actor’s 
sensitivity to conflict costs, thus decreasing the time to management initiation. 
 
H7: Within a crisis, all other things being equal, the actor with the highest relative 
civil rights and civil liberties will be more likely to initiate management. 
 
As discussed in Chapter IV (Experiment I) one of the difficulties involved in 
creating effective experimental scenarios is presenting information to subjects that can be 
related to their own understanding of political processes, while still enabling exploration of 
the key variables of interest. For this reason, in the experimental designs domestic 
constraints were operationalized as the level of public support for the crisis. This measure is 
both familiar to undergraduate subjects and captures the essence of the theoretical 
hypotheses, at least in the domain of democratic regimes.  
The findings relating to the extent of military action prior to negotiation support the 
expectations of Hypotheses 1 and 2. Not only did subjects in high salience conditions 
progress further into the conflict before offering negotiation, but they incurred a higher 
level of casualties. Both these findings are statistically significant at the .01 level. The 
findings regarding the effects of exposure to public opinion were not significant, nor did 
they provide a full test of the theoretical hypotheses as, in nearly all cases subjects choose to 
negotiate before public opinion fell below 50%. 
The most central test of the theory, however, relates to the contextual effects of 
costs. That is, that what influences decision makers choices is not objective costs, but pain -  
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the impact of those costs, translated through the conflict context and the wider political 
environment. In the post experimental questionnaire, subjects were asked to rate how 
“painful” they felt the conflict to be. The number of casualties experienced in each case (as 
a function of the event at which they chose negotiation and the experiment ended) was then 
divided by the self-reported evaluation of the pain to create a measure referred to as the 
“relative casualty value”. This variable indicates that, in high salience conditions, it took a 
significantly greater number of casualties to move a subject one unit of pain than it did in 
low salience conditions. In other words, a casualty incurred in a low salience condition 
created more pain for the decision maker. This finding supports the model’s central 
contention that the costs of conflictual action are not consistent across contexts. To ignore 
context, then undermines our ability to explain and predict the strategic choices made by 
actors involved in crises. 
Experiment Two  
In the second experiment salience and offer categories were manipulated, while the 
information condition was held constant at casualty only. Manipulation of the salience 
variable enabled cross-validation of the findings of experiment one. The consistency of the 
results between the two experiments provides a further indication of the strength of the 
effect of issue salience, as well as the stability of the salience manipulation used in both 
experiments. Issue salience proves to be an important predictor of the extent to which 
decision makers will pursue a conflictual strategy prior to offering, or accepting an 
opponent’s offer of, negotiation. Both Experiments I and II demonstrate that subjects 
involved in high salience conflicts tolerated significantly more casualties prior to negotiating 
than did those in low salience conflicts. These findings regarding issue salience support the 
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theoretical proposition that decision makers have pain thresholds associated with conflicts 
and that these thresholds are dependent on the importance they place on the issue at stake.  
The experimental findings regarding the effects of receipt of an offer were mixed. 
The model proposed that the effect of an offer would be conditional on the salience of the 
conflict. 
H3:  Actors in highly salient disputes will respond to an offer of negotiation from 
their opponent by fighting longer than they would have if no offer had been 
made.  
 
H4:  In low salient disputes, actors will respond to an offer of negotiation from an 
opponent by fighting for less time than they would have if no offer had been 
made.  
 
The findings of Experiment II supported the theoretical expectations for high 
salience conflicts but not low. In both conditions, the receipt of an offer from the opponent 
increased the duration of the conflict, although the relationship was not significant.  
Experiment Three 
 In the third experiment information and offer categories were manipulated, while 
the salience condition was held constant at high salience. Manipulation of the information 
variable enabled cross-validation of the findings of Experiment I. Manipulation of the offer 
condition enabled cross-validation with Experiment II.   
As with Experiment I, the results for the effects of information on the duration of 
conflict were in line with the model’s prediction that, when the majority of the public 
supported the conflict actor’s would fight longer. Majority public support also 
demonstrated, as predicted a tranquilizing effect on sensitivity to pain. On average, it took 
more casualties to induce the same level of pain in public opinion conditions than it did in 
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casualty conditions.  However, these findings were not significant, and, as discussed earlier 
provide only a partial test of the theories predictions.   
Consistent with the findings of Experiment II (high salience conditions), subjects 
did continue to fight longer when they received an offer of negotiation. There is also 
directional support for the theoretical contention that the reason for this effect is increased 
the resolve of a decision maker to “win” the conflict through use of force, thereby 
increasing his/her bargaining power at the final settlement stage. The findings regarding the 
effects of an offer were simpler in Experiment III than Experiment II, as the salience was 
held constant and high, thus eliminating the interactive effects predicted in the earlier 
experiment.  
Methodological Validity  
The question of the ability of experimental methodology to examine questions such 
as those raised in this model needs to be reiterated at this stage. The internal validity of 
experimentation as a means of testing hypotheses can be directly tested140 and is accepted by 
international relations scholars and political scientists more generally (Kinder and Palfrey 
1993). Debate remains, however, over the method’s external validity. Particularly relevant to 
this design is the criticism of the use of “novice” decision makers (undergraduates), as a 
proxy for “expert” decision makers141.  
The basis of this criticism lies in the belief that the greater experience and 
knowledge of policymakers and politicians influences their problem-solving processes and 
thus is reflected in their decisions (Wagner and Hollenbeck, 1998; Klein 1989; DeFong and 
                                                 
140 See discussion of the results of the manipulation checks of salience and information reported in this result 
sections of each experimental chapter. 
141 This discussion of external validity is taken from Geva and Skorick 2001. 
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Ferguson-Hessler 1987; Phelps and Shanteau 1978). This debate really boils down whether 
or not there is a substantive difference between how experts and novices process 
information.  The findings from several experiments suggest this is not the case. Experts 
have been found to be likely to use heuristics in a similar manner to novices (Gaeth and 
Shanteau, 1984; Christensen-Szalanski, et.al. 1983). The literature also suggests that, in 
general expert judgment is sub-optimal and naive and expert subjects demonstrate the same 
biases142. 
Such debate aside, it should also be noted that, much like formal models, 
experiments are designed primarily to tests hypotheses deduced from a given theory and 
model. Additionally, experiments can be employed to explore the consequences of 
controlled counterfactual scenarios that are derived from more loosely defined theories. 
Again, as with formal modeling, this gives us potential insight into what may happen, but 
did not yet actually happen, in the real world (Mook 1983). In cases where the experiment is 
an appropriate representation and thus test of the theory, the findings merely support the 
logic of the theory. “What we seek to generalize is not the findings but the theory” (Geva 
and Skorick 2001).  
Empirical Analysis 
 The experimental tests in Chapters IV, V, and VI demonstrate that the expectations 
of the model are supported in the controlled environment of the experiment. Whether these 
findings are consistent with an actor’s behavior in actual crises required the move to 
historically-based empirical data. This transition raised several difficult problems due to the 
type and structure of data available on international crises and disputes, relative to the 
                                                 
142 Discussed by Wright, Bolger and Rowe (1993: 217). 
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questions being asked. These problems and their solution are discussed in detail in Chapter 
VII. What needs to be kept in mind when evaluating the empirical results drawn from the 
constructed data set is that they are limited in their strength and generalizability by the 
limitations of the data itself.  
As discussed in the experimental chapters, there was no test of the effects of relative 
power on the initiation of crisis management, as in all conditions subjects “played” the 
United States. Chapter VII therefore provides the first test of Hypothesis 8: 
H8. Actors will reach their pain threshold more quickly when they are the weaker 
party in the dispute and more slowly when they are the stronger party. Thus, 
weaker actors are more likely to initiate management. 
 
Similarly, in order to limit the complexity of the experimental design and instructions there 
was no test of the hypothesis regarding the impact of international involvement: 
H6: International involvement in conflict management attempts will increase 
actors’ sensitivity to the costs of conflict, decreasing the time to management 
initiation. 
 
The chief purpose of the two empirical models developed in this chapter was to test 
the applicability of the theoretical model to real world crises. At the same time, however, it 
provided an interesting opportunity to compare findings across methodologies as many of 
the hypotheses tested in the three experiments are replicated in the empirical chapter.  
The first question addressed by the model is; in a crisis, when will an actor offer 
conflict management? There are two mechanisms in the model that predict the change from 
a conflictual to a negotiating strategy – the rate of accumulation of pain (slope) and the 
actor’s pain threshold. The rate of pain accumulation predicts which actor within an 
individual conflict will initiate conflict management. The pain threshold predicts at what 
point in a crisis conflict management will be initiated.  
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Model 1, dealing with pain accumulation, compares actors within crises and the unit 
of analysis is the crisis. Due to the nominal nature of the dependent variable, the most 
appropriate estimation model is one designed for categorical and limited dependent 
variables. As there is no theoretical or logical reason to expect that there is any underlying 
order to the three outcomes, the use of multinomial logit (MNL) is most appropriate (Long 
1997).  
Model 2 tests the predictions regarding the pain threshold of actors. Specifically, 
does issue salience affect pain tolerance, and is there a systematic difference in conflict 
duration (prior to the initiation of conflict management) as a function of issue salience.  In 
contrast to Model 1, the unit of analysis is the crisis actor(s) initiating conflict management 
in a specific crisis, and the comparison is between crises, rather than crisis actors. The 
dependent variable for Model 2 is the duration (in days) of the crisis prior to the first 
conflict management event initiated by a primary actor in the crisis. As the dependent 
variable in this second model is continuous, a simple OLS regression is a suitable estimation 
technique. 
Model 1: Within a crisis, which actor will initiate conflict management? The results from the 
MNL analysis are generally supportive of the theoretical model. As predicted, A (conflict 
initiator) initiating conflict management, decreases as A’s power increases relative to B 
(conflict target), although this finding is not significant overall. However, there is a 
significant and negative relationship between relative power and the probability of either A 
or B initiating, compared to both. Examination of A’s predicted probability of initiating 
indicates that this relationship is strongest when A’s costs are highest, suggesting that there 
may be a cumulative relationship between increased costs and increased relative power.  
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The model also predicts that increases in the costs incurred by actors, relative to 
their opponent would increase the probability of their initiating conflict management. 
Although the variable for economic costs is not significant for any pair of outcomes, the 
calculated predicted probabilities show that actors are more likely to initiate conflict 
management independently when the costs they incur are higher than the costs their 
opponent incurs. This is consistent with the expectations of the model. 
For both A and B the probability of initiating conflict management increases as the 
relative political rights of the actor decrease. In the comparison between the probability of 
A and B initiating, this relationship is also statistically significant. It is also significant in the 
comparison of either A or B initiating, compared to both initiating. This is consistent with 
the theoretical expectation that domestic constraints effect decision makers’ strategy choices 
in a crisis situation.  
Model 2: When will conflict management occur? The results of the OLS regression offer 
mixed support for the model. Most importantly, one of the central theoretical contentions 
that actors will fight longer in high salience crises is supported by the findings regarding the 
level of threat and its interaction with the contextual variable indicating the crisis to be part 
of an enduring rivalry. As hypothesized, in crises involving high levels of threat actors take 
longer to move from a conflictual to a negotiating strategy.  
The secondary hypotheses regarding actors’ tolerance for costs are less clear. As 
tested, the cost variables do not perform in the manner expected. In fact, both higher 
economic costs and fatality levels are associated with increased conflict duration143. The 
                                                 
143 This result may be partly the result of multicollinearity, although VIF levels do not indicate that this is a 
problem. It is more likely an issue of model specification. 
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relationship between costs and crisis duration is operationalized in Model 2 as a direct 
relationship. However, theoretically the model proposes that these relationships are 
conditioned by the importance actors place on the issue at stake.  
Expectations regarding actors’ sensitivity to experienced costs were tested. The 
findings support the theoretical proposition that international involvement in crisis 
management (measured by the variable number of previous conflict management attempts) 
and crisis intervention (UN operation) were consistent with the model and the latter 
measure was statistically significant. The findings regarding domestic sensitivity were not 
consistent with theoretical expectations. It was predicted that, as the political rights within a 
state increase, the leader’s sensitivity to the costs of conflict will also increase, resulting in a 
shorter duration of conflictual action prior to initiation of conflict management. This 
expectation is not supported in the empirical findings. In fact, the opposite relationship is 
present and significant. 
Finally, relative power was included as an indicator of the costs an actor might 
expect to incur through the use of a conflictual strategy. The expectation is that actors who 
are at a power advantage, relative to their opponent, will expect to incur lower costs from 
the conflict and a lower probability of failure. The findings support this expectation, with 
increasing relative power resulting in longer conflicts prior to the initiation of management. 
 
Discussion 
This research was motivated by the recognition that, even thirty years after Blainey 
noted that “for every thousand pages published on the causes of wars, there is less than one 
page directly on the causes of peace” (1973:3), there is still a large disconnect between the 
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study of conflictual crisis behavior and crisis management initiation. The theory and model 
developed were designed to provide an initial means of understanding crisis management 
initiation by conceptualizing crises as a dynamic process in which conflict and management 
are strategies for achieving a certain goal, rather than an end in themselves.  
The central question this conceptualization raises, therefore, is what factors 
influence actors’ strategy choices during a crisis. The theory proposes that, when it comes to 
the initiation of conflict management, it is costs that dominate the decision process. Or as 
Jackman so succinctly puts it; “for those confronted with a very restricted range of available 
alternatives extending from horrendous to merely awful, minimizing pain is the same as 
maximizing utility” (1993). That conflict costs are multifaceted and changing in nature, 
ranging from economic, to reputational to human, is widely accepted in the conflict 
literature. That their impact on a decision maker may be similarly variable is not taken into 
consideration. This research theorizes that the context in which conflict costs are incurred, 
both in terms of the salience of the conflict itself and the wider political environment in 
which the decision maker must act, influences the impact they have on the decision maker, 
and thus the timing of strategy change from conflictual to management.  
In order to capture this translation process the model employs the concept of 
“pain”, which is designed to incorporate not only the objective components of conflict 
costs, but the decision maker’s sensitivity to those costs. The experimental findings present 
strong support for this central contention that the perception of the “painfulness” of costs 
– in this case casualties- changes, relative to the salience of the conflict in which they are 
incurred. That the effect of costs is not consistent across conflict contexts is also supported 
by the empirical findings. 
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In conclusion, this research develops a theoretical model that enables exploration of 
the process of decision making in crises. Additionally, by broadening the treatment of costs 
by accounting for the effects of context, it demonstrates that if we really want to understand 
what motivates decision makers to come to the table and at least initiate conflict 
management, we need to consider more than the distribution of force and power. The 
importance placed on the issue of dispute and the wider political environment in which a 
decision maker works both effect their choices in crises and their response to the pain of 
conflict.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Below is the text of the instructional and background information inputted into the 
Dectracer and shown to the experimental subjects. The only variations in the information 
provided are those necessary to provide the manipulation of the relevant independent 
variables. The text of these sections is indicated by italics.  
 
Introduction 
You are the Chief Foreign Policy Advisor to the President of the United States of 
America. You are the last point of reference for the President on matters of foreign policy, 
and he relies on you to provide balanced and informed foreign policy advice.  
Your job today is to give the President advise on how best to resolve an ongoing 
military conflict between the US and Hendara over the Kell Islands, a group of islands in 
the south Atlantic.  
When advising the President you should consider the effect your choices will have 
on three key factors: domestic public support for the administration, the international 
reputation of the United States and national security. 
 
Background to the Dispute 
Since losing control of Kell Islands in 1833, Hendara has never recognized United 
States’ control over the territory. It challenged the legality of the 1947 US grant of 
independence in 1948, and again in 1953 and 1973. UN supported talks between Hendara 
and the US were attempted in 1966 and again in 1997, but were unsuccessful.  
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On May 12th of this year, the Hendaran Foreign Minister warned that if an 
agreement on the islands was not reach shortly Hendara would resort to “other means” to 
resolve the dispute. The UN Security Council called upon both parties to seek a diplomatic 
solution to the crisis. The US restated its position that Kell is an independent nation, and 
the Hendaran President declined to resume talks.  
Seven days ago the Hendaran army took control of Kell. The Kellites have called on 
the US to come to their aid, as they have no desire to become part of Hendara. The 
majority of Kellites are of European and American descent and have few historical or 
cultural ties to Hendara. In a televised speech the President promised to defend Kell and 
announced that the US had severed diplomatic ties with Hendara and imposed economic 
sanctions.  There has been widespread international condemnation of the invasion and 
support for the US position. 
Following the invasion, the Hendaran government resisted all requests from allies, 
regional organizations and the UN to negotiate a resolution to the crisis. They repeated their 
resolve to bring Kell under Hendaran control and landed additional troops to fortify their 
positions. The US Department of Defense advised the President that delaying military 
action would only make it more costly for the US to retake Kell. 
In light of these developments your President decided to commit the US to military 
action in order to regain Kell. 120 US marines and Special Forces landed on West Kell 
yesterday. They successfully established a beachhead and a full-scale US operation against 
the Hendaran forces is currently underway. 
Public opinion polls indicate that the majority of Americans believe the US action is 
justified and that US forces will quickly defeat the Hendarans. UN Secretary General, Kofi 
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Annan, has called upon both the US and Hendara to declare a ceasefire and seek a 
diplomatic solution.  
 
The United States and Kell 
 
[Low Salience] [High Salience] 
 
At the end of WWII, the US revoked its 
territorial claim to Kell. During the Cold War the 
4,700 square-mile territory of windswept, almost 
treeless bog and boulder was considered to be of no 
significant strategic value.  
 
The 54,000 Kellites, many of American and 
European descent, have continued their rural 
lifestyle, farming and raising sheep and alpaca for 
wool. They trade with Hendara and other near-by 
countries and also rely on their neighbors for 
advanced education and health care services.  
 
The United States has no official representative in 
Kell, but there is a small, unmanned 
communications post on the island used for satellite 
tracking.  
 
 
With the increasingly diffuse nature of security 
threats facing the US in the post-Cold War era 
Kell remains a strategically important military 
intelligence base. The significance of Kell has been 
demonstrated on numerous occasions since 
September 11th 2001. Its location enables the US 
military to maintain continuous, real-time satellite 
surveillance of politically critical areas, including 
the Middle East and South East Asia.  
 
Since 1947 the United States has maintained a 
garrison of approximately 80 marines at the 
capital, Port Lincoln. There is also a 
communications post on the island, used for 
satellite surveillance, which is manned by air force 
intelligence personnel.    
 
A recent geological survey indicates concentrated off-
shore petroleum deposits near the main island. 
Joint development of these reserves with the Kellites 
could decrease US dependence on Middle East oil. 
 
The 540,000 Kellites, many of American and 
European descent, live a primarily rural lifestyle, 
farming and raising sheep and alpaca for wool. 
They trade with Hendara and other near-by 
countries.  
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Background Information on Hendara 
Location 
Hendara, located in central South America, is approximately the same size as Texas. 
It is the largest country in the region.  
Economics 
Strategic advantage and trading power have put Hendara at a position of regional 
strength. The discovery of reserves of petroleum and uranium in the 1960s cemented 
Hendara’s regional influence. The US currently imports approximately 11% of its total 
petroleum imports from Hendara. Hendara is an important player in regional economics 
and a member of the Organization for Free Trade and Regional Cooperation (OFTRC). In 
1997 it became a member of the World Trade Organization.   
Politics 
Hendara became an independent democracy in 1983. However in 2000, after a 
bloodless coup, former military commander General Leopoldi became President for life. 
Hendara is a member of SAOS (South American Organization of States), a regional security 
organization.  
Military Capabilities 
Despite recent economic problems Hendara continues to spend a considerable 
portion of its annual revenue on the military. In 2007 its military expenditure was estimated 
at $US 8.9 billion, placing it 20th in the world.   
Hendara has a military capacity about 2/3rds the size of Great Britain, but 
considerably less sophisticated. They have 32 major warships, 1 nuclear-powered 
submarine, a 326-plane air force and some medium-range missile capability.  
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Crisis over the Kell Islands
PORT LINCOLN
MAIN ISLAND WEST KELL
HENDARA
USA
THE KELL ISLANDS
 
 
Decision Task 
As Chief Foreign Policy Advisor to the President of the United States, you must 
decide on the best strategy to resolve this crisis successfully. You will need to consider how 
both the American people and the international community will respond to your 
recommendations and the costs that result from them.  
During the crisis you will choose between  
1: Pursuing the same conflictual strategy your advisors have supported to this point.  
2: Offering to negotiate with the Hendarans.  
 
Your advisors from the Department of Defense, the State Department and the CIA 
will provide you with updates on the progress of the crisis after each decision. After each 
update you will again chose to either continue with your current strategy, or offer to 
negotiate with the Hendarans.  
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Included in this information will be the number of casualties (from the first day of 
fighting) that the US has suffered up to this point in the conflict. The Department of 
Defense (DoD) Cumulative Casualty Count will be updated after every event to reflect new 
casualties.  
[Public Opinion Conditions Only] 
You will also be given current public opinion data regarding the level of public support for the 
conflict. This data is being collected daily and the most recent report will be included with every update you 
receive from your advisors. 
 
[Offer Conditions Only] 
Please Note:  
If you receive an offer of negotiation from the Hendarans you do not have to accept it immediately. 
You have the option to continue with military action after an offer is made and choose to negotiate 
at a later time of your choosing. 
Once you advise the President to negotiate with the Hendarans, however, military action will stop 
until this option (negotiation) is fully explored. 
 
As you deal with this crisis and consider your options you should assume that: 
1. The United States has no major military commitments in progress. 
2. The United States is not involved in any military action or dispute with another 
country. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
EVENT SET 
Below is the text of the event set that experimental subjects worked through after 
reading through instructions and background information. After the first event subjects 
could choose to negotiate at any point. Text in bold and public opinion  levels was included 
in the public opinion conditions only. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. DAY 7 of the CONFLICT  
 
The US attack on the main island was launched earlier this morning. Ground troops moved toward the 
capital and airbase, making good progress despite resistance. The Hendaran air force initiated a 
coordinated air-ground attack and shot down 4 F-14s.  The remaining US planes were forced to cut 
short their mission without significantly impacting Port Lincoln or the Hendaran planes at Goose 
Green.   
 
DoD CUMULATIVE CASUALTY COUNT: 27 
 
CURRENT PUBLIC SUPPORT for CONFLICT: 63.9% 
 
Do you advise the President to: 
 
 Continue military action  Offer to negotiate with Hendara 
 
2 DAY 11 of the CONFLICT  
 
Ground forces have been advancing toward the capital Port Lincoln, still encountering organized 
resistance from the Hendaran and incurring casualties.   A squadron of F15s attacked the east Kell 
airstrip severely damaging 2 of the 4 runways. During the attack 3 US F-18 Hornets were shot down 
and 2 pilots lost at sea. Air reconnaissance is tracking a large Hendaran naval contingent moving 
toward Kell. 
 
DoD CUMULATIVE CASUALTY COUNT:  30 
 
CURRENT PUBLIC SUPPORT for CONFLICT: 66.3% 
 
Do you advise the President to: 
 
 Continue military action  Offer to negotiate with Hendara 
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3 DAY 13 of the CONFLICT  
 
Early this morning an Exocet air-to-surface missile sank the US destroyer Impellance. The 283-man 
crew lost 26 killed and 31 wounded. Ground forces moving toward Port Lincoln and Goose Green 
continue to engage Henaran forces and sustain casualties.  
 
The administration’s public affairs chief believes the President should visit the Impellance’s home port 
and deliver a speech supporting the troops and families and restating the importance of Kell for the 
security and protection of the US. 
 
DoD CUMULATIVE CASUALTY COUNT:  58 
 
CURRENT PUBLIC SUPPORT for CONFLICT: 61% 
 
Do you advise the President to: 
 
 Make a public statement  Offer to negotiate with Hendara 
 
4 DAY 15 of the CONFLICT   
 
The President received a warm reception from supporters on his arrival in San Diego. A group of anti-
war protestors were involved in minor scuffles with police. In a televised speech, the President referred 
to the soldiers, sailors, and marines on Kell as heroes, deserving of the full support of the American 
people. He also met in private with the families of those lost on the Impellance. 
 
A marine platoon involved in the advance on Goose Green yesterday, was caught in an ambush by 
Henaran soldiers disguised as civilians. After losing a critical number of soldiers they were forced to 
withdraw from the village they secured earlier.  
 
DoD CUMULATIVE CASUALTY COUNT:  63 
 
CURRENT PUBLIC SUPPORT for CONFLICT: 64.9% 
 
Do you advise the President to: 
 
 Continue military action  Offer to negotiate with Hendara 
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5 DAY 17 of the CONFLICT  
 
US forces continued to press the Hendaran occupying the main island as the Hendaran fleet came into 
range of the US fleet and the main Island. US ships and fighters sank a trawler, tanker and supply ship 
within hours of the fleet’s arrival. This leaves the Hendaran ground forces potentially short on food 
and ammunition.  
 
Extreme bad weather and low visibility has grounded US planes, leaving ground forces without air 
support or reconnaissance.  19 marines were killed and 22 soldiers wounded after being ambushed by 
Hendaran forces in a deserted village late yesterday afternoon. 
 
UN Secretary general Kofi Annan, meeting with high level US and Hendaran officials, again 
urged  Hendara and the US to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis.  
 
DoD CUMULATIVE CASUALTY COUNT:  78  
CURRENT PUBLIC SUPPORT for CONFLICT: 66.3% 
 
Do you advise the President to: 
 
 Continue military action  Offer to negotiate with Hendara 
 
6 DAY 18 of the CONFLICT   
 
A 12-man team of US Special Forces struck a Hendaran installation on Pebble Island, blowing up an 
ammunition dump and destroying 8 planes.   
 
After the severe damage sustained by its ships over the past two days, the newly arrived Hendaran fleet 
has withdrawn from Kell and all indications are it is retreating to Hendara. Military intelligence 
indicates that the Hendaran forces have been hard-hit by recent US attacks and face shortages of food 
and ammunition. 
 
 
DoD CUMULATIVE CASUALTY COUNT:  94 
 
CURRENT PUBLIC SUPPORT for CONFLICT: 67.5% 
 
Do you advise the President to: 
 
 Continue military action  Offer to negotiate with Hendara 
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7 DAY 19 of the CONFLICT   
 
The Pentagon has released reports to the media regarding US losses in the battle for Kell.  These 
figures do not include the loss this morning of a Chinook, shot down by a surface-to-air missile while 
ferrying troops to the main island where ground fighting continues. 16 soldiers drowned in the attack 
and another 12 were injured. 
 
 
DoD CUMULATIVE CASUALTY COUNT:  112 
 
CURRENT PUBLIC SUPPORT for CONFLICT: 72.7% 
 
Do you advise the President to: 
 
 Continue military action  Offer to negotiate with Hendara 
 
 
8 DAY 21 of the CONFLICT  
 
US forces have begun mobilization and late-stage planning for the main landing and invasion of the 
main Island. The weather around Kell remains extreme and fighters were grounded after the crash of 
an F14 and the loss of its pilot due to poor visibility. 
 
Media discussion of Hendaran President Leopoldi’s inability to generate regional support for 
his action is widespread. It is being interpreted as a sign that the international community 
recognizes the legitimacy of the US’s position, even if they will not openly support the use of 
force to settle the dispute.  
 
 
DoD CUMULATIVE CASUALTY COUNT:  135 
 
CURRENT PUBLIC SUPPORT for CONFLICT: 74% 
 
Do you advise the President to: 
 
 Continue military action  Offer to negotiate with Hendara 
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9 DAY 23 of the CONFLICT  
 
US forces began their main invasion, landing 5000 troops on the north-west coast of the main island 
this afternoon. The invasion started badly when a Chinook helicopter ferrying troops ditched into the 
sea drowning 36 US marines. Resistance onshore was minimal, however and a firm beachhead has been 
established. 
 
 
DoD CUMULATIVE CASUALTY COUNT:  163 
 
CURRENT PUBLIC SUPPORT for CONFLICT: 71% 
 
Do you advise the President to: 
 
 Continue military action  Offer to negotiate with Hendara 
 
10 DAY 25 of the CONFLICT  
 
A 72 plane Hendaran air assault has seriously damaged the US frigate Ohio whose crew lost 36 dead, 
44 wounded. 2 other US ships have been damaged. 16 Hendaran planes were shot down for the loss of 
2 US F-14s and 2 reconnaissance helicopters. 
 
Despite administration efforts, European allies remain reluctant to declare support for, or 
approval of the US decision to use military action to retake Kell.  
 
DoD CUMULATIVE CASUALTY COUNT:  183 
 
CURRENT PUBLIC SUPPORT for CONFLICT: 67.9% 
 
Do you advise the President to: 
 
 Continue military action  Offer to negotiate with Hendara 
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11 DAY 28 of the CONFLICT   
 
The US frigate, the Indiana was destroyed by Hendaran bombs late yesterday afternoon. Its crew lost 4 
dead and 10 wounded, but 6 attacking aircraft were shot down during the battle. 
 
 
DoD CUMULATIVE CASUALTY COUNT:  192 
 
CURRENT PUBLIC SUPPORT for CONFLICT: 62.7% 
 
 
Do you advise the President to: 
 
 Continue military action  Offer to negotiate with Hendara 
 
 
12 DAY 29 of the CONFLICT  
 
8 more Hendaran planes were shot down as the battle for Port Lincoln intensified. US marines and 
Special Forces meet unexpectedly stiff resistance from Hendaran soldiers entrenched in the hills 
around the port. Captured soldiers are in poor conditions, with very low reserves of supplies and, in 
many cases, insufficient clothing for the harsh winter weather.  
 
You receive word that the Organization of Southern States (OSS), meeting at the request of 
Hendaran President Leopoldi, voted not to condemn US actions. Hendara is a founding 
member of the OSS and such a public show of non-support indicates that Hendaran President 
Leopoldi is unlikely to be able to generate any regional military support for his actions against 
Kell and the US. 
 
DoD CUMULATIVE CASUALTY COUNT:  211 
 
CURRENT PUBLIC SUPPORT for CONFLICT: 64.5% 
 
Do you advise the President to: 
 
 Continue military action  Offer to negotiate with Hendara 
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13 DAY 30 of the CONFLICT  
 
In an early morning attack on US ships moving closer to Port Lincoln, the US destroyer Sheffield was 
hit, and sunk with 31 of the 170-man crew killed and 33 wounded. 5 more Hendaran fighters were shot 
down during the attack. Pentagon advisors calculate that the Hendaran air force is close to losing a 
critical percentage of its capability. 
 
 
DoD CUMULATIVE CASUALTY COUNT:  228 
 
CURRENT PUBLIC SUPPORT for CONFLICT: 61% 
 
Do you advise the President to: 
 
 Continue military action  Offer to negotiate with Hendara 
 
 
 
14 DAY 32 of the CONFLICT   
 
A US merchant ship was struck by an Exocet missile while delivering supplies to the aircraft carrier the 
Intrepid. The 170-man crew lost 12 men and 4 helicopters went down with the ship. Ground forces 
continue advance on Port Lincoln and a marine force is moving into position to attack Goose Green.  
 
 
DoD CUMULATIVE CASUALTY COUNT:  238 
 
CURRENT PUBLIC SUPPORT for CONFLICT: 54.5% 
 
Do you advise the President to: 
 
 Continue military action  Offer to negotiate with Hendara 
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15 DAY 33 of the CONFLICT  
 
10 more US warships arrived in Kell and aircraft losses have been replaced by a reinforcing squadron 
of F15s. The reinforcing squadron of 15 F14s more than makes up for current US losses, especially 
considering the Hendaran’s limited reserves of fighters. Marines approaching Goose Green have 
reported minor skirmishes with Hendaran forces. 
 
 
DoD CUMULATIVE CASUALTY COUNT:  251 
 
CURRENT PUBLIC SUPPORT for CONFLICT: 50.8% 
 
Do you advise the President to: 
 
 Continue military action  Offer to negotiate with Hendara 
 
 
16  DAY  36 of the CONFLICT  
 
250 marines stormed and captured Goose Green south of the beachhead established in 12 days ago. 
The larger 350 man force which attacked Darwin was unsuccessful in securing the town and forced to 
retreat back to the original landing point.  
 
During a regular session the European Parliament officially condemns Hendara’s invasion of 
Kell, although the stopped short of publically approving US action. Instead, they reiterated the 
member states’ commitment to the peaceful resolution of international disputes. 
 
 
DoD CUMULATIVE CASUALTY COUNT:  272 
 
CURRENT PUBLIC SUPPORT for CONFLICT: 49.4% 
 
Do you advise the President to: 
 
 Continue military action  Offer to negotiate with Hendara 
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17 DAY 37 of the CONFLICT  
 
3000 more troops were transferred from the aircraft carrier Intrepid to Goose Green and Darwin was 
finally captured. 1000 Hendaran troops were taken prisoner after surrendering to US forces, but marine 
and army units experienced casualties.  
 
 
DoD CUMULATIVE CASUALTY COUNT:  314 
 
CURRENT PUBLIC SUPPORT for CONFLICT: 44.3% 
 
Do you advise the President to: 
 
 Continue military action  Offer to negotiate with Hendara 
 
 
18 DAY 39 of the CONFLICT  
 
Approximately 5,000 US troops pressed east to take strategic high ground at Mount Kent and Two 
Sisters Ridge. This advance places US troops on the ground in a much stronger position to launch an 
attack on the capital Port Lincoln.  
 
There has been no indication that the Hendaran forces intend to withdraw from the island despite this 
setback. Information gained from captured soldiers, however, indicates that moral is low among the 
Hendaran soldiers and their living conditions have deteriorated due to disruptions in their supply lines.  
 
DoD CUMULATIVE CASUALTY COUNT: 366 
 
CURRENT PUBLIC SUPPORT for CONFLICT: 44.5% 
 
Do you advise the President to: 
 
 Continue military action  Offer to negotiate with Hendara 
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19 DAY 43 of the CONFLICT   
 
With a strong force well positioned east of Port Lincoln US commanders are advising the placement of 
additional forces at Port Fitzroy, 17 miles southwest of Port Lincoln. This would involve landing an 
additional 3000 forces from the aircraft carrier Defiance, currently 100 miles off the coast. 
 
US Commander General McDowns is confident that all the troops can be moved into position at Port 
Fitzroy with little risk. Troops on Twin Sisters Ridge and Mont Kent have successfully held and 
expanded their positions against several attacks by Hendaran soldiers over the past days. The fighting 
has been sporadic but intense. 
 
The United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan has again called upon both the US and 
Hendara to declare a ceasefire and seek a diplomatic solution.  
 
DoD CUMULATIVE CASUALTY COUNT: 384 
 
CURRENT PUBLIC SUPPORT for CONFLICT: 43.9% 
 
Do you advise the President to: 
 
 Continue military action  Offer to negotiate with Hendara 
 
20 DAY 46 of the CONFLICT   
 
US forces established a second beachhead when 3000 marines and army regulars from the fifth brigade 
were put ashore at Port Fitzroy. Despite the optimistic assessment you received, US forces suffered 
their worst casualties of the war in the process. Both large landing ships were set afire and destroyed 
with 76 killed aboard and 61 wounded. In other air attacks a smaller US landing craft was sunk and the 
frigate Ohio was damaged. Ground troops also met with stiff resistance from the entrenched Hendaran 
forces. 
 
DoD CUMULATIVE CASUALTY COUNT:  461 
 
CURRENT PUBLIC SUPPORT for CONFLICT: 44% 
 
Do you advise the President to: 
 
 Continue military action  Offer to negotiate with Hendara 
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21 DAY 47 of the CONFLICT   
 
Opposition politicians are questioning the administrations handling of the conflict. In particular they 
are calling on the President to make a clear statement of when the conflict will be over. 
 
DoD CUMULATIVE CASUALTY COUNT: 466 
 
CURRENT PUBLIC SUPPORT for CONFLICT: 39% 
 
Do you advise the President to: 
 
 Make a public statement  Offer to negotiate with Hendara 
 
 
22 DAY 49 of the CONFLICT   
 
In a televised speech last night the President set out the administration’s view on the progress of the 
conflict in Kell. He focused on how close US forces were to a decisive victory. Fighting continues 
around Port Lincoln and small skirmishes with isolated pockets of Hendaran resistance around Darwin 
and Goose Green have also been reported. 
 
 
DoD CUMULATIVE CASUALTY COUNT: 476 
 
CURRENT PUBLIC SUPPORT for CONFLICT: 43.8% 
 
Do you advise the President to: 
 
 Continue military action  Offer to negotiate with Hendara 
 
 
 
  
222
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 DAY 51 of the CONFLICT   
 
After intense fighting US forces are now in position to the east and southwest of Port Lincoln. In all, 
9000 US marines, Special Forces and army troops are in place to move against the 5000 Hendaran 
troops estimated to be in the Lincoln perimeter. Even your most skeptical military analysts agree that 
the fall of Port Lincoln is now inevitable.  
 
The European Parliament joined with the International Court in encouraging the US and 
Hendara to avoid unnecessary violence and settle their diputing claims diplomatically and 
according to international law. 
 
DoD CUMULATIVE CASUALTY COUNT: 479  
 
CURRENT PUBLIC SUPPORT for CONFLICT: 44.5% 
 
Do you advise the President to: 
 
 Continue military action  Offer to negotiate with Hendara 
 
 
24 DAY 53 of the CONFLICT   
 
Earlier today 3000 US soldiers and marines overran the Hendaran positions on the hills 12 miles west 
of the capital and pushed to within 7 miles of Port Lincoln. While shelling the capital, the US Cruiser 
McMahon was hit by a land-based Exocet.   
 
 
DoD CUMULATIVE CASUALTY COUNT: 497 
 
CURRENT PUBLIC SUPPORT for CONFLICT: 43.6% 
 
 
Do you advise the President to: 
 
 Continue military action  Offer to negotiate with Hendara 
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25 DAY 55 of the CONFLICT   
 
In the past three days 6000 US troops have seized Mount Tumbledown, Wireless Ridge and Mount 
William, reaching within 3 miles of the capital Port Lincoln. 
 
 
DoD CUMULATIVE CASUALTY COUNT: 511 
 
CURRENT PUBLIC SUPPORT for CONFLICT: 48% 
 
Do you advise the President to: 
 
 Continue military action  Offer to negotiate with Hendara 
 
 
 
26 DAY 57 of the CONFLICT   
 
Fighting continues in and around Port Lincoln. US marines penetrated the Hendaran perimeter in 
several key locations, effectively dividing their main force. 
 
You have received word from US commander in chief General McDowns that the Hendaran 
commander General Avianca has asked for a cease-fire. It is General McDown’s assessment that the 
cease-fire should be granted. 
 
DoD CUMULATIVE CASUALTY COUNT: 516 
 
CURRENT PUBLIC SUPPORT for CONFLICT: 49.2% 
 
Do you advise the President to: 
 
 Grant a ceasefire    Offer to negotiate with Hendara 
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Offer Condition Only 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 DAY 57 of the CONFLICT   
 
The remaining 8,978 Hendaran troops on Kell, including the 4500 in the Port Lincoln perimeter have 
surrendered. 
 
The war is over.  
 
DoD CUMULATIVE CASUALTY COUNT: 516 
 
CURRENT PUBLIC SUPPORT for CONFLICT: 49.6% 
 
Do you advise the President to: 
 
 Declare Kell a US protectorate, ignoring Hendara’s claim 
  
 Offer to negotiate with Hendara toward a mutually satisfactory resolution 
 
 
 
 
Event # and day will vary 
 
You have received word from the Hendaran Foreign Minister that President Leopoldi is interested in 
finding a negotiated solution to the conflict over Kell. He is prepared to agree to a cease-fire if the US 
will agree to negotiations. He requires an answer within the next 24 hours. 
 
 
 
Do you advise the President to: 
 
    Reject Leopoldi’s offer to negotiate a settlement and continue military action 
     
    Accept Leopoldi’s offer to negotiate a settlement 
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APPENDIX C 
 
POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRES FOR EACH EXPERIMENT 
Below are the post-experimental questionnaires completed by subjects at the end of 
the decision task. The wording of all questions was consistent across experiments whenever 
possible.  
 
Experiment 1: Post-Experimental questionnaire 
 
POST-CRISIS ASSESSMENT DOCUMENT 
 
 
1. How many days did the conflict last? 
 _____________ 
 
2. How many casualties did the US sustain during the conflict? 
 _____________ 
 
3. Overall, how did the American public and media respond to the conflict? 
 ____  supported the President 
 ____  did not support the President 
 ____  were indifferent to the conflict 
 
4. Overall, how did the international community respond to the conflict? 
 ____  supported the United States 
 ____  remained neutral regarding the conflict 
 ____  did not support the United States 
 
5. On a scale of 0 – 100, mark and number how painful you consider this conflict to 
be for the United States?  
     
0   _______________________|_______________________  100 
  No Pain          Extreme 
Pain 
 
6. What is the probability that you will resume military action to retake Kell? 
 
None at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Absolutely 
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7. To what extent would you prefer to resolve this conflict through military action? 
 
None at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Absolutely 
  
 
NATURE of the DISPUTE 
 
8. Overall, how important do you consider the conflict over Kell to be to the United 
States? 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Extremely  
Important   Important 
     
9. How important do you consider control of Kell to be to the national security of 
the United States? 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Extremely  
Important   Important 
    
10. How important do you consider maintaining control of Kell to be to the 
international position and reputation of the United States? 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Extremely  
Important   Important 
     
YOUR ASSESSMENT 
 
To what extent did the following factors influence the advice you gave to the President? 
 
11:  Military losses suffered by the United States 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very  
   Significantly 
   
12:  Loss of domestic support for the President. 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very  
   Significantly 
   
13: The importance of maintaining US control over Kell. 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very  
   Significantly  
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14:  Loss of international support for, and reputation of the United States. 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very  
             Significantly  
 
YOUR DECISION 
To what extent do the following considerations match your MAIN reason for offering to 
negotiate? 
 
15: Maintaining US control of Kell through military action was not worth the cost (in 
terms of lives, expenditure, public opinion and international opinion). 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very  
             Significantly  
 
16: The belief that negotiation should be attempted before engaging in military action. 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very  
             Significantly  
 
17: A desire to gain more information about what the Hendaran’s wanted, before 
committing to further military action. 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very  
             Significantly  
 
If you decided to negotiate for another reason please describe. 
 
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. If you had received a direct offer of negotiation from the Hendaran government 
would you have been more willing to consider recommending negotiating to the 
President? 
    ___   no 
    ___   yes, more willing to recommend negotiation 
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UNITED STATES’ INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS 
 
19. In general, how important is it for the United States to win conflicts such as this? 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Extremely  
 Important      Important 
  
 
20. In this conflict such as these, how many casualties do you consider to be a 
reasonable number for the US to sustain? 
 
   A  
 
21. What number of casualties would make you search for other means to resolve the 
conflict?  
 
   B 
 
22. On the scale below, mark and number how severe, “painful”, you consider the 
level of US casualties you indicated in box A to be. 
 
0   _______________________|_______________________  100 
  No Pain         Extreme Pain 
 
23. On the scale below, mark and number how severe, “painful”, you consider the 
level of US casualties you indicated in box B to be. 
 
0   _______________________|_______________________  100 
  No Pain         Extreme Pain 
 
Experiment II: Post-Experimental questionnaire 
 
POST-CRISIS ASSESSMENT DOCUMENT 
 
1. Consider the cost of military action, the risk of public disapproval of the President 
and death of US troops that were described in the events you just reviewed.  
 Given all these factors, mark and number on the scale below, how painful this 
conflict was to the United States.  
0   _______________________|_______________________  100 
  No Pain         Extreme Pain 
 
 
2. How many days did the conflict last? 
 _____________ 
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3. How many casualties did the US sustain during the conflict? 
 _____________ 
 
4. According to the instructions, an offer of negotiation from the Hendarans: 
 ____  would remain open for the duration of the conflict. 
 ____  had to be accepted immediately or it would be withdrawn. 
 
5. Overall, how did the majority of the American public and media respond to the 
conflict? 
 ____  supported the President 
 ____  did not support the President 
 ____  were indifferent to the conflict 
 
6. Overall, how did the international community respond to the conflict? 
 ____  supported the United States 
 ____  remained neutral regarding the conflict 
 ____  did not support the United States 
 
7. Before the President decided to use military action to retake Kell, had the US and 
Hendara tried to resolve the dispute through negotiation? 
 ____  yes 
 ____  no  
 ____  don’t know  
 
NATURE of the DISPUTE 
 
8. Overall, how important do you think this conflict is to the United States? 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Extremely  
  Important      Important 
  
9. To what extent would losing access to Kell and the US military base there negatively 
affect the national security of the US? 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Extremely  
  Important      Important 
  
10. Will the international reputation of the US be negatively affected if the US is not 
able maintain control of Kell and deter the Hendarans? 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Extremely  
  Important      Important 
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11. Did the offer of negotiation from the Hendaran government make you more willing 
to consider recommending negotiating to the President? 
    ___   no 
    ___   yes, more willing to recommend negotiation 
    ___  I did not receive an offer of negotiation 
 
  
YOUR ASSESSMENT 
To what extent did the following factors influence the advice you gave to the President? 
 
12:  Military losses suffered by the United States 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very  
             Significantly  
13:  Loss of domestic support for the President. 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very  
             Significantly  
 
14. Loss of international support for, and reputation of the United States. 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very  
             Significantly  
15. The importance of maintaining US control over Kell. 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very  
             Significantly  
 
16. Negotiation provides an opportunity to gain useful information about you 
opponent and their demands. 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very  
             Significantly  
 
17: The belief that military action can only be justified if all other means of resolving a 
conflict have been attempted. 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very  
             Significantly  
 
18. US forces had inflicted considerable damage on the Hendarans and this placed the 
US in a strong position to negotiate a settlement favorable to the US. 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very  
             Significantly  
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 Experiment III: Post-Experimental questionnaire 
 
POST-CRISIS ASSESSMENT DOCUMENT 
 
1. How many days did the conflict last? 
 _____________ 
 
2. How many casualties did the US sustain during the conflict? 
 _____________ 
 
3. Which of the following best describes your understanding of your option for 
responding to the Hendaran offer of negotiation? 
 ____  The offer would remain open for the duration of the conflict. 
 ____  I had to respond to the offer immediately [that event] or it would be 
withdrawn. 
 ____  I did not receive an offer from the Hendarans. 
 
4. Overall, how did the American public and media respond to the conflict? 
 ____  supported the President 
 ____  did not support the President 
 ____  were indifferent to the conflict 
 
5. Overall, how did the international community respond to the conflict? 
 ____  supported the United States 
 ____  remained neutral regarding the conflict 
 ____  did not support the United States 
 
6. On a scale of 0 – 100, mark and number how painful you consider this conflict to 
be for the  United States?  
     
0   _______________________|_______________________  100 
  No Pain         Extreme Pain 
 
7. What is the probability that you will resume military action to retake Kell? 
 
None at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Absolutely 
          
  
8. To what extent would you prefer to resolve this conflict through military action? 
 
None at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Absolutely 
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NATURE of the DISPUTE 
 
8. Overall, how important do you consider the conflict over Kell to be to the United 
 States? 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Extremely  
  Important      Important 
  
 
9. How important do you consider control of Kell to be to the national security of 
the United States? 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Extremely  
  Important      Important 
  
 
10. How important do you consider maintaining control of Kell to be to the 
international position and reputation of the United States? 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Extremely  
  Important      Important 
  
YOUR ASSESSMENT 
 
To what extent did the following factors influence the advice you gave to the President? 
 
11:  Military losses suffered by the United States 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very  
             Significantly  
12:  Loss of domestic support for the President. 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very  
             Significantly  
 
13: The importance of maintaining US control over Kell. 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very  
             Significantly  
14:  Loss of international support for, and reputation of the United States. 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very  
             Significantly  
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YOUR DECISION 
 
To what extent do the following considerations match your MAIN reason for offering to 
negotiate? 
 
15: Maintaining US control of Kell through military action was not worth the cost (in 
terms of lives, expenditure, public opinion and international opinion). 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very  
             Significantly  
 
16: The belief that negotiation should be attempted before engaging in military action. 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very  
             Significantly  
 
17: A desire to gain more information about what the Hendaran’s wanted, before 
committing to further military action. 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very  
             Significantly  
 
If you decided to negotiate for another reason please describe. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
18. Did the offer of negotiation from the Hendaran government make you more willing 
to consider recommending negotiating to the President? 
    ___   no 
    ___   yes, more willing to recommend negotiation 
    ___  I did not receive an offer of negotiation 
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